WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XXXIV, Number 2 January 1982

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Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, P.U.P., 3175 Princeton Pike, Lawrenceville, N.J. 08648.

U.S. and Canada—Individual subscribers: $12.50 per year; $22.00 for two years; $31.00 for three years. Institutional subscribers: $22.50 per year; $41.50 for two years; $55.00 for three years. Single issues: $6.50.

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Back Issues: WORLD POLITICS is available in microfilm or xerographic copies from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Two years after publication, complete volumes are available in microfiche form from KTO Microform, Route 100, Millwood, N.Y. 10546. Individual issues in the current and two preceding volumes may be ordered from Princeton University Press, 3175 Princeton Pike, Lawrenceville, N.J. 08648.

Advertising: Advertising Dept., Princeton University Press, 41 William St., Princeton, N.J. 08540.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI, Book Review Index, Combined Retrospective Index Sets* (CRIS), *Combined Retrospective Index to Book Reviews in Scholarly Journals, 1886-1974* (RSJ), *Public Affairs Information Service, Social Science Index*, and *Monthly Periodical Index*; it is abstracted and indexed in *United States Political Science Documents*. Abstracts of articles also appear in *Book Review Digest, Historical Abstracts, and International Political Science Abstracts*.

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WORLD POLITICS (ISSN 0043-8871). Published quarterly by Princeton University Press, 3175 Princeton Pike, Lawrenceville, N.J. 08648, January 1982. Vol. xxxiv, No. 2. Second Class postage paid at Trenton, N.J., and additional mailing offices. Send address changes to Princeton University Press, 3175 Princeton Pike, Lawrenceville, N.J. 08648. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

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WORLD POLITICS

Vol. XXXIV · January 1982 · No. 2

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ABSTRACTS

Professionalization as a Policy Choice: British Special Education in Comparative Perspective

By D. L. KIRP

Policies may be characterized in several distinct and competing ways: as best resolved by professional expertise, as fit for political determination, as properly treated in terms of legal rights, as appropriately subject to bureaucratic norms, or as sensibly left to market determination. The consequences of the choice among these frameworks is apparent in contrasting the British and American approaches to a particular policy issue, the education of handicapped children. That analysis reveals the utility of maintaining a policy scheme which builds in a tension among the competing frameworks.

Dependence on Foreign Investment and Economic Growth in the Third World

By R. W. JACKMAN

Estimates of the extent to which Third World countries have experienced slower rates of growth than those in the industrialized West since 1960 indicate a weak relation between initial wealth and subsequent economic growth that follows an inverted U-shape pattern: while the lowest growth rates are found among the poorest countries of the Third World, the highest growth rates are found not in the industrialized West, but in the wealthiest Third World countries. Drawing on contending arguments associated with modernization and dependency perspectives, the relationship between foreign investment and growth within the Third World is examined. Results undermine the idea that foreign investment inhibits growth, suggesting instead that flows of foreign investment may facilitate growth, especially among the initially wealthier countries of the Third World.

Security versus Access to Resources: Explaining a Decade of U.S. Ocean Policy

By F. LAURSEN

In an effort to explain U.S. ocean policy making, four analytical perspectives are applied: statism, international interdependence, bureaucratic politics, and domestic politics. In each of these perspectives, structures, processes, and actors are singled out that may have an impact on the policy-making process. The statist perspective can explain the importance of security interests and of access to resources, but it cannot account for some of the major changes in U.S. ocean policy during the 1970s. The perspective of international interdependence introduces some of the international constraints and explains the use of linkage strategies. But only domestic politics, which played an increasingly important role during the period, can explain the enactment of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. One of the general conclusions is that the policy-making system is structurally biased toward subnational and parochial interests. For this reason, policies of the world-order type are likely to be frustrated.

Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: Detente as a Problem of Stabilization

By K. GOLDMANN

What determines the occurrence, the scope, and the timing of major changes in foreign policy? In approaching this question, the author focuses on the "stabilizers" of foreign policy—that is, on the factors blocking, reducing the scope of, or delaying adaptation to new conditions, learning from negative feedback, or change in response to other disturbances. A framework for the analysis of stability in foreign policy is proposed. Several hypothetical stabilizers of foreign policies are discussed; they are grouped into administrative, political, cognitive, and international categories. Finally, the framework is applied to the problem of East-West détente.

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Women and Modernization Theory: A Decade of Feminist Criticism

By J. S. JAQUETTE

The literature on women's roles in economic and political development, and on the impact of development policies on women, illuminates both the process of modernization and the nature of male-female relations. Three main kinds of approaches—liberal modernization theory and its feminist critiques, socialist approaches and their feminist critiques, and an eclectic "female sphere" position that emphasizes the need to replace male-dominated theory and practice with female experience and values—are discussed. Each approach has a distinct view of the causes, consequences, and significance of women's inferior status during modernization, and each proposes different strategies of change. The clarification of theoretical differences suggests new opportunities for productive research with implications for public policy.

Two Views of Chinese Foreign Policy

By RONG ZHI

The authors of the two volumes under review present different approaches to an analysis of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. Gurtov and Hwang stress the importance of national interest and the interaction of domestic factors and foreign policy; they make a connection between China's sensitivity to external threat and its reaction to it, especially at times of domestic political weakness. Armstrong asserts that ideology has played a major role in Chinese foreign policy making. In both volumes, case studies are cited to support the authors' hypotheses. The article concludes that national interest is the principal factor determining the foreign policy of the PRC. Mao Zedong's thought continues to play an important role in Chinese thinking; it is concerned with domestic economic and social change and not with the internal affairs of other countries.

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION (Act of October 23, 1962; Section 4369, Title 39, United States Code). 1. Date of filing: September 23, 1980. 2. Title of publication: *World Politics*. 3. Frequency of issue: Quarterly. 4. Location of known office of publication: Corwin Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, Mercer, New Jersey 08544. 5. Location of the headquarters or general business office of the publishers: 41 William Street, Princeton, Mercer, New Jersey 08540. 6. Names and addresses of publisher, editor, and managing editor: Publisher, Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540. Editors, Cyril E. Black, Gerald Garvey, Lynn T. White, III, and Henry S. Bienen, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544. Executive editor, Elsbeth G. Lewin, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544. 7. Owner: Princeton University Press (a non-profit corporation without stockholders). 8. Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities: None. 10. A. Total number of copies printed (net press run): Average number of copies each issue during preceding 12 months, 5,100; single issue nearest to filing date, 5,100. B. Paid circulation: (1) Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors, and counter sales: None. (2) Mail subscriptions: Average number of copies each issue during preceding 12 months, 3,994; single issue nearest to filing date, 4,024. C. Total paid circulation: Average number of copies each issue during preceding 12 months, 3,994; single issue nearest to filing date, 4,024. D. Free distribution by mail, carriers or other means: Average number of copies each issue during preceding 12 months, 120; single issue nearest to filing date, 120. E. Total distribution: Average number of copies each issue during preceding 12 months, 4,144; single issue nearest to filing date, 4,144. I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete. William C. Becker, Business Manager, Princeton University Press.

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

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PROFESSIONALIZATION AS A POLICY CHOICE:

British Special Education in Comparative Perspective

By DAVID L. KIRP*

I. Policy Frameworks

THE way a policy problem gets defined says a great deal about how it will be resolved. This link between definition and solution, question and answer, is most obvious with respect to the *scope* of an issue. Asking, for example, whether the welfare allowance for winter coats should be increased generates a reply different in kind from a query about the rightness of any earmarked welfare allowance, or one comparing welfare and job-training programs. The *framework* within which a policy issue is imbedded involves a less familiar but equally significant policy choice; here again, conceptualization shapes response. In this essay, I shall examine the consequences of choosing among policy frameworks, by contrasting British and American approaches to the education of handicapped youngsters and, more generally, assess the impact of different social policy strategies.

Contemporary social policy is dominated by four distinct ways of characterizing an issue.[1] A given policy question may be regarded as best settled by recourse to professional expertise, and in that event,

* Paper prepared for the Program in Law, Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance, Stanford University. The advice and comments of colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic—Michael Adler, Eugene Bardach, David Cohen, Maurice Kogan, Henry Levin, Stuart Maclure, Paul Peterson, and Martin Trow—are gratefully acknowledged.

[1] The discussion of frameworks borrows at least in spirit from other and very diverse attempts to examine the implications of choosing among ways of ordering the world, including: Brian Barry, *Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970); Michael Sherwin, *Logic of Explanation in Psychoanalysis* (New York: Academic Press, 1969); Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Judith Shklar, *Legalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964); E. P. Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975); Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973); Paul Diesling, *Five Types of Decision and Their Social Conditions* (Urbana: Illinois Press, 1962); Murray Edelman, *Political Language: Words That Succeed and Policies That Fail* (New York: Academic Press, 1977); Morris Kline, *Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Michael Polayni, *Personal Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958); Charles Lindblom and David Cohen, *Usable Knowledge: Social Science and Social Problem Solving* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

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expert say prevails. Alternatively, the question may be resolved by relying on political judgment, either through ideologically driven clashes or through the give-and-take of bargaining among the interested parties; by stressing legal norms, especially the norm of fair decision-making process; or by depending on bureaucratic standards of consistency and internal accountability. Lurking in the background is a fifth possibility, the determination to let the market, subject to varying degrees of regulation, fix policy outcomes.

These alternatives—professionalization, politicization, legalization, bureaucratization, and market regulation—coexist uneasily with one another. They are pursued by different policy actors for different reasons. They have distinctive potentialities and equally distinctive pathologies, and tend to fall in and out of favor with policy makers over time. Choosing among these policy frameworks affects the policy system and, vitally, the supposed beneficiaries.

We routinely link certain frameworks with particular policy domains. The treatment of criminals, for example, seems essentially a legal issue, while the care of thalidomide victims depends on medical and psychological expertise. Yet such categorizations offer only partial truths. Because crimes are defined by rules, and because a rule-bound process determines guilt or innocence, law is a major—but not the only—framework applied in treating criminals. Talking about treatment as rehabilitation introduces professional concerns; the bureaucratic structure of the prison system may make alternative treatments infeasible; and politics settles both what we mean by criminal behavior and whether resources are devoted to deterrence or rehabilitation. The thalidomide case is similar. Although the care of thalidomide victims demands professional knowledge, the treatment itself depends on the legal rights enjoyed by the victim, the institutional structure within which help is provided, and the balancing of the claims of this group for political attention against those of another class of victims.[2]

As these illustrations suggest, few policy problems get defined exclusively in terms of one or another framework. They draw instead on elements of two or more frames. Although the several frameworks can sometimes be brought into harmony—students of policy implementation consistently remind us that attention to how organizations

[2] The particular case of thalidomide victims is analyzed in depth in Jonathan Bradshaw, *The Family Fund: An Initiative in Social Policy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).

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work, for example, properly informs the analysis of any complex policy issue[3]—conflict among frameworks, not harmony, is the norm.

These frameworks are not merely descriptive devices. They also represent alternative values. Professionals regard expertise as a superior form of problem solving because it eschews petty partisanship, while the ideologue disparages claims of expertise as concealing political judgments. Bureaucratic norms are said to secure the fairness that results from checking discretion; on the other hand, legal standards supposedly provide a firmer protection against arbitrariness precisely because they permit careful inquiry into specific circumstances.[4] Such disagreements cannot be settled by recourse to an agreed-upon metric, for it is the metric itself that is the focus of contention. Choosing among these frameworks of analysis means selecting among ways of ordering the relevant policy universe.

Since each of the frameworks has its own built-in constituency with a special stake in the policy, this is no abstruse matter. Legalization is the lawyer's lifeblood. Organized interest groups see issues in predominantly political terms. Doctors and caseworkers routinely define questions as depending on expertise for their resolution. It is a trait of the vocation that being a lawyer or an administrator or a lobbyist means, among other things, that one regards problems in a distinctive light.

These distinctions among frameworks matter a great deal. They determine what will be provided, by whom, and on what terms. They fix the nature and extent of regulatory control. They shape how varied the good or service will be, and identify who will benefit. Defining a policy problem primarily in terms of rights creates a different client class, with a different stake, than does treating the issue as one fit for professional discretion or as the ministerial responsibility of a bureau.[5] Because choices among frameworks embody choices about the allocation of power, how these choices are made becomes a central policy question.

Once a policy has been framed in a particular way, change usually comes slowly and at the margin. Here, as in so many aspects of the

[3] See for example, Eugene Bardach, *The Implementation Game* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977); Erwin Hargrove, *The Missing Link: The Study of Implementation in Social Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1975); Michael Lipsky, *Street-Level Bureaucracy* (New York: Russell Sage, 1980).

[4] For thoughtful treatments of this tension between legalism and bureaucratic norms, see Robert Kagan, *Regulatory Justice* (New York: Russell Sage, 1969), and Philippe Nonet, *Administrative Justice* (New York: Russell Sage, 1967).

[5] See generally, John Chubb, *The Politics of Energy: Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1981).

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policy process, incrementalism embodies the norm: professional judgment may count for somewhat more or less over time, the significance of procedural protections varies, and so forth. More marked and ubiquitous changes can be detected in the longer run. Legalism has generally grown substantially more important in the United States during the past two decades while bureaucratic standard-setting—particularly important during the 1970s in the areas of environmental protection, occupational safety, and consumer product regulation—has lately fallen from favor.[6] Comparable trends are evident in Britain, though they are both more recent and more tentative.

Why do these transformations occur? The explanations are sometimes issue-specific. New technologies, new ways of accomplishing a desired result, may prompt a realignment: the emergence of a promising professional cure for some social malady encourages increased dependency on expertise. Factors transcending any particular policy issue are also relevant: a shift in the political climate, for example, or newly felt constraints on the budget of the public household[7] may prompt what amounts to a shift in paradigms. Each of these factors has been at work in the United States and Britain. Yet, because policy issues are usually tacitly understood as inextricably linked to a given framework, it is often hard to reconceptualize the question in less incremental terms. Only by embracing a different kind of perspective, one that relies on historical or comparative insight, does it become apparent that a vital policy choice has indeed been made.

The evolution of educational policy for handicapped children in Britain, usually and euphemistically termed "special education," nicely illustrates these propositions.[8] In Britain as in the United States, de-

[6] On the spread of legal norms, see Philip Selznick, *Law, Society, and Industrial Justice* (New York: Russell Sage, 1969). On deregulation, see Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan, *Going by the Book: Enforcement of Protective Regulation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981); Charles Schultze, *Public Use of Private Interest* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1977); James Q. Wilson, ed., *The Politics of Regulation* (New York: Basic Books, 1980).

[7] The term is drawn from Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradiction of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

[8] The discussion of British special education policy rests heavily on interviews with key figures in the fields. These interviews assume special importance because of the paucity of relevant writing. In most instances, interviewees were unwilling to be quoted for the record, and for that reason specific interviews are not cited in the notes. Those interviewed include: Naomi Angell, Children's Legal Centre; John Bagley, Principal, Department of Education and Science (DES); John Banks, Assistant Secretary, DES; Professor Tessa Blackstone, Institute of Education, University of London; W. K. Brennan, former Assistant Education Officer for Special Education, Inner London Education Authority (ILEA); Kenneth Burgin, Principal, Economic Analysis, DES; Geoffrey Cockerill, former Undersecretary, DES; George Cooke, Vice-Chairman,

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termination of handicap and prescription for handicapped youngsters were historically left to the medical profession. During the past 30 years, other professionals, notably psychologists and educationalists, have contended for dominance. The rightness of defining the issues almost exclusively in terms of professional expertise was not, however, called into question in Britain until very recently, and then only timidly. British policy statements have been largely dismissive of or inattentive to alternative frameworks which, by contrast, have enjoyed greater acceptance in the United States: restructuring the bureaucracy that delivers services, bringing the handicapped into the ordinary educational system as a part of an ideologically driven push for social integration, and enabling the handicapped significantly to shape their own treatment regime.

These alternatives surfaced in Britain between 1974 and 1978, during a period of intense policy review of the education of the handicapped undertaken by a government-appointed Committee of Enquiry. The concept of integration found its way into British law, but in toothless form, and the other alternative frameworks were effectively rejected. The Committee of Enquiry was familiar with these options. A committee delegation came to the United States, to learn first-hand about the approach taken in the Education for All Handicapped Children Act;[9] that legislation expands federal and state control over local prac-

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Warnock Committee, Secretary General of Society of Education Officers, former Chief Education Officer, Lincolnshire; Dr. D.M.C. Dale, Institute of Education, University of London; John Fish, Staff Inspector for Special Education, Her Majesty's Inspectorate (HMI); Doreen Flint, National Society for Mentally Handicapped Children and Adults; Richard Gray, The Spastics Society; John Hedger, Assistant Secretary, DES, and Secretary to the Warnock Committee; Dr. Seamus Hegarty, National Foundation for Educational Research, Slough; Professor Jeffrey Jowell, Faculty of Law, University College, University of London; Dr. Harry Judge, Department of Education, Oxford University; Professor Maurice Kogan, Department of Government, Brunel University; Peter Litton, Undersecretary, DES; Eric Lord, HMI; Stuart Maclure, Editor, Times Educational Supplement; Bert Massey, Royal Association for Disablement and Rehabilitation (RADAR); Peter Mitchell, RADAR; Dr. Peter Mortimore, head of educational research, ILEA; Peter Newell, Advisory Centre for Education; Patricia Pearce, parent governor, Alexander Priory, London; Morag Plank, Campaign for the Mentally Handicapped (CMH); Philipa Russell, Voluntary Council for Handicapped Children; Stanley Segal, Ravenswood Village Community, Berkshire; Tony Smythe, National Association for Mental Health; Barry Taylor, Chief Educational Officer, Somerset; Felicity Taylor, education writer, London; Winifred Tumin, parent member of Warnock Committee; Lord Vaizey, professor, Brunel University; Mary Warnock, Chairman of Warnock Committee, and senior research fellow at St. Hughes College, Oxford; Professor Klaus Wedell, Institute of Education, University of London; Shirley Williams, former Secretary of State, DES; Allison Wortheimer, Campaign for the Mentally Handicapped; Lady Janet Young, Minister of State, DES. Marleen Fouché assisted with the interviewing.

[9] Public Law No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975), codified at 20 USC §§1401-1461.

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tice, elaborates substantive and procedural rights, and establishes a statutory preference for integration. The British committee chose instead to preserve a professionalized approach, and although its proposals have subsequently been modified by the government, nothing approaching the nature of the American undertaking has been suggested.

Why should such differences in approach arise? And to what effect? Succeeding sections of this essay will recount the history, contrasting it both with British social policy in other spheres and with the American experience in special education. In the concluding section, I will consider the impact of the choice of a policy framework on the lives of children.

II. The Evolution of British Special Education Policy

Recent policy reviews—including the report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Education of Handicapped Children and Young People (1978)[10] and the Government's White Paper, *Special Needs in Education* (1980)[11]—confirm the longstanding perception of British special education as being almost exclusively the province of specialists, an institutionally marginal service isolated from ordinary schools, and managed by a specialist group.

A. The Rise of a Professionalized Service

Special education was an afterthought in the history of publicly provided schooling in Britain.[12] The first schools for the handicapped—asylums for idiots, academies for the deaf and dumb—were established a century before the Education Act of 1870, but that Act made no provision for handicapped youngsters. Over the next 50 years, the law was amended on a handicap-by-handicap basis, first to permit and then to require that local education authorities assume responsibility for providing basic schooling for these children. Change in law proceeded slowly, and change on the ground was slower still. By 1909, for instance, only one-third of all authorities were providing schooling for the retarded. Twenty years later, the Mental Deficiency Committee

[10] *Special Educational Needs: Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Education of Handicapped Children and Young People* (London: H.M.S.O., 1978) [hereafter referred to as Warnock Report].

[11] *Special Needs in Education* (London: H.M.S.O., 1980) [hereafter referred to as White Paper].

[12] The historical material is drawn primarily from Warnock Report (fn. 10), 8-36, and D. G. Pritchard, *Education and the Handicapped: 1760–1960* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963).

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established by the Ministry of Education reported that just one-sixth of all retardates had been identified and assigned to special schools, at a time when almost all other youngsters attended at least primary school.[13]

Gradual changes in the legislation did not affect the basic pattern of provision. While ordinary education was primarily a state-provided enterprise, state-subsidized private schools were the main providers of services for particular kinds of handicap. This remains true today, as four out of five blind children, approximately half the deaf children, and one-third of those labeled as maladjusted are privately schooled.[14] Even when education for the handicapped was publicly supplied, it was a separate and distinct service, usually delivered in special schools whose quality depended upon the resources a local authority chose to allocate. A series of reports issued by the Ministry of Education beginning in the 1920s recommended bringing special and ordinary students together in order to avoid the stigma of special treatment.[15] The reports offered only advice and not mandates. In this instance, the advice went ignored since local authorities were more interested in providing some distinct type of schooling for handicapped youngsters.

The Education Act of 1944, which reshaped the system of British education generally, made the terms on which special education would be offered more coherent. That Act treats "pupils who suffer from any disability of the mind or body" as a single group. Local authorities are obliged to ascertain who these children are, to determine their disability primarily through medical examination, and "to provide for the education of a pupil with a serious disability in an appropriate special school, or any other suitable school where this was impractical or the disability was not serious."[16]

During the parliamentary debate over the 1944 Act, the government spokesman declared that "we desire to see as many children as possible retained in the normal stream of school life";[17] in 1946, a Ministry of Education report envisioned a special education system reaching as

[13] *Report of the Joint Departmental Commission on Mental Deficiency* (London: H.M.S.O., 1929).

[14] Patricia Rowan, *What Sort of Life?* (Slough: National Foundation for Educational Research, 1980).

[15] *Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Problems Relating to Partially Sighted Children* (London: H.M.S.O., 1934); *Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Problems Relating to Children with Defective Hearing* (London: H.M.S.O., 1968); *Report of the Joint Departmental Commission on Mental Deficiency* (London: H.M.S.O., 1929).

[16] Education Act (1944), 7 and 8 George VI, C. 31 (London: H.M.S.O.).

[17] Hansard, vol. 398, col. 703 (March 21, 1944).

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many as one-sixth of British youngsters.[18] Yet special education developed very differently, as a distinct service reaching a tiny fraction—fewer than 2 percent—of British schoolchildren.

The structure of the Act helps in explaining this outcome. Because the handicapped child must be medically diagnosed, problems concerning a child's school experiences are less likely to be regarded as falling within the province of special education than the more traditional maladies: it is rickets, not reading deficiencies or rebelliousness, which most readily command attention. The Act makes special provision the norm, linkages to the ordinary system the exception; this structure also suggests a regime of narrowly defined concerns.

Institutional and professional preferences have reinforced these structural and legal tendencies, giving rise to a small and separate service. No one plumped for a vastly expanded conception of special children who would largely be integrated into the regular system. In a straitened postwar economy, priorities had to be determined. Children most evidently in need also seemed most deserving of help, and separate institutions appeared essential for this group. Those responsible for special education within the government set about persuading local authorities that there existed an area of expertise called "special education," and that programs should be established for each of the ten diverse categories of handicap—ranging from educationally subnormal to blind, maladjusted to delicate—specified in departmental regulations.

The advocates of special education created a job market for educational psychologists as professionals uniquely able to identify and distinguish certain kinds of special students; they fostered the development of distinct institutions walled off from ordinary schools. These institutions had their own staffing patterns and resource requirements, both extremely generous in comparison with the ordinary system. The advocates' success is apparent in the increase of specialist professionals and special students. Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Education in 1959 for minimum numbers of specialist professionals[19] were withdrawn in 1973, for by then every authority had exceeded the Ministry's recommendation.[20] The number of special students also grew. When compared with the ordinary population, they remained a minuscule and almost invisible group (a circumstance reinforced by their separation), but the increase in the numbers of students identified as special

[18] *Special Education Treatment* (London: H.M.S.O., 1946).
[19] *The Handicapped Pupils and Special Schools Regulations* (London: H.M.S.O., 1959).
[20] *Staffing of Special Schools and Classes*, Circular 4-73 (London: H.M.S.O., 1973).

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—from 38,499 in 1945 to 58,042 in 1955, and to 184,996 in 1979—is impressive evidence of system building.[21]

This newly strengthened special system identified its clientele in essentially medical terms. It attributed behaviors to individual organic deficiencies, whether the behavior in question was maladjustment or blindness. The increasing emergence of a psychological orientation among professionals dealing with certain kinds of handicaps, notably the maladjusted and the "moderately educationally subnormal," altered the specification of the illness but not the underlying perception that a personal disorder was at work. Individual cure or, more likely, adjustment to a less-than-normal adult life, became the objective of the special system. A youngster entering the system of special education was unlikely to return to ordinary school. Only after leaving school, if at all, might he disappear into the general population.

The Education Act of 1944 and subsequent professional efforts solidified a framework that defined the needs of children who differed from the norm as a professional concern. Central government had a sizable role in spurring these developments. While the government does not allocate resources for particular operational expenditures, it does approve school building requests. The Education Ministry explicitly favored special school construction during the 1950s; thus, between 1950 and 1977, the number of such schools increased from 685 to 1882.[22] A series of circulars and reports concerning aspects of special education, issued regularly since the 1950s, reinforced the professional character of the service. Some of the government reports—*Units for Partially Hearing Children*, for instance, or *Diagnostic and Assessment Units*[23]—set the standard for good practice in particular areas. Others, for example the *Report of the Committee on Maladjusted Children*,[24] identified particular categories of handicap: that report defined maladjustment in the psychological language characteristic of the 1950s. Still others, such as the survey of special units for "behaviorally disturbed" students undertaken in 1978, catalogued and implicitly legitimated new developments in special education.[25] Reports by the Department of Education and Science (DES) also signaled the relevance of resource constraints as affecting the capacity of local authorities to take up new ideas.[26]

[21] Warnock Report (fn. 10), 22; White Paper (fn. 11), 8.
[22] Warnock Report (fn. 10), 121.
[23] *Units for Partially Hearing Children* (London: H.M.S.O., 1966); *Diagnostic and Assessment Units* (London: H.M.S.O., 1968).
[24] *Report of the Committee on Maladjusted Children* (London: H.M.S.O., 1955).
[25] *Behavioural Units* (London: H.M.S.O., 1978) 42.
[26] *Staffing of Special Schools and Classes* (fn. 20).

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These reports, although advisory, were not without effect. In British educational policy, orders are rare and "government by circular" is the norm.[27] The system is perceived by its participants as depending on hint and signal, consultation and suggestion. Advice from central government commands at the least a respectful audience. A DES publication is followed by queries from Her Majesty's Inspectorate (HMI) during visits to local authorities, discussions with the national groups who regularly consult with DES, and the like. A DES publication will routinely stir discussion among the specialists, and may lead authorities to appoint working parties that make policy recommendations in light of the national advice. Policy change takes place gradually on an authority-by-authority basis. In the case of special education, policy reform was tied directly to expertise.

The clearest example of centrally promoted change is Circular 2/75, which addressed the assessment of handicapped children.[28] The 1944 Act had required the certification of a doctor to identify a child as needing special education; the circular could not, of course, countermand the law. Yet the assessment forms that the circular specified gave effective control to the psychologist, who would coordinate the appraisals of a number of professionals, including the doctor and the classroom teacher, and also gather information from parents. The circular codified what was regarded as sensible practice and, in a tone more directive than is customarily used, urged its application in all authorities. Circular 2/75 solidified the professional claim to competence, even as it altered the balance of authority among professionals within the special education system.

Debate over educational policy in Britain often assumes the form of discussions about sound educational practice, and in such an environment the role of Her Majesty's Inspectorate becomes crucial. HMI serves a dual purpose. Through its advising, HMI is supposed to improve local practice. The inspectorate also brings information about existing practices to the attention of the central government and recommends policy changes. With respect to special education, HMI evaluations substantially affected the substance of departmental advice, and as consultant to local authorities, HMI took an unusually directive stance. Although the inspectorate in effect competes with a local educational authority's own advisers for attention with respect to other aspects of

[27] See generally, Bryan Keith-Lucas and Peter G. Richards, *A History of Local Government in the Twentieth Century* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1978); Robert E. Jennings, *Education and Politics* (London: Batsford, 1977).

[28] *The Discovery of Children Requiring Special Education and the Assessment of Their Needs*, Circular 2/75 (London: H.M.S.O., 1975).

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schooling, HMI had an effective monopoly on special education expertise until the reorganization of LEAs into larger units with their own special-education experts.

By 1971, when a Committee of Enquiry was established by the Secretary of State for Education and Science to study children's special educational needs, those needs had come to be defined almost exclusively in terms of specialist expertise. The field itself had been carved up, with experts for particular types of physical handicap, degrees of retardation, specimens of maladjustment. The determination that all children could benefit from professional intervention had led DES in 1970 to assume responsibility for some 34,000 severely handicapped children, previously the charge of the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS).[29] As a result, professional staff interested in education supplanted the lay care that DHSS had historically provided, and local authorities' special education activities were extended to a new clientele.

Suggestions from advisory committees composed of fellow professionals led DES to recommend policy changes, but these involved tinkering with an enterprise that was considered to be essentially sound. From the viewpoint of DES, its specialist advisers, and practitioners in the field, progress in special education meant continuing the expansion of a distinct enterprise, aimed particularly at reaching handicapped children below formal schooling age and older than age 16.

B. THE REJECTED ALTERNATIVES

In molding special-education policy in Britain, professionalism enjoyed near-absolute pre-eminence as a policy frame. Counterforces—alternative frameworks for thinking about policy—long went unheard in policy discussions. Neither politics nor law nor the market have effectively challenged professional hegemony.

1. *Politics.* Little political attention was paid to special education. There were no parliamentary calls for review of the legislative structure, even at a time when handicapped groups working with the parliamentary All Party Disablement Conference were pushing for new legislation concerning accessibility to public buildings and government job quotas for handicapped persons. Neither at the national nor at the local level of government did the treatment of handicapped pupils become an issue remotely comparable in importance to the treat-

[29] Education (Handicapped Children) Act 1970, Elizabeth II, C. 52 (London: H.M.S.O.); *The Last to Come In* (London: H.M.S.O., 1975).

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ment of a similarly small group, nonwhite students.[30] Policy was effectively formed by administrators and professionals; and even where politicians got involved in particular communities, they acted on behalf of professionally defined interests. "Those advising the politicians," a student of social service budget-setting observes, "are themselves professionals. There is a heavy professional social work involvement both on the demand and the supply side."[31]

Voluntary organizations concerned with particular handicapped groups, such as the Royal National Institute for the Deaf and the Spastics Society, do exist; but these are not interest groups. For one thing, they are typically charitable enterprises, not membership organizations, designed to serve but not to represent a particular group. They are primarily engaged in improving the lot of handicapped individuals and their families by offering support, not by calling for government action; indeed, their legal status as charitable organizations formally precludes them from acting otherwise. For another thing, the special-education lobbying efforts mounted from time to time have been hampered by the fragmentation of these groups. It is the needs of persons with particular handicaps, not the interests of all children who are or should be receiving special help in the schools, that defines the main concern of each group. While there exists a Joint Council for the Educationally Handicapped, its activities embody what one senior DES official termed "the lowest common denominator of joint interest."

In a political system where interest-group pressure is a way of life,[32] such efforts on behalf of the handicapped are rare. The interest-group activity that does occur has been orchestrated by the professionals. A small but energetic lobbying effort promoted by one of the senior professionals in the field led, first, to the 1970 legislation that extended DES authority over the profoundly retarded, and then to the formation of the Committee of Enquiry in 1974. Although these individuals lacked the power to change the law directly, their persistence—exemplified in letters to all M.P.s, a steady stream of correspondence with successive DES Secretaries of State, endless speeches at profes-

[30] See David Kirp, *Doing Good by Doing Little: Race and Schooling in Britain* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

[31] Howard Glennerster, "The Determinants of Social Expenditure," in Timothy Booth, ed., *Planning for Welfare: Social Policy and the Expenditure Process* (Oxford: Basil Blackstone and Martin Robertson, 1979), 3, 12.

[32] On interest-group activity generally, see S. E. Finer, *Anonymous Empire* (London: Pall Mall, 1958); Graham Wooton, *Interest Groups* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

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sional meetings, and similar tactics—helped set in motion a train of events that has led over time to the desired changes.

2. *Law.* Legal norms have played an even more modest part than political action in determining the course of British special education. Litigation concerning educational policy—like public law litigation in Britain generally—must identify a violation of a statutory duty; unlike in the United States, there are no sweeping constitutional principles on which to rest a case. The 1944 Education Act makes such claims enormously difficult to establish. Although the courts have intervened with growing frequency in instances of apparently arbitrary administrative behavior, the scope of those interventions has been decidedly limited, at least by comparison with American court decisions.[33]

Actions of local authorities which violate prescribed procedures have been reversed by the courts. Such decisions do not speak to the substance of the proposed action, but merely mandate that it be carried out in the legally correct way.[34] The leading decision on policy-making prerogative, the *Tameside* case,[35] effectively insulates local authority action from both DES scrutiny and individual attack. The court held in *Tameside* that the Secretary of State for DES could not reverse a local authority's policy determination unless the Secretary concluded that the authority's action had no basis in reason. That decision twists a provision of the 1944 Act—which empowers the Secretary of State to intervene if "satisfied . . . that any local authority . . . have acted or are preparing to act unreasonably"—into a defense of local variability: under the *Tameside* standard it is hard to imagine what an "unreasonable" action would entail. Although the Act broadly authorizes initiatives by the Secretary of State to "secure the effective execution of national policy," *Tameside* embraces a less centrist and more pluralist approach. After *Tameside*, DES can intervene only if it has a specific statutory mandate to do so. Because the 1944 Act is drafted in broad terms, allowing much room for administrative discretion over policy matters, such specificity is the exception. The *Tameside* rationale also assures that parental complaints against an authority's action, based on

[33] For a general treatment of these questions, see Stanley A. de Smith, *Judicial Review of Administrative Action* (London: Stevens, 1973 ed.); Harold Wade, *Administrative Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977 ed.). The British and American approaches to "making" law are contrasted in H.L.A. Hart, "American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream," *Georgia Law Review*, XI (September, 1977), 969-91.

[34] See, e.g., Bradbury v. Enfield London Borough Council (1967), 1 WLR 131.

[35] Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (1967), 3 WLR 64.

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the claim that the authority is acting unreasonably, will almost unvariably be resolved in the authority's favor.

Even before the *Tameside* decision, DES was reluctant to overturn local determinations. Under the 1944 Act, parents can allege in a complaint to the Secretary of State that an authority has acted unreasonably or has failed to perform some statutory duty. An estimated 100 such complaints concerning special education have been filed annually since 1970. As a matter of DES policy, these complaints are treated informally; there is not even a departmental record of their number. Only when a complaint uses the language of appeal does DES mobilize the administrative apparatus. Complaints are handled by a number of middle-level DES administrators who apply no clear or fixed standard; consequently, the handling of a complaint substantially depends on who processes it. The only hope parents have of prevailing depends on the matter being treated informally, with DES urging a particular solution on the authority; no formal request for DES intervention has succeeded during the period. The legal rights embodied in the 1944 Act thus have no practical meaning.

This wholly discretionary system is peculiar to education. It is sharply distinguishable from the administrative appeals machinery that exists in other areas, most notably in that of supplementary welfare benefits. It also represents a shift in departmental practice, away from close administrative review of certain claims. Prior to the declaration in the 1970 Act that all children were educable, parents could appeal to the Secretary of State from the determination of a local authority that their child "was unsuitable" for education; the 1959 Mental Health Act tightened the standards for such determination. The history of DES reviews of these assessments reveals that a substantial number of complaints were lodged between 1951 and 1969.[36] Three hundred sixty-nine, or 11.6 percent of all instances of locally determined ineducability, were objected to in 1951. By 1969, even as the number of instances of unsuitability had declined, the proportion of objections rose: appeals were lodged in 139 cases, 61.2 percent of all such local determinations. Prior to the change of legal standard, the department had been reluctant to reverse local decisions, doing so in just 1.6 percent of the cases in 1951 and in 9.4 percent in 1960, the year before the new legal standard incorporated in the Mental Health Act went into effect. The altered legal standard reduced the number of children identified as unsuitable for education. It made the department much more willing

[36] *Annual Report of School Medical Service: Numbers of Cases, 1944–1970* (London: H.M.S.O., 1970).

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to support parental appeals: in more than 20 percent of the cases filed each year between 1961 and 1969, appeals were upheld. This history confirms that in certain circumstances DES can manage an effective administrative appeals process. The present system—in which appeals are discouraged, seem always to fail, and are not recorded publicly—embodies a preference for professional discretion over formal, law-like review.

Antagonism to the law remains the norm with respect to decision making in education. Those who manage and staff social programs distrust legalization because it interferes with the exercise of "enlightened and altruistic" administration, frustrating what Richard Titmuss terms "a system of flexible, individualised justice based on considerations of dignity and self-respect."[37] Legalism is regarded as a pathological condition, undermining the realization of a purposive and benevolent administrative regime. Leftist critics are equally dismissive of legal intervention, but for another reason: they see the law as being used to thwart challenges to the prevailing political and economic order.[38] There are those who embrace a model of social-service reform through legal change, but their successes have been few in number and modest in scope.[39]

3. *The market.* Although special education is offered both by private state-aided schools and local authority schools, the market does not discipline public-sector behavior. There exists little real competition between the the sectors. Private schools provide specialized services that are either too costly for most local authorities to maintain (for instance, education for blind children) or that cater to the excess demand generated by the publicly run schools (for instance, schools for the maladjusted). The professionals who staff schools in the two sectors share similar values. In terms of how the educational system actually operates, it makes better sense to treat the public and private special education programs as components of a single system.

C. WHAT MAKES SPECIAL EDUCATION SPECIAL?

The preference for a professional solution to a problem of social policy characterizes not just special education, but also British educa-

[37] Titmuss, "Welfare Rights, Law, and Discretion," *Political Quarterly*, XLII (April-June 1971), 113-32.

[38] See generally, John Griffiths, *The Politics of the Judiciary* (London: Fontana, 1977). Compare Thompson (fn. 1), 258-69.

[39] See, e.g., Tony Prosser, "Politics and Judicial Review: The Atkinson Case and Its Aftermath," *Public Law* (Spring 1979), 59-83.

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tional policy and, indeed, British social policy generally.[40] The courts rarely act to fix policy; there is no British equivalent of the American welfare or desegregation cases. Central government has seldom exercised its broad powers under the 1944 Act to shape the system. In education, the conversion of a three-tiered secondary school system into a comprehensive school regime and the restructuring of higher education stand out as the two noticeable exceptions in nearly four decades.[41]

Special education is special only because it exaggerates these tendencies of British policy. What is supposed to distinguish special from ordinary education is the level of expertise involved. Everyone can claim to be an expert concerning ordinary schooling, if only because everyone has experienced it. By contrast, the demands of the retarded or blind child seem more exotic, and the means of instructing such children outside the kit bag of knowledge that leads many of us to imagine that we might competently manage the teaching of third-grade mathematics or fifth-grade English. Special educators are regarded, and regard themselves, as specialists to a degree that the regular classroom teacher does not, and this bolsters their claims of expertise.

For their part, parents of handicapped youngsters are not particularly willing or able to press a different understanding of the needs of their children. These parents bear a distinctive kind of burden.[42] Frequently, they perceive their children as an embarrassment and stigma for which they themselves deserve some measure of blame, and assume responsibility for having produced a less-than-normal child. Their inclination is to protect that child—and themselves—by not asserting themselves, for assertion makes both parent and child visible in un-

[40] On the professionalization of social services, see Eliot Friedson, *Professional Dominance: The Social Structure of Medical Care* (New York: Atherton, 1970); Robert Vinter, "Analysis of Treatment Organizations," in Yehaskel Hasenfeld and Richard English, eds., *Human Service Organizations* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), 33; Jeffrey Berlant, *Professions and Monopoly: A Study of Medicine in the United States and Great Britain* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Everett Hughes, *Men and Their Work* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958); Magali Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Harold Wilensky, "The Professionalization of Everyone?" *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 70 (September 1964), 133-58. With respect to child policy and professionals, see Alfred J. Kahn and Sheila B. Kammerman, *Child Care Programs in Nine Counties: A Report* (Washington, D.C.: D.H.E.W., 1976).

[41] See generally, Maurice Kogan, *Educational Policy Making* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1975); Michael Locke, *Power and Politics in the School System* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974).

[42] See Jules Henry, *Pathways to Madness* (New York: Random House, 1971); Robert Edgerton, *Cloak of Competence: Stigma in the Lives of the Mentally Retarded* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

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wanted ways.[43] Such perceptions, while surely wrong, are nonetheless widely shared. Groups acting on behalf of particular handicaps seek to ease parents' isolation, but there is not much evidence that these parents regard themselves as a group, or that they have learned to make demands on behalf of, say, blind or spastic children; rather, they are grateful for what they get. There are, of course, the rare cases that wind up in the courts, including disputes over the appropriate education of an assertedly dyslexic child, and the protracted struggle, as recounted in the pages of the *Times*, of one parent, herself a well-known editor, to extract from the Inner London Education Authority a decent education for her child. But these are singular occurrences that do not threaten the general dominance of the professionals.

With respect to two of the largest categories of handicap, learning difficulties and maladjustment, the fact that the handicap itself is so closely associated with a social misfortune—low income, family instability, and the like—means that the parents cannot defend the interests of their children by effectively confronting professionals and bureaucracies. It would be unrealistic to expect most parents of such youngsters, rightly attentive to the survival of their families, to be able to question professional judgment even if they were inclined to do so.

The apparently marginal importance of special education assures that issues of policy and practice rarely enter into general discussions. Such services as welfare, housing, health, and ordinary schooling affect sufficient numbers of people and cost enough money to merit routine scrutiny by local authorities, government departments, journalists, and students of politics and social administration. Special education, by contrast, occupies its own structurally differentiated niche within education. Because special education consumes only about 6 percent of the total education budget, it is largely insulated from detailed review. Social science and education faculties within the universities do not take much notice of special education; the favor is returned by academics in the field of special education who have not related the concerns of their domain to those of ordinary education or social services. Debates over special-education policy are thus confined to a very small circle of people who have grown up in the field, and who share a commitment to basic assumptions, notably the primacy of expertise in the shaping of policy. The system whose workings the Committee of Enquiry undertook to examine was thus a largely self-contained and self-satisfied concern.

[43] See Bradshaw (fn. 2).

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III. The Warnock Committee of Enquiry Report: Policy Review as a Laying-On of Hands

A. Committees and the Conventional Wisdom

Committees of Enquiry have been widely used in education to assess particular policy areas.[44] The appeal of this device is considerable. The appointment of a committee theoretically enables a knowledgeable group to take an unblinkered look at policy in a given domain. In practice, new ideas rarely emerge from these committees, although on occasion—as with the Plowden Committee's embracing the open-classroom concept—innovative practices are given legitimacy.[45] More often, the committee tends to seize upon the prevailing conventional wisdom, and to become a lobby for its own cause.

That committees of enquiry, set up with the apparent intention of seeing the world afresh, should instead see a more familiar world is readily understandable. Committee nominees are reviewed by senior civil servants, and while there is of course some balancing to be done—maintaining parity among Welsh, Scottish, and English members, and making the requisite political appointments—most nominees have been proposed, if not actually approved, by DES. Members of the committee tend not to be sharp critics of present practice, but to represent mainstream views. The committee chairman, while deliberately chosen from outside the field being investigated, is reportedly selected from a list of candidates screened for reliability by the civil service. Any widely prevailing differences in viewpoint concerning the issue before the committee will be represented among its members, thus encouraging compromise.

The primary source of advice and support for the committee is DES itself, which assigns individuals both from the department and HMI to serve as staff for the committee. As representatives of DES, they are unlikely to hold heterodox views. The committee staff brings a particular expertise to the project. Because it drafts papers for the committee, the staff can shape the terms of discussion; its connections outside the committee determine the kinds of views that the committee hears; and it has that most precious resource—time—which enables it to under-

[44] See, e.g., *Half Our Futures* (Newsom Report) (London: H.M.S.O., 1963); *Report of the Committee on Higher Education* (Robbins Report) (London: H.M.S.O., 1961-63); *A New Partnership for Our Schools* (Taylor Report) (London: H.M.S.O., 1977).

[45] *Children and Their Primary Schools* (London: H.M.S.O., 1967).

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take more than all but the most conscientious committee members can.[46]

The tradition of moderation characteristic of central policy making generally carries over to these committees. If the committee wishes to be taken seriously, it attunes itself to prevailing opinion. Consequently, committees of enquiry urge a bigger and better-coordinated version of the present: provide more services or extend service provision to those previously unserved. This characterization aptly describes the report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Education of Handicapped Children and Young People, commonly referred to as the Warnock Report after its chairman, Mary Warnock.

The consequences of these twin sources of departmental power, a voice in committee appointments and a supportive relationship to the enterprise, are apparent in the composition and workings of the Warnock Committee. The committee was drawn almost entirely from professionals who had some relation to special education. One-third of its members were associated with special schools. Committee members represented the medical, psychological, nursing, social work, and teaching professions. Its chairman, an Oxford philosophy don, was the one nonspecialist; its vice chairman was a county education officer who had long been involved with special education. Only one of the committee's 26 members was the parent of a handicapped child. The special-interest groups were unrepresented, for DES affirmed that it was not forming a constituent body. Despite the disproportionate number of nonwhite children who had been identified as educationally subnormal or maladjusted, no nonwhite served on the committee; nor was there a lawyer, who might have spoken to the relevance of a legal-rights viewpoint; nor was there a handicapped person.

The committee's staff developed material that reflected both the departmental position and viewpoints congenial with those of committee members. Although outside evidence was collected, both in hearings and written presentations, this material had scant influence on the committee. Concerning the critical matter of framing the policy question, there was little dissent among committee members and staff. As it saw its task, the committee had few fundamental choices to make.

B. WHAT THE REPORT URGES

The report reflects this general complacency. What commands central attention is not the system of special education, which is generally

[46] On the power of the British civil service generally, see Geoffrey Smith and Nelson Polsby, *British Government and Its Discontents* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 144-68.

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commended, but the ways in which special children are described in the law and regulations. Departmental regulations had created categories of handicaps for which special services were to be provided. Those categories, the committee determined, were excessively rigid and did not reveal the range of problems that might beset a child who was, say, physically handicapped and retarded. They also imposed a label that could stigmatize rather than define an educational deficiency. Moreover, the categories distinguished too sharply between the small fraction of the population with severe handicaps and the far larger proportion, estimated by the committee as nearly one in five, who would need special help at some point during their school careers.

The Warnock Report urges the abolition of these categories. Under its proposed scheme, records would be maintained and formal diagnoses carried out only for the most handicapped youngsters—the group roughly corresponding to those receiving full-time special education. These pupils would not be formally labeled as maladjusted or physically handicapped, but would instead be the recorded group, each individually described. The larger group with special needs would receive assistance within the context of the school program without bearing any label at all. The labels would survive for purposes of description only, not categorization. There is one change: the educationally subnormal would henceforth be referred to as children with learning difficulties.

The semantics of euphemism has had particular relevance to unfortunates, whether they be poor countries—underdeveloped, less developed, emerging nations—or handicapped pupils. Although the regulations in force still refer to the educationally subnormal, this group was later called retarded, and then slow learners. Now its members are described as children with learning difficulties.[47] Less than a century ago, these youngsters were known as idiots and imbeciles. Such changes may signal a shift in attitude toward the population being described. Whether they imply new modes of assessment, and more critically, whether assessment affects the education provided, are entirely different matters about which the Warnock Report speaks with a less sure voice.

The proposed new assessment procedure relies heavily on Circular 2/75, which contemplates collecting a variety of professional views, coordinated by a psychologist, in ascertaining handicap. The Warnock Report expands this effort into a five-stage procedure, each stage calling on more refined expert judgment than the last. That model presumes

[47] Warnock Report (fn. 10).

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what is highly problematic: that a handicap is comprised of a set of conditions diagnosable by professionals, and that within the professional ranks those with narrowly defined specialties are most adept at making assessments.

Psychologists often speak of assessment as if it were an end in itself, divorced from education, because they know so much more about the former than about the latter. Yet from the children's perspective, what matters most is the nature of the education received, who gets what kind of schooling in what setting. Here again, the Warnock Report's primary contribution is definitional and not substantive in nature. The report identifies four types of special education to be provided in ordinary schools, ranging from full-time instruction in an ordinary class with some supplemental support to full-time education in a special class within the school, without clarifying the circumstances that would make one or another alternative preferable. Instruction in special schools is placed farther along the same continuum, with no adequate benchmarks. This section of the report is dotted with palliative phrases—"children . . . who are more likely to thrive in the more intimate communal and educational setting of a special school"[48]—which put the best, most expert-like face on what is in fact an absence of expertise.

A full detailing of the educational offering would, to be sure, have lain outside the province of the committee. What is wanted is guidance, a hint as to what can be done. In place of such guidance, the Warnock Report says in effect: trust the professionals. The thinness of this undertaking becomes strikingly apparent in the discussion of curriculum. Here, even more plainly than when discussing the nature of the educational service, vacuous words such as "appropriate" and "needs" dominate, masking how little is actually known about what approach should be adopted for which children.[49]

The Warnock Report describes the problem of special educational needs as one best resolved by the flexible application of expertise. The major fault that it finds with the present system—the rigidity of the categories of handicap fixed in the law—is really a plea for relying more on professional assessment. The *ad hoc* application of trained judgment to individual cases defines the course of reform. The report's other recommendations are consistent with the idea that the weaknesses of special education are curable by professional determination.

[48] Warnock Report (fn. 10), 123.

[49] In citing the report of the Schools Council Project, "The Curriculum for Slow Learners," the Warnock Committee recognized this weakness in the curriculum, yet it made nothing of it. Warnock Report (fn. 10), 219.

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They call for expanding provision for handicapped children under age five and above age 16, and for offering training to ordinary teachers, to enable them better to meet the demands of special children. Had the Warnock Report's recommendations been incorporated into the law, the scope of special education would have been widened to serve the student population newly identified as special. Added money would have been spent on the service—how much is uncertain, since the report included no cost estimates—with the special services provided by specialists. In short, the Warnock Report spells "more of the same."

C. WHAT THE WARNOCK COMMITTEE DID NOT CONSIDER

In the options that it dismissed as well as in those it adopted, the Warnock Committee shaped the issue in terms of professionalism. Its resistance to the idea of integration because of its ideological overtones, its discomfiture with full parental participation, its disregard of legal rights, and its inattention to questions of school organization are all compatible with a professional orientation.

1. *Ideology and Politics.* During the period of the report's preparation, the Education Act of 1976 was amended to require that all children be educated in ordinary schools except where this was "impracticable or incompatible with the provision of efficient instruction in the schools; or would involve unreasonable public expenditure."[50] Section 10, inserted into the Act by the House of Lords and unenthusiastically accepted by the government, embodies the weakest of preferences for the integration of handicapped and ordinary children. It does not speak of instruction in common classrooms, but in "county or voluntary schools," and thus clearly contemplates the maintenance of units composed entirely of special children whose only contact with their schoolmates might come at meals or on the playground. The broad exceptions to the legislative requirement, which effectively enable an authority to base policy on its view of economic or educational concerns, make it hard to imagine any local judgment being overturned by a court or DES.

Nonetheless, Section 10 is not without significance. As a political statement, it appears to commit the government to the idea of integration, and it turns an educational question into a question of principle with deep symbolic importance. This very fact, coupled with the considerable opposition to Section 10 heard within the special-education field, led the committee to choose a different course. It could not refute

[50] Education Act (1976), Elizabeth II, C. 81 (London: H.M.S.O., 1976).

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the section which, while not yet implemented—as written, it had to be effectuated by an order of the Secretary of State—was nonetheless newly adopted law. Once again, the committee substituted definition for analysis. It identified three forms of integration—integration as a matter of physical location, social interaction, and educational interchange—and treated the choice among these as a matter of professional judgment.

More revealingly, the discussion of integration contrasts the educational needs of children with the social good of integration. Of particular concern in the report are the ordinary children, whose progress in schooling is regarded as jeopardized by excessive integration. In this calculus, the professional endeavor, education, is balanced against a social or political undertaking, integration, ignoring the likelihood that integration has educational as well as social consequences. Children learn at least as much from each other as they do from the particulars of curriculum or pedagogy. This proposition underlies the unhappiness with the three-tiered system of secondary schooling for ordinary children,[51] and seems to hold true for handicapped children as well. The efficacy of special programs for the mildly handicapped, particularly the maladjusted and retarded, has been seriously questioned.[52] These students—as well as other types of handicapped youngsters, including the deaf and blind[53]—may well do better in ordinary classrooms with supplementary support, without hampering the progress of other children. Though these data are hardly conclusive, they challenge the Warnock Report's framework of analysis. Like so much that is of apparent relevance, they go undiscussed in the report.

2. *Rights and Law.* The idea that handicapped children or their guardians might have legally cognizable rights scarcely figures in the Warnock Report. Although one chapter describes "Parents as Partners," the terms of the partnership are fixed by the professionals. Parents are to be given information concerning available services as well as practical help, and are expected to contribute their knowledge of the child in the assessment procedure. Yet parents have only limited access to the material on which assessment decisions are based. While

[51] See generally, Jean Floud and A. H. Halsey, *Social Class and Educational Opportunity* (London: Heineman, 1956).

[52] David Galloway and Carole Goodwin, *Educating Slow-Learning and Maladjusted Children: Integration or Segregation?* (London: Longman, 1979).

[53] D.M.C. Dale, "Educating Deaf and Partially Hearing Children Individually in Ordinary Schools," *The Lancet*, No. 884 (October 21, 1978); Martin Milligan, "Accepting Blind Children in Ordinary Schools—Everyone Benefits," *Where*, No. 142 (October 1978), 275.

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they are encouraged to discuss the educational program with school officials, there is no recourse in instances of disagreement. The report does not even mention the existing possibility of appealing to DES, let alone the courts.

The issue of rights concerns not only individual families but also racial groups. Nonwhites, especially West Indians, are substantially overrepresented among those students labeled educationally subnormal.[54] Programs for maladjusted children, including the special units to deal with behavioral disturbance attached to a growing number of secondary schools, are criticized as dumping grounds for West Indian students. These revelations led West Indian community leaders to demand an investigation by the government's race relations agency. Despite this contretemps, race is nowhere mentioned in the Warnock Report. The index to the report includes West Germans but not West Indians. Racial overrepresentation is an unknown concept. The discussion of testing students whose native language is not English refers only to Welsh and Gaelic, despite the fact that many nonwhite immigrant youngsters lack fluency in English. Because the question of nonwhites and special education raises not one but two red flags—it poses the specter of legal rights and is politically volatile—the committee opted to ignore the issue entirely.

The very idea of rights was unsettling. Those committee members who visited the United States came away horrified by the reliance on administrative hearings and litigation over matters that seemed either petty or unsuitable for such review; it was as if Richard Titmuss's warnings about hearings over the cost of a new toothbrush had been realized in American special education. Hearings were thought to breed controversy when consensus was the objective. In the framework of the Warnock Report, the idea of rights would war with the idea of efficient service provided by professionals acting to the best of their abilities; hence it was pernicious. As committee chairman Mary Warnock declared: "There is something deeply unattractive about the spectacle of someone demanding his own rights."[55]

3. *Organization.* The Warnock Report focuses on the needs of individuals, not on the structure that will meet those needs. Three paragraphs devoted to "organization, methods, and curriculum" speak of the importance of the organization's ability to adapt to new demands.

[54] See Bernard Coard, *How the West Indian Child Is Made Educationally Subnormal in the British School System* (London: New Beacon, 1971).
[55] *Times Educational Supplement*, February 25, 1977.

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The level of discussion is unspecific, even in comparison with the rest of the document. "The demands may be relatively simple or more complex and varied according to circumstance,"[56] the report announces. The only concrete organizational recommendation envisions establishing a special education unit with its own head within the ordinary school, a notion inconsistent with the reconceptualization of special education set out elsewhere in the report. The Warnock Report does offer one other suggestion with organizational implications. It proposes that a named person, the head teacher in the school, help parents in bringing together the several special education services. Insofar as the named person is to act as the intermediary between these services and the child's advocate, the head teacher seems a strange choice, if only because the parent may be unhappy with the school itself. The committee's failure to recognize this potential for conflict reveals either naiveté concerning how schools work (which is unlikely, as a number of committee members were themselves school officials), or a preference for letting professionals determine organizational configurations for themselves.

Organizational concerns are the predicate for the effective delivery of any service, since support for a redefined special education has little meaning if the structure is unfit for the task. A school system which rigidly observes the demarcation between ordinary and special education will make one thing of the notion of an expanded special program, while a system working to connect up ordinary and special instruction assumes a rather different set of tasks. To link the futures of handicapped children to the ordinary schools demands attention to, among other things, teaching skills required in heterogeneous classrooms, the quality of interchange among students with diverse backgrounds and abilities, the relationship between the ordinary program and supplementary support, and the fears concerning the impact of the venture on the quality of education. Ignoring these matters puts the pedagogical and psychological cart before the organizational horse. The Secondary Heads Association made this point rather more poetically: "The Warnock owl has told the grasshopper to change into a mouse, but if asked how this can be done suggests that owls only deal with policy."[57]

The consequences of disregarding the organizational aspect of the

[56] Warnock Report (fn. 10), 109.

[57] *Times Educational Supplement*, June 25, 1978. See generally, Seymour Sarason, *The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970).

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issue are most apparent in the Warnock Report's treatment of maladjustment as an individual problem, to be remedied by professional attention. The reported incidence of maladjustment has increased far more rapidly than any other handicap. While only 3,544 children in Britain were identified as maladjusted in 1950, the number has climbed steadily—to 6,033 in 1961, 14,534 in 1971, and 22,402 in 1979—a rate of increase surpassing that of any other category of handicap.[58] These figures significantly understate the size of the maladjusted population, because they do not include children assigned, without benefit of any formal ascertainment, to special units within the ordinary school. A DES survey published in 1978 revealed 3,932 places in such units, while a 1980 questionnaire, returned by only half the authorities in the United Kingdom, reported 5,837 places.[59]

Why has there been such rapid growth in the maladjusted category? For one thing, the expanded presence of psychologists trained to identify maladjustment almost guarantees that more maladjusted individuals will in fact be identified, since professionals create their own clientele. For another thing, broader changes in educational policy have doubtless had an impact. Extending the school-leaving age to 16 has forced ordinary schools to figure out how to deal with students who would otherwise have left school for work at the onset of adolescence. The merging of the old two-tier system, secondary modern schools and grammar schools, into comprehensive schools during the late 1960s and 1970s also compelled authorities to educate a more diverse student population under one roof. One way of coping with a larger population of badly educated, resentful secondary-school youngsters who can no longer be kept out of the path of the academically ambitious by assignment to a secondary modern school is to create a special program for them.

That strategy responds in part to real and individual problems. As educationalist Peter Newell notes, "some students exhibit irrational or disturbing behaviour, and behaviour which would damage others in schools, because of provocations in their lives which in a sense have nothing to do with the schools." But Newell adds that, "while schools retain structures and practices which are entirely undemocratic, and which only allow as alternatives apathetic or active conformity or dis-

[58] Data concerning the number of children ascertained as maladjusted come from Department of Education and Science, "Educational Provision of Handicapped Pupils," (*DES Statistics of Education*), for the relevant years; the source of the 1979 figure is White Paper (fn. 11).

[59] *Behavioural Units* (fn. 25), 49; "Ace Survey: Disruptive Units," *Where*, Vol. 159 (June 1980), 10.

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ruption and rejection, it is the schools we must label as disruptive and not the students."[60] Although the critique is overstated, establishing new programs for the maladjusted does place the burden of adaptation on the student, not the school. Sociologists Ian Lewis and Graham Vulliamy have written: "Problems endemic to schools become easily translated to become problems of particular children, and practice suggests that categorization is followed by isolation, rather than eradication of the causes of the problem."[61] Such considerations go unnoticed if one sees the phenomenon solely through the eyes of the experts.

D. THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE: WARNOCK WITHOUT TEARS?

The government's response to the Warnock Report, the White Paper entitled *Special Needs in Education* (1980), adopts the report's reconceptualization of special educational needs without providing any of the additional resources for the under-fives, over-sixteens, teacher retraining, and the like, that the Warnock Committee had recommended. The government has tried to reconcile the framework of expertise with the bare government cupboard of the 1980s by transforming the problems besetting special education into a matter of semantics.

The Warnock Report invites such a reaction. With 224 policy recommendations, mostly unranked, and not a cost calculation in the lot, the document seems to have been drafted for earlier, more affluent times. "A mass of uncosted idealism," one DES official termed it. The report's ambiguous treatment of so many issues permitted enthusiasts to embrace it for wholly inconsistent reasons. The author of Section 10 of the 1976 Education Act, which proposes integration of handicapped children, lauded the effort as a "magnificent and important"[62] endorsement of integration, even as the general secretary of the National Union of Teachers observed that "we are glad that the Warnock Report does not advocate speedy integration."[63] Such ambiguity, coupled with the report's emphasis on good practice as apposed to policy, has left the central government free to argue that there was little it ought to do.

The government has proposed abandoning the categories in force since 1945, substituting the distinction between recorded and unre-

[60] Peter Newell, "Sin Bins: The Integration Argument," *Where*, Vol. 160 (July/August 1980), 8.

[61] Lewis and Vulliamy, "Warnock or Warlock? The Sorcery of Definitions: The Limitations of the Report on Special Education," *Educational Review*, XXXII (February 1980), 3-10.

[62] *Times Educational Supplement*, June 23, 1978.

[63] *Times Educational Supplement*, May 26, 1978.

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corded children with special needs, as set out in the Warnock Report. That reformulation of the issue, the White Paper argues, will permit "the gradual redeployment of resources." The source of funds for new ventures such as the proposed preschool program is unspecified. The government speaks of "coordination," "good practice," and "good will" —language vainly searching for some meaning.

The White Paper differs from the Warnock Report in one significant respect. In lieu of implementing Section 10, it permits parents of handicapped children to contest the local authority's evaluation of the child or the proposed placement to an LEA appeals committee, thus giving some recognition to the idea of legal rights. This change in the law is, however, a modest one and should be appreciated in the context of broader educational reforms. Under the Education Act of 1980, parents of ordinary children make their preferences known to the educational authority and, if dissatisfied with the authority's decision, can bring their dispute to a local appeals committee. The 1980 Education Act explicitly denies parents of handicapped children the right to file an appeal, a slight that produced the first glimmerings of political mobilization on behalf of handicapped schoolchildren. The All-Party Disablement Conference, previously little concerned with education issues, questioned this distinction and persuaded the government to change its mind.[64] Yet disputes concerning handicapped children are still treated differently from those involving ordinary youngsters. For the former group, the appeals committee can only recommend a course of action to the authority; for the latter, the appeals committee may actually reverse the authority. The difference is defended by recourse to what is almost a tautology: "the circumstances may be very special" for handicapped children.

The introduction of the concept of rights, even if in weakened form, potentially alters the way special education is conceptualized. The framework for policy remains overwhelmingly rooted in professional judgment, but a contending notion has been given some legitimacy. In its attentiveness to fiscal constraints and its willingness to speak in terms of rights, the government's policy toward handicapped children may signal a possible sea change in thinking about British social policy.[65]

[64] Hansard, April 7, 1980. For a discussion of the political history of this legislation, see David Bull, "School Admissions: A New Appeals Procedure," *Journal of Social Welfare*, VII (September 1980), 209.

[65] On the possibility of capitalizing on the contraction of the educational system to accomplish good educational ends, see Harry Judge, "After the Comprehensive Revolution: What Sort of Secondary Schools?" *Oxford Review of Education*, V (June 1979), 137-46.

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IV. Professionalization Versus Rights

A. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

What are the consequences of professionalization? The question is best approached by comparing the quite different British and American experiences. The course of special education policy in the United States followed a pattern roughly akin to Britain's until the late 1960s.[66] Service was provided in separate units within the public school system to those children who, while victimized by some handicap, were nonetheless thought capable of benefiting from an education.[67] The more seriously handicapped youngsters were treated as ineducable and denied a publicly supported education; some received instruction in private schools, paid for by their parents and not the government. The terms of service were set by the professionals who offered it. During the 1950s and 1960s, pressure for a new teaching credential in special education and the development of more sophisticated assessment techniques indicated the growing professional status of the field.

As in Britain, special education was a policy backwater whose critics tended to come from inside the profession. That pattern changed for several reasons. Programs for the mildly handicapped, particularly the so-called educable retardates, drew political fire as inefficacious and, more potently, as dumping grounds for minority youngsters.[68] The IQ tests which brought the bad news of weak academic performance, and which were the primary basis for assignment to these classes, sparked particular criticism because of their supposed racial bias. The denial of any education to the most profoundly handicapped was attacked as inhumane, and as resting on erroneous judgments about personal potential.

These points were aggressively pressed by a lobbying group which borrowed many of its tactics from the civil rights movement, and

[66] This history is recounted in Seymour Sarason and John Doris, *Educational Handicap, Public Policy, and Social History: A Broadened Perspective on Mental Retardation* (New York: Free Press, 1979); David Rothman, *The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Jane Mercer and John Richardson, " 'Mental Retardation' as a Social Problem," in Nicholas Hobbs, ed., *Issues in the Classification of Children*, II (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975), 131; Willard Gaylin, Ira Glasser, Steven Marcus, and David Rothman, *Doing Good: The Limits of Benevolence* (New York: Pantheon, 1978); Marvin Lazerson, "The Origins of Special Education, 1890-1940," paper prepared for the Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance (Stanford University, 1980).

[67] Carl Milofsky, *Special Education: A Sociological Study of California Programs* (New York: Praeger, 1976).

[68] The references are collected in Kirp, "Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Policy Implications of Student Classification," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, Vol. 121 (April 1973), 705-97.

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which consequently undertook to convert the issues surrounding the education of the handicapped into questions of civil rights.[69] Isolating the mildly retarded from normal school life and depriving the seriously handicapped of any schooling were both depicted as iniquitous, and, like so many other iniquities, were brought to the courts. Arguments over policy were turned into constitutionally rooted claims of unequal educational opportunity.

The several strands of litigation were pursued with varying degrees of success. It was hard to devise a legal argument for providing a better education, since that sounded too much like pure policy. But for those who had been excluded from school, the courts could and did insist that "appropriate" or "suitable" instruction be offered, and without much analysis this right was extended to encompass all handicapped children.[70] Nonwhites could not convince the courts to shut down classes for the mildly retarded, as that too seemed a matter of policy. Yet they were able to force school systems to stop relying primarily on IQ tests to determine who was retarded; more generally, the hostility toward labeling children as retarded led school districts to rely less on this classification.[71]

By the mid-1970s, federal courts had laid down broad maxims concerning equality of opportunity for handicapped youngsters. All children were deemed entitled to some form of education. (Here the courts achieved through reliance on constitutional principle what had earlier been recognized by legislation in Britain.) The specifics of that education should fit the child's own needs. Where the suitability of the educational program was a matter of dispute, parents were entitled to a full-dress review of the dispute, in a due-process hearing presided over by a neutral official. Parents could be represented at the hearing, introduce evidence, and scrutinize the evidence presented by the school authorities. The outcomes of these hearings were appealable to the state commissioner of education and, ultimately, to the courts. Consistent

[69] See Alan Abeson and Jeffrey Zettel, "The End of the Quiet Revolution: The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975," *Exceptional Children*, XLIV (Winter 1977), 44. David Kirp, William Buss, and Peter Kuriloff, "Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical Studies and Procedural Proposals," *California Law Review*, Vol. 62 (January 1974), 40-155; David Neal, "The Legalization of Special Education," paper prepared for the Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance (Stanford University, 1980); Jack Tweedie, "Federal Reform of Special Education: An Exploration into Policymaking Style," paper prepared for the Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance (Stanford University, 1980).

[70] Pennsylvania Association of Retarded Citizens v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 342 F. Supp. 279, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).

[71] Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1973), *aff'd*, 502 F. 2d. 963 (9th Cir. 1974).

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with their special needs, children were to be schooled in a setting as close as possible to the ordinary classroom. Other things being equal, regular class placement supplemented by itinerant special help was legally preferable to full-day special classes, and special classes were preferable to special schools.

The 1974 Education of All Handicapped Children Act[72] embraces and expands upon this concept of equal opportunity. The Act entitles handicapped children to treatment as similar to normal education as possible, includes detailed due-process protections, and cautions against discriminatory assessment measures. It also requires an individual education plan for every handicapped schoolchild, diagnosing the child's condition and specifying a prescriptive regime, which is to be approved by the child's parents. Although the legislation has been funded at relatively modest levels—$874 million in 1981, as compared with an authorization of $2.32 billion—this has not prevented Washington from closely monitoring state and local activities, insisting that states live up to their obligations under the Act or risk a cutoff of funds.

That the claims of the handicapped were not merely conditions of receiving federal largesse, but embodied personal rights, was underscored by the interpretation of companion legislation, the Rehabilitation Act.[73] This bill, which demanded "nondiscrimination" in education on grounds of handicap, was modeled after earlier civil rights legislation. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare held that the obligation to secure nondiscrimination imposed on states essentially the same requirements concerning suitable education for the handicapped as did the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. Even those states which chose not to accept federal money for handicapped students were nonetheless obliged to take the same actions on their behalf as those that did; this was a matter of the civil rights of the handicapped.

The formal differences between the British and American approaches are obvious. While special education in Britain remains essentially a bureaucratized, professionally run undertaking, the American reforms introduce several new elements into the policy equation. The education of handicapped youngsters remains rooted in professional judgment; in a period characterized by professional expansionism into so many spheres of personal and family life, it is hard to imagine a policy toward the handicapped that did not pay considerable deference to the professionals.[74] But the new American approach to special edu-

[72] Public Law No. 94-142 (fn. 9). [73] 29 U.S.C. §794 (1976).
[74] For an empirical confirmation of this proposition, see Richard Weatherly, *Reform-*

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cation policy also draws on each of the other policy frames as competing approaches. It sets up a tension between bureaucratic concerns for control and accountability on the one side, professional interests in autonomy on the other. It places the issue of special education within a larger political framework: the preference for what is termed "mainstreaming," while defensible in terms of educational efficacy, essentially constitutes a political judgment. Special education—"appropriate" special education—has become a legally recognized right, not an artifact of governmental generosity or professional judgment. The due-process hearing stands as a procedural safeguard for substantive claims to a suitable and individually determined education.

B. THE IMPACT OF RIGHTS

It is the idea of legally enforceable rights that is critical here.[75] Thinking about special education in terms of political and legal rights forces a consequential recharacterization of special education. The distribution of resources, relationships among the affected parties, and levels of disputatiousness are all affected by the introduction of the perspective of rights, as is the very conception of handicap.

1. *Resources.* In a sector where the demand for a service is powerfully determined by supply, there are never enough resources. This has been true both in Britain and America, where waiting lists for special programs have been the measure of insufficiency. Expenditure for special education in both countries has grown during the past two decades at a rate exceeding that for social services generally. What distinguishes America from Britain is the *attitude* toward resources, and the influence of the rights orientation on that attitude.

What handicapped children receive in Britain depends on what the government determines it can afford, and that holds true whether one is focusing on a local authority or on DES. DES circulars in the early 1970s made explicit reference to resource constraints as justifying the failure of local authorities to implement concededly beneficial reforms. Section 10 of the 1976 Education Act, which called for integrating handicapped children into ordinary schools, was not implemented partly because the resources were unavailable; DES would neither re-

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ing Special Education: Policy Implementation from State Level to Street Level (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979). See also Christopher Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World* (New York: Basic Books, 1979).

[75] See John Gliedman and William Roth for the Carnegie Council on Children, *The Unexpected Minority: Handicapped Children in America* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980); Kirp (fn. 68).

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quire authorities to find the funds themselves nor promise the seemingly unattainable. The 1980 White Paper permits local authorities to reject the recommendation of a local appeals committee concerning special education programs if the decision has "substantial resource implications." The failure to fund the new special programs urged by the Warnock Report is premised on a lack of resources, not a rejection of the proposals' merits.

The American structure of rights, by contrast, does not formally treat resource limits as constraining what can be provided. Court decisions rejected the arguments of school districts that certain needs of handicapped children were unaffordable.[76] The constitution, said the courts, does not carry a price tag—the implication being that these needs were not demands to redistribute resources which might be *compared with other demands, but were absolute entitlements.* The Education for All Handicapped Children Act has received less federal financial support than was authorized, a tacit concession that the hoped-for funds were not available. But the claim of a child to an appropriate education remains a claim of right that the states must somehow support. The due-process hearings held pursuant to the Act illustrate the implications of this standard. Many of the hearings have involved claims that an expensive non-public institution could do a better job than the public school of meeting a particular child's needs, and that the school district was therefore obliged to pay the child's tuition.[77]

Limited resources remain a reality in American special education. Yet obligatory official disavowal of resource constraints forces cost calculations below the surface of policy, and this gives advocates for the handicapped an edge in competition with other groups not similarly regarded as enjoying rights. The rights orientation also helps to explain both the rapid expansion of the provision of special education in American schools—8 percent of students in America,[78] as compared with fewer than 2 percent in Britain, have been assessed for special needs—and the more rapid rate of growth of expenditure for special education in the United States than in Britain over the past decade, when the rights orientation took firm hold.

[76] See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).

[77] See Michael Kirst and Kay Bertken, "Due Process Hearings in Special Education: An Exploration of Who Benefits," paper prepared for the Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance (Stanford University, 1980).

[78] Count of children taken by the states, December 1, 1979. This annual count serves as the basis for allocation of funds appropriated under PL 94-192. Department of Education, *The Interim Report, Secretarial Task Force on Equal Educational Opportunity for Handicapped Children* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Education, 1980).

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2. *Relationships.* Interchanges between individuals are harder to appraise than expenditure patterns, but here too the orientation to rights has apparent implications. Discussion of the needs of the handicapped in Britain is routinely coupled with concern for ordinary children. Nowhere is this made plainer than in the Warnock Report, which balances the social gains to handicapped children stemming from integration with the costs that integration may impose on the rest of the students. The American rights orientation renders such balancing odious; a quota on handicapped students in any ordinary school, proposed by the Warnock Report, sounds something like the discredited "benign quotas" for black students in desegregating schools. Although the dilemmas of association across the boundary of handicap raised by the Warnock Report are familiar in both countries, the British approach weighs interests, while the American rights orientation places the burden of adjustment on the ordinary school. In the American context, it becomes hard to ask "how will the *other* children fare?" Consequently, integration has been promoted far more energetically in the U.S. than in Britain.

3. *Conflict.* The orientation to rights also encourages more apparent conflict than does a professionally dominated environment—a decidedly mixed blessing. In the United States, conflicts find formal manifestation in due-process hearings and appeals,[79] as well as in the continuing pressure for judicial solutions to policy conflicts.[80] Since 1978, for instance, lower courts have ordered a halt to IQ testing in one state, forced the shutdown of another state's institution for mentally retarded students (intimating that institutionalization itself might be impermissible), and looked closely into New York City's program for emotionally disturbed students.[81] In Britain, litigation and administrative appeals have been rare and unsuccessful; even if such a challenge were to succeed, the outcome would directly affect only the litigants. In the United States, by contrast, these cases, if ultimately upheld, mold policy for school districts or even entire states, thus making the conflict more consequential. The differing norms of the two policy systems

[79] See, e.g., Kirst and Bertken (fn. 77); Peter Kuriloff, David Kirp, and William Buss, *When Handicapped Children Go to Court: Assessing the Impact of Legal Reform of Special Education in Pennsylvania,* report prepared for the National Institute of Education (1979).

[80] See generally, David Kirp and Mark Yudof, *Educational Policy and the Law* (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1982 ed.).

[81] See Larry R. v. Riles (fn. 71); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), *aff'd* in part and *rev'd* and *remanded* in part, 612 F. 2d. 84 (3rd Cir. 1980), *rev'd* 49 U.S.L.W. 4363 (1981); Lora v. Board of Education, 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1268 (E.D. N.Y. 1978), *rev'd* 623 F. 2d. 248 (2d. Cir. 1980).

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encourage these variations in behavior. The receptivity of American courts to policy issues promotes disputatiousness, even as the diminution of disagreement in Britain—exemplified by repeated references to "good will" in the White Paper and the belief expressed in the Warnock Report that "partnership," not conflict, is the desired end—muffles disputes.

This disputatiousness affects the educational system in a variety of ways. The American habit of publicly challenging the enterprise furthers change and reform under the banner of rights. It may lead school authorities to offer students an education that is measurably better than would otherwise have been provided; in general it fosters a dynamic, rather than a static, policy. Yet conflict carries a heavy price. It threatens the element of trust which is essential if a helping relationship is to be maintained.[82] Conflict also promotes discomfort, and for that reason not even those who instigate disagreements thrive in this climate of disputatiousness. It is, however, clear that parents feel driven to exercise their right to protest by the severest of provocations, that failing to assert their child's rights will lead to a most malign neglect.[83] The problem is one of striking a balance. Describing parents as partners, as the Warnock Report does, may be pollyannaish, but "see you in court" is not the happiest of rejoinders.

The degree of conflict is influenced by differences in how the relationship between central and local government is structured in the two countries. In Britain, the central government's primary source of contact with local authorities, HMI, offers professional guidance. Pressure in the unsubtle sense of threatening to withhold government aid is unknown. The British aspire to lift the weakest authorities to the level of the best over time. By contrast, local authorities in the United States are legally required to meet a minimum level of performance. This produces a tension between levels of government, akin in some ways to tensions within American schools, which does not find its counterpart in Britain.

4. *The meaning of handicap.* The most profound impact of the idea of rights may be on how handicap is understood in the two countries.

[82] On the importance of trust relationships in the management of schools, see David Kirp, "Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting," *Stanford Law Review*, XXVIII (May 1976), 841-76. Compare Mary Metz, *Classrooms and Corridors: The Crisis of Authority in Desegregated Secondary Schools* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

[83] Milton Budoff and Alan Orenstein, "Special Education Appeals Hearings: Their Forum and the Response of the Participants," in *Final Report on Due Process in Special Education: Legal and Human Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: D.H.E.W., 1979).

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Through political astuteness and judicial successes, handicapped groups in the United States have forced their way onto the center stage of policy.[84] Their concerns are related to those of other groups who see themselves as victims of discrimination; their policy proposals are presented as part of a larger struggle for equity. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act signals a considerable success in this effort, for it sets a higher authorization level than any other federal education legislation. The integration of handicapped children into the educational mainstream, although not so highly charged as the integration of blacks and whites, is similarly premised on a claim of rights. Both groups, historically invisible, have made themselves profoundly present. In this respect, the enactment of rights affords a predicate for the assertion of self.[85]

The handicapped in Britain remain for the most part beneficiaries of what Charles Dickens tellingly termed "telescopic philanthropy"—a form of benevolence in which "the further away the object of our compassion lies the more intense will be the feelings of concern and obligation which it evokes."[86] This compassion, while real enough, conflicts with the idea that the handicapped are persons in the full sense, capable of participating in the definition of their own interest. They have remained substantially a dependent class, the wards of caring professionals. What the handicapped receive is still treated as a matter of grace, a contribution made by the larger society to help a small and distinct group. The lack of a counterforce may mean that they have embraced this socially held view as their own.

C. CHOOSING BETWEEN POLICY FRAMEWORKS

The British and American approaches, the one professional-centered and the other more rights-centered, embrace different conceptions of good social policy. The rights orientation of American special education policy coincides with a view of social welfare espoused during the Great Society, which generally stressed individual entitlement to governmentally subsidized benefits.[87] That approach creates an inherently

[84] See, e.g., Wolf Wolfensberger and others, *Citizen Advocacy for the Handicapped, Impaired, and Disadvantaged* (Washington, D.C.: D.H.E.W. publication No. OS-72-42, 1972).

[85] See Robert B. Edgerton, *Cloak of Competence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

[86] Dickens's observation, made in *Bleak House*, is quoted and elaborated upon in Robert Pinker, *The Idea of Welfare* (London: Heineman, 1979), 3.

[87] See, e.g., Charles Reich, "The New Property," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 73 (April, 1964), 733-87; Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare* (New York: Pantheon, 1971).

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uneasy relationship between the client and the government agency. The client's worth is understood to be predicated on being more than a supplicant, and the experience of being a client is somehow supposed to be empowering. The ideal is a social welfare system true both to its own mission and to the expressed wishes of its clients, which combines fairness and efficiency—avoiding racism, sexism, "ageism" and the other isms—with attention to individual clients' needs and preferences. This ambitious aspiration is doomed to failure, for the internal contradictions among the demands are too profound and the counterforces are too powerful.[88] Yet special-education policy, as it works in practice, suggests a more feasible goal.

The American approach, though rights-centered, creates a *dynamic tension among the competing frameworks, in which varying conceptions of the good social welfare system are pressed by all who have been invited into the house of policy.*[89] Professionalism, legalism, bureaucratization, and politicization pull and tug against one another. Given such a conception, problems arise when one or another framework becomes too powerful—for instance, when legalism engulfs in procedural snarls questions that may either be unresolvable or better resolved less formally, when professionals deprive parents of an effective voice in decisions concerning their children, or when bureaucratic rules undermine the exercise of wise professional discretion. Policy remedies take the form of redressing the balance among these frameworks.

The British aspiration has been wholly different: *enabling professionals, through the exercise of benign discretion, to offer the highest level of service on the least stigmatizing terms possible, given available social resources.*[90] This model of social welfare does not recognize conflict. It is silent concerning politics and actively antagonistic toward law, postulating professionals and administrators working on behalf of an ever-expanding clientele toward an agreed-upon common good.

Such an approach is well suited to a period of social prosperity, when government can afford to provide more services for more people. It fares less well when economic growth slows, or when the social services are being trimmed. That situation fosters a reexamination of how available resources are distributed, and this may in turn reduce profes-

[88] See, e.g., Daniel P. Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty* (New York: Free Press, 1969).

[89] Compare Michael Walzer, *Radical Principles* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 23-53.

[90] See, e.g., Richard Titmuss, *Commitment to Welfare* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1968); Robert Pinker, *Social Theory and Social Policy* (London: Heineman, 1971).

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sional discretion. The new British emphasis on parental choice in education illustrates this reexamination at the micro-level. Each family becomes in effect semi-sovereign, able under certain circumstances to override professional judgments: since the beneficiaries cannot have more, as in the past, the temptation is to give them a greater say concerning what they do receive. At the macro-level, the government has sought to rationalize the distribution of funds by replacing the growth-oriented rate support grant, which in effect permitted local authorities to determine expenditures, with a more uniform national standard. This, too, constricts the authority of professionals and local program administrators.[91]

Both increased choice on the part of parents and the promise of more rationalist central government control identify the ambiguity of power relationships within the British policy-making system, and indicate the circumstances under which the unquestioned dominance of professional values in social welfare policy may come to an end. Neither the imminence nor the importance of these changes should be exaggerated. Choice and greater centralization remain merely proposals of uncertain impact, and because special education is so small in scope and structurally so isolated, these proposals may well have little obvious or direct impact even if implemented. Yet to the extent that change is marked, it will curb the authority of the professional providers, and so move British special education policy somewhat closer to the American model.

[91] See Tyrell Burgess and Tony Travers, *Ten Billion Pounds: Whitehall's Takeover of the Town Halls* (London: Grant McIntyre, 1980); Richard McAllister and David Hunter, *Local Government: Death in Our Time* (London: Outer Circle Policy Unit, 1980).

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DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE THIRD WORLD

By ROBERT W. JACKMAN*

> For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath.
>
> —*Matthew 13:12*

THAT there is a widening gap between rich and poor countries has become commonly accepted. International inequality is growing because industrial countries have higher rates of economic growth than do underdeveloped countries.[1]

A growing literature on dependency seeks to account for this "Matthew effect"[2] in terms of the position of countries within the world economy, with special emphasis on the distinction between the "core" industrialized countries and the "periphery." Within this general perspective, the effect of foreign-controlled multinational corporations on capital formation and on economic growth within the periphery has been of major concern. In particular, the investments made by these corporations in underdeveloped countries are often seen as inhibiting economic growth, since they are more than offset by excessive rates of capital repatriation to the industrial core. Foreign investment thus appears to remove from the periphery even that which it hath.

Politically, these patterns are perceived as having two major sets of implications. First, they undermine the autonomy of the periphery. Multinationals and international lending agencies become major, if not dominant, forces in economic policy making, a position they maintain by means of an implicit threat of withdrawal from, and consequent loss of capital by, the host country in the periphery.[3] Second, these pat-

* I would like to thank Mary R. Jackman, Terry M. Moe, and Brian D. Silver for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, and the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and the National Science Foundation for their support.

[1] See, e.g., Gunnar Myrdal, *Rich Lands and Poor* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), and Alejandro Portes, "On the Sociology of National Development: Theories and Issues," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 82 (July 1976), 55-85.

[2] A term coined by Robert K. Merton, "The Matthew Effect in Science," *Science*, Vol. 159 (January 1968), 56-63.

[3] See Tony Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory," *World Politics*, XXXI (January 1979), 247-88, at 251.

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terns lead to the development of new class relations and an acceleration of social inequality in the periphery; new groups emerge that are linked to the core, while the remainder of the periphery population becomes increasingly marginal, in both economic and political terms. Thus, an understanding of the relation between economic dependence and economic growth is important both for its own sake and because this relation is widely believed to have far-reaching indirect effects on patterns of political development.

In this paper, I examine the way in which foreign investment influences economic growth in Third World countries. After briefly outlining the central issues at stake, my analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I estimate the magnitude of the Matthew effect that is said to distinguish the industrialized West from the Third World. Second, I examine the degree to which foreign investment has affected economic growth in the Third World since 1960. To summarize in advance, the results provide little evidence either for the Matthew effect as commonly propounded, or for the idea that dependence on foreign investment inhibits growth. This, in turn, implies that many of the deleterious political outcomes often attributed to economic dependence are moot.

The Issues

Since discussions of different approaches to economic growth and development are readily available elsewhere,[4] I shall confine my attention here to a brief sketch of the key issues. To simplify somewhat, two broad approaches exist: the "world-system/dependency" approach with its emphasis on forces external to the nation-state, and the "modernization" approach with its emphasis on internal mechanisms.[5] These approaches have been taken in the quantitative comparative

[4] For example, Christopher Chase-Dunn, "The Effects of International Economic Dependence on Development and Inequality: A Cross-national Study," *American Sociological Review*, XL (December 1975), 720-38; Chase-Dunn, "Comparative Research on World-System Characteristics," *International Studies Quarterly*, XXIII (December 1979), 601-23; Portes (fn. 1); J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, "Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment," *Comparative Politics*, X (July 1978), 535-57; and Smith (fn. 3).

[5] This distinction is, of course, common in the recent literature. However, it is important to recognize that the labels are quite broad, since there is considerable heterogeneity of views within the dependency and (especially) the modernization approaches. Indeed, apart from this distinction (which itself only reflects a tendency), there is little that unifies the studies typically labeled as examples of the modernization perspective.

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literature[6] as providing two competing hypotheses about the impact of foreign investment on economic growth.

First, following the work of Baran, Frank,[7] and others, the dependency approach is generally taken to imply that foreign investment depresses growth. The core-periphery relationship is considered exploitative, in that profits are transferred back to the core rather than reinvested in the periphery; economic dependency thereby contributes to the "underdevelopment" of the periphery. At the same time, the external orientation of periphery economies encouraged by foreign investment is said to generate internal distortions and contradictions that retard growth. Growth is therefore slower in the periphery than it otherwise might be.

In sharp contrast, the modernization approach (which is usually taken to include neo-classical economics), implies that foreign investment promotes growth by providing external capital, which either substitutes for or supplements local capital. It is the presence rather than the origin of the capital that is considered important: capital fosters growth, and its benefits spread throughout the economy. In addition, foreign investment is thought to stimulate growth through the introduction of new technology into the less developed countries.[8]

Although the results of earlier attempts to verify these two approaches were mixed, more recent analyses have claimed to furnish evidence for the dependency explanation or a variant of it, while they have been taken as providing little evidence for the modernization explanation. For example, Stoneman argues that direct foreign investment is associated with structural effects that retard the economic growth of poor countries.[9] Similarly, Chase-Dunn reports that foreign investment inhibits growth and exacerbates inequality, from which he concludes "that dependency theories predict the effects of inputs from advanced nations to less-developed ones better than neo-classical inter-

[6] For example, see Chase-Dunn (fn. 4, 1975); Volker Bornschier, Christopher Chase-Dunn, and Richard Rubinson, "Cross-national Evidence of the Effects of Foreign Investment and Aid on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Survey of Findings and a Reanalysis," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 84 (November 1978), 651-83; and David Snyder and Edward L. Kick, "Structural Position in the World System and Economic Growth, 1955–1970: A Multiple-Network Analysis of Transnational Interactions," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 84 (March 1979), 1096-1126.

[7] Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957); and Andre G. Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).

[8] See, for example, Peter T. Bauer and Basil S. Yamey, *The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), chap. 10.

[9] Colin Stoneman, "Foreign Capital and Economic Growth," *World Development*, III (January 1975), 11-26.

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national economics theories or sociological modernization theories."[10] Modifying the argument slightly, Bornschier and his colleagues maintain that in the long term (5 to 20 years), the stock of foreign investment decreases the rate of economic growth; however, this pattern is especially strong within the initially richer of the developing countries. Although they properly note that "no one finding can either prove or disprove such a complex theoretical framework," they do take this result as at least "consistent with dependency theory."[11] Finally, in a related analysis that focuses more generally on "structural position" in the world economy rather than on foreign investment, Snyder and Kick report that being in the periphery inhibits economic growth; they take this as "strong support for world-system/dependency theories of structure in the post-World War II period and of the sources of differential economic growth of nations."[12]

There are at least two major problems with these studies—problems they share in varying degrees with most of the crossnational literature on this topic.[13] First, these inquiries are deficient as tests of the *relative* merits of the two approaches because they pay little attention to the factors identified in the modernization approach as important determinants of economic growth. Second, it is not at all clear that the dependency approach unambiguously implies that dependency retards economic growth.[14] I will discuss these issues in turn.

Snyder and Kick are perhaps most explicit in their dismissal of modernization theories, which they reject as "straw men" on the tenuous grounds that "an exogenetic vantage point can easily incorporate

[10] Chase-Dunn (fn. 4, 1975), 720. [11] Bornschier and others (fn. 6), 652.

[12] Snyder and Kick (fn. 6), 1123. However, the analyses underlying this conclusion are not especially robust: see Jackman, "A Note on the Measurement of Growth Rates in Cross-national Research," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 86 (November 1980), 604-17, at 607-11.

[13] Most of this literature is listed in Bornschier and others (fn. 6).

[14] However, many of these studies also draw on Wallerstein's world-system analysis, which, paralleling Frank's work (fn. 7), does imply such an outcome: see Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974). Nor is the view of dependency in the studies cited above unique to those analyses. A similar interpretation is clear, for example, in case studies which indicate that dependency has fostered growth and which then interpret this pattern as undermining or substantially modifying the world-system/dependency perspective: see, among others, Richard Barrett and Martin K. Whyte, "Dependency Theory and Taiwan: A Deviant Case Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 87 (forthcoming), and Ruth Milkman, "Contradictions of Semi-Peripheral Development: The South African Case," in Walter L. Goldfrank, ed., *The World System of Capitalism: Past and Present* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979), 261-84. For more general criticisms of the world-system/dependency approach, see, for example, Peter Gourevitch, "The International System and Regime Formation," *Comparative Politics*, x (April 1978), 419-38; Smith (fn. 3); and Aristide R. Zolberg, "Origins of the Modern World System: A Missing Link," *World Politics*, xxxiii (January 1981), 253-81.

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domestic factors . . . , while the converse would be conceptually more difficult."[15] The disregard of modernization explanations is less explicit in other studies. For example, the only control variables that Chase-Dunn considers are the level of domestic capital formation and the percentage of GDP originating in the mining sector.[16] Bornschier and his colleagues are careful to distinguish *levels* from *rates* of growth in their discussion of foreign investment, but make no corresponding distinction in their discussion of domestic capital formation.[17]

This neglect has led to an important lacuna. To be sure, a comprehensive attempt to specify the so-called modernization approach is perhaps impossible, given the heterogeneity of the studies commonly included under this rubric. Nonetheless, it is important to identify at least some of the critical factors addressed in this literature; if we do not, we have no way of evaluating the relative merits of the dependency and modernization approaches as explanations of growth in the Third World.

A good place to start is with domestic capital formation, in view of the central role assigned to capital investment in standard treatments of economic growth. If it is important to distinguish levels from growth in foreign investment, as do Bornschier and his colleagues, then it is equally important to make the corresponding distinction in the specification of domestic investment. After all, if the standard view is correct, the source of investment (foreign or domestic) is not the critical factor. In addition, it is a commonplace in discussions of economic growth that high crude birth rates inhibit economic growth because they produce a disproportionately young, nonproductive population:[18] hence, the well-known argument that control of fertility rates facilitates economic growth. (If that were the case, countries with declining crude birth rates should have higher rates of economic growth.) Finally, it is often observed that, all other things being equal, larger countries should have higher growth rates because greater population size introduces economies of scale into patterns of production. Indeed, Chenery and Syrquin suggest that size may be especially important for those Third World countries *above* the lowest income lev-

[15] Snyder and Kick (fn. 6), 1097.
[16] Chase-Dunn (fn. 4, 1975).
[17] Bornschier and others (fn. 6), 671-77.
[18] See, among others, Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover, *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958); Paul Bairoch, *The Economic Development of the Third World Since 1900*, trans. by Cynthia Postan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), chap. 1; and Joan Robinson, *Aspects of Development and Underdevelopment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 7-10.

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els, since these countries have sufficiently advanced economic infrastructures to be able to take advantage of economies of scale.[19]

The above points are hardly intended to exhaust the possibilities.[20] However, they do at least furnish a more reasonable background than has been provided in recent studies, against which any effects of foreign investment on growth can be evaluated.

A second general problem in the quantitative literature is the common assumption that in the dependency approach, dependence is seen as inhibiting economic growth.[21] The validity of this assumption is not at all self-evident. In this connection, it is important to remember that Marxist views of imperialism underlie the theory, and that these views imply that imperialism leads to *growth* in the periphery. Thus, in *The Communist Manifesto* we read:

> The bourgeoisie . . . draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation. . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.[22]

In his elaboration, Lenin argued that the core needed to develop markets in and acquire raw materials from the periphery, but that over time the core would stagnate while the periphery became a source of industrial growth.[23] In other words, imperialism would lead to capitalist economic growth in the periphery.

Much of the quantitative literature seems to have gone astray by relying on analyses like Frank's and Bodenheimer's.[24] The problem here, as Portes notes, is that

[19] Hollis Chenery and Moises Syrquin, *Patterns of Development, 1950–1970* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), chap. 4. This is not to imply that any scale effects due to population size can be achieved through very high rates of fertility. The two factors are quite distinct. Indeed, a disproportionately young, nonproductive population is more likely to strain existing resources than to allow for economies of scale.

[20] Among the factors I have not included, one of the more interesting may be agricultural productivity (see, for example, Bairoch [fn. 18], chap. 2). Unfortunately, this omission must stand here since appropriate data are unavailable.

[21] Rare exceptions include Robert R. Kaufman, Daniel S. Geller, and Harry I. Chernotsky, "A Preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependency," *Comparative Politics*, VII (April 1975), 303-30, at 307-08, and James L. Ray and Thomas Webster, "Dependency and Economic Growth in Latin America," *International Studies Quarterly*, XXII (September 1978), 409-34, at 411.

[22] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), 20.

[23] V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Form of Capitalism* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965).

[24] Frank (fn. 7); Susanne J. Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment," *Politics and Society*, II (May 1971), 327-57.

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> These writings have created the erroneous impression that "dependency" analyses continue to be concerned with the same quasi-colonial situation of economic stagnation and foreign control of export enclaves. On the contrary, contemporary dependency studies address a situation in which domestic industrialization has occurred along with increasing economic denationalization; in which sustained economic growth has been accompanied by rising social inequalities; and in which rapid urbanization and the spread of literacy have converged with the ever more evident marginalization of the masses.[25]

Thus, contrary to the assumption made in many of the recent quantitative studies, the dependency perspective continues to be informed by and to extend Marxist views of imperialism. Cardoso and Faletto refer to the process as one of "dependent development":

> By development, in this context, we mean "capitalist development." This form of development, in the periphery as well as in the center, produces as it evolves, in a cyclical way, wealth and poverty, accumulation and shortage of capital, employment for some and unemployment for others. So we do not mean by the notion of "development" the achievement of a more egalitarian or just society. *These are not consequences expected of capitalist development*, especially in peripheral economies.[26]

The foreign investment introduced by multinationals is thus seen as entirely compatible with high rates of economic growth. However, this rapid growth is likely to be unbalanced, and therefore inegalitarian.[27] In light of this, the common argument that the dependency

[25] Portes (fn. 1), 75. For similar arguments, see Fernando H. Cardoso, "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States," *Latin American Research Review*, XII (Spring 1977), 7-24; Thomas E. Weisskopf, "Dependence as an Explanation of Underdevelopment: A Critique," mimeo (Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, 1977); and Valenzuela and Valenzuela (fn. 4), 536.

[26] Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, trans. by Marjory M. Urguidi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), xxiii; emphasis added. See also Barbara Stallings, *Economic Dependency in Africa and Latin America* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1972), 35-44.

[27] Along with the quantitative studies of the impact of dependence on growth mentioned earlier, there has been a growing number of studies of the effects of dependence on inequality *within* countries: for example, Chase-Dunn (fn. 4, 1975); Bornschier and others (fn. 6); Volker Bornschier and Thanh-Huyen Ballmer-Cao, "Income Inequality: A Cross-national Study," *American Sociological Review*, XLIV (June 1979), 487-506; and Peter B. Evans and Michael Timberlake, "Dependence, Inequality, and the Growth of the Tertiary: A Comparative Analysis of Less-Developed Countries," *American Sociological Review*, XLV (August 1980), 531-52. With few exceptions, these analyses have provided support for the dependence-inequality relationship. Evans and Timberlake go as far as to suggest that this relationship is therefore "one of the most robust quantitative, aggregate findings available" (p. 532). There is an interesting paradox here. On the one hand, the quantitative literature says that dependence retards growth, while on the other hand it maintains (often in the same study) that dependence increases inequality. If Cardoso and Faletto (among others) are correct, these two patterns are contradictory. They are also contradictory if we take seriously

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approach implies a negative relationship between foreign investment and growth is not as well-founded as it might appear. Although these considerations do not in themselves bear on the results reported in the recent empirical literature, they do suggest that those results cannot be correctly interpreted as providing unambiguous support for a dependency argument.

Before examining the way in which foreign investment affects economic growth rates in the Third World, I turn to the prior question: have Third World countries experienced slower rates of economic growth than the industrialized West? Although this question is generally answered affirmatively, and although such an answer is generally taken as a given in the empirical dependency literature, there has been remarkably little systematic analysis of the magnitude and form of the pattern.

How Big Is the Matthew Effect?

In one of the few studies that have directly addressed this issue, Portes examines the growing inequality between poor and advanced countries in two ways. First, he presents data showing that over the years 1963–1973, underdeveloped countries had an average annual percentage growth rate in per capita GNP of 3.2 percent, as compared with 3.9 percent for the developed countries. He also notes that these figures understate the gap because OPEC countries were included in the former category. Second, he cross-classifies countries by 1963 per capita GNP and by growth rates from 1963 to 1973. Bearing in mind the "great deal of dispersion" evident in this classification, Portes concludes that "left to themselves, economic mechanisms . . . tend to increase disparities between the wealthiest and poorest nations."[28]

I adopt a comparable approach, by regressing growth rates on initial levels of wealth. Data on annual average growth rates in per capita GNP from 1960 to 1978 are from the World Bank, as are figures on 1960 per capita GNP.[29] Since I am concerned with the comparison between the Third World and the West, I exclude countries with cen-

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the view advanced some time ago by Olson that rapid economic growth inherently exacerbates social inequality and is therefore politically destabilizing; see Mancur Olson, "Rapid Economic Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History*, XXIII (December 1963), 529-52.

[28] Portes (fn. 1), 59.

[29] The former figures appear in World Bank, *World Development Report, 1980* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1980), table 1; the latter are in World Bank, *World Tables, 1971* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1971).

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trally planned economies from the analysis. In view of Portes's discussion, I also exclude the three "capital surplus oil exporters" identified by the World Bank: Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia.[30]

In the first row of the top panel of Table 1, growth rates are regressed on the (natural) logarithm of 1960 per capita GNP. The estimates for this regression suggest a positive relationship between initial wealth and subsequent growth (as anticipated in the literature), and the coefficient has a t-ratio of 3.4 which is statistically significant well beyond the .01 level. At the same time, however, the $\bar{R}^2$ of .101 indicates that the fit is poor: initial wealth does not account for much of the variance in growth.

The second row displays the estimates using an alternative specification. Following Chenery and Syrquin,[31] growth rates are regressed on the logarithm of 1960 per capita GNP and its square. In other words, the model is quadratic in the logarithms, and allows for a possible nonlinearity in the relationship. Comparing the $\bar{R}^2$s for the two specifications, it is clear that the nonlinear model in row 2 gives a much better fit than does the linear model (the $\bar{R}^2$ increases by 68 percent from .101 to .170), although the relationship can again hardly be described as strong.

The second row also shows that the estimate for lnGNP per capita is positive (+5.870), while that for the squared term is negative (−.464). In addition, both estimates have highly significant t-ratios. This means that the relationship follows an inverted "U" pattern, so that growth rates increase with initial wealth up to an inflection point which occurs at the 1960 per capita GNP level of $559.[32] Beyond this

[30] These three countries are identified in World Bank, *World Tables, The Second Edition, 1980* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 470-71. Note, however, that the same pattern is obtained when both sets of countries are included in the analysis, and whether or not Kuwait is included (Kuwait is an outlier here, with an extremely high initial per capita GNP coupled with a negative growth rate of −2.3%).

[31] Chenery and Syrquin (fn. 19).

[32] There is, of course, considerable collinearity between logGNP per capita and its square. This, however, is not a problem in the present analysis, for two reasons. First, *despite* the collinearity, the t-ratios are high. Second, an alternative estimation procedure that reduces the collinearity gives the same results. Specifically, instead of estimating (where X = logGNP per capita):

$$\text{growth} = b_0 + b_1 X + b_2 X^2,$$

we subtract the mean of X from X and then estimate:

$$\text{growth} = c_0 + c_1(X - \bar{X}) + c_2(X - \bar{X})^2.$$

This procedure removes the collinearity for the purposes of estimation while generating the same curve, since $b_0 = c_0 - c_1\bar{X} + c_2\bar{X}^2$; $b_1 = c_1 - 2c_2\bar{X}$; and $b_2 = c_2$. For discussion on centering X around its mean (or some other constant) to reduce collinearity in polynomial regression, see Ralph A. Bradley and Sushil S. Srivastava, "Correlation in

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TABLE 1

REGRESSIONS OF AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES IN PER CAPITA GNP, 1960 TO 1978, ON PER CAPITA GNP, 1960

[COEFFICIENTS (T-RATIOS)]

Cases	*Dependent Variable*	*lnGNP per capita 1960*	*(lnGNP per capita 1960)²*	*Constant*	$\bar{R}^2$	*F-ratio*
Third World and Industrial West (N = 98)	GNP growth 1960–78	.588*** (3.4)		−.492 (0.5)	.101	11.9
		5.870*** (3.3)	−.464*** (3.0)	−14.954*** (3.1)	.170	10.9
Third World Only (N = 80)	GNP growth 1960–78	1.012*** (3.5)		−2.559* (1.8)	.127	12.5
		5.647 (1.6)	−.452 (1.3)	−14.189 (1.6)	.135	7.1
Third World and Industrial West (N = 102)	GNP growth 1960–74	.784*** (4.4)		−1.435 (1.5)	.156	19.6
		6.292*** (3.4)	−.484*** (3.0)	−16.520*** (3.3)	.220	15.2

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

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level, growth rates *decrease*. When this curve is plotted as in Figure 1, we find that at the lowest 1960 per capita GNP level of $44, the estimated average growth rate is 0.6 percent. This rises to a maximum estimated average growth rate of 3.6 percent at the inflection point in the curve, and then declines to 2.4 percent at the highest 1960 per capita

FIGURE 1

RELATION BETWEEN 1960 GNP PER CAPITA AND AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE GROWTH IN GNP PER CAPITA, 1960 TO 1978*



* Curve plotted from the estimates in the second row of Table 1 (N = 98).

GNP level of $2,719. In other words, the lowest growth rates are found among the poorest Third World countries, as anticipated. Contrary to expectations, however, the highest growth rates are found not in the industrialized West, but in the wealthiest Third World countries.

Substantively, these estimates suggest two things. First, the Matthew effect occurs primarily *within* the countries of the Third World, de-

Polynomial Regression," *The American Statistician*, XXXIII (February 1979), 11-14. I would like to thank Kenneth Bollen for drawing this procedure and reference to my attention.

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fined here as those in the low- and middle-income categories identified by the World Bank.[33] Among these countries, those that were the wealthiest in 1960 had the highest growth rates between 1960 and 1978. Among the industrialized countries of the West, however, the pattern is reversed, and the relationship between initial wealth and subsequent growth is negative, although on the average these countries have higher rates of growth than the poorest Third World countries. Thus, while it is true that the gap between the West and the poorest Third World countries has been increasing, that between the West and the wealthiest Third World countries has been decreasing, which implies a Matthew effect of considerably modified form. Second, in terms of goodness of fit, the pattern is not a strong one, accounting for less than one-fifth of the variance in growth rates. This means that the strength of the Matthew effect just described should not be overstated.

In order to check this pattern further, in the second panel of Table 1, I re-estimate the model for low- and medium-income countries only (that is, I exclude the 18 Western countries as identified by the World Bank). If the above interpretation is correct, the pattern should be approximately linear among these Third World countries, so that adding the quadratic term should not improve the fit. The estimates in the second panel indicate that this is indeed the case: the $\bar{R}^2$ does not increase meaningfully when the quadratic term is added, and unlike the t-ratio for the linear model, those for the quadratic model are less than 2.0. At the same time, these estimates underscore the weakness of the relationship: initial wealth accounts for only about one-eighth of the variance in subsequent growth among Third World countries.

Finally, it might be argued that the period 1960 to 1978 was "unusual," in that the sharp rise in oil prices starting in late 1973 may have affected growth rates after that date so drastically (especially within the West) as to bias the overall figures for 1960 to 1978. Hence, my inverted U-shaped curve with its inflection point of $559 may simply reflect this new circumstance rather than a long-term pattern. On *a priori* grounds, there is little to commend this view, since there is every reason to believe that the rise in oil prices has affected the Third World at least as much as the West, if not more.[34] On empirical grounds, there is also little to support this argument. As the figures in the bottom panel of Table 1 show, the same inverted U pattern is found when average annual growth rates in per capita GNP for 1960 to 1974 are substituted for those for 1960 to 1978.[35] Whether we examine the

[33] World Bank (fn. 30), 470-71. [34] Compare Bairoch (fn. 18), 210.
[35] The 1960 to 1974 figures are from World Bank, *World Bank Atlas, 1976* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1976).

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shorter or the longer period, we find only a weak Matthew effect of the modified form described above.

The fact that the Matthew effect is weaker, and of a form different from the one that has generally been assumed, challenges a key assumption of much of the quantitative dependency literature. The observed pattern, in which parts of the periphery have experienced higher rates of growth than the core, undermines the argument advanced by Snyder and Kick,[36] among others, that the core has been successfully and invariably underdeveloping the periphery.

Foreign Investment and Growth, 1960 to 1978

The pattern of growth just described does not logically preclude the possibility that foreign investment systematically affects growth in the Third World. That is the issue to which I now turn. I begin with a simple model that expresses growth as a function of levels of, and growth in, both domestic *and* foreign investment; changes in the crude birth rate; and initial population size. This model is estimated for all Third World countries, which are defined as before to include the low- and middle-income countries identified by the World Bank,[37] but not the three capital surplus oil exporters, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia.

The variables are defined as follows. The dependent variable is the average annual percentage growth rate in per capita GNP, 1960 to 1978, as described in the previous section. The level of domestic investment is measured by figures on gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP, 1960, as reported by the World Bank.[38] Growth in domestic investment is defined as the average annual percentage growth rate in gross domestic investment, 1960 to 1973, as calculated by the World Bank.[39] Thus, the first measure reflects initial levels of domestic investment, while the second reflects subsequent average growth or decline in domestic investment patterns. The choice of 1973 as the cutoff point for the second variable is dictated by practical considerations of data availability; as will become evident below, this year also has the advantage of coinciding with the cutoff point for available data on growth in foreign investment.

[36] Snyder and Kick (fn. 6).

[37] World Bank (fn. 30), 470-71.

[38] World Bank (fn. 29, 1980), table 5. Here and elsewhere, I employ the most recent estimates available, since the World Bank and other agencies are continuously revising their estimates for earlier as well as for more recent years. Typically, these revisions are minor.

[39] World Bank, *World Tables, 1976* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), Series I.

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Measuring foreign investment patterns is more difficult because data are more scarce. Here I follow previous studies[40] and use the total amount of direct investments by members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the Third World. More specifically, this variable reflects "the net book value to the direct investor of affiliates (subsidiaries, branches, and associates) in LDCs."[41] Data on this measure are available for two years, 1967 and 1973.[42] Since figures are unavailable for the years before 1967 (and since this date is closer to 1960 than it is to 1978), I take the 1967 figures to reflect the "initial" level of foreign investment (as is done in the above studies, among others). Paralleling the treatment of the initial level of domestic investment, the 1967 level of foreign investment is taken as a percentage of 1967 GDP.[43] Thus, both levels of investment variables are expressed as shares of total domestic production. To measure growth in foreign investment, I follow conventional procedures where annual series are unavailable, by taking the logarithm of the ratio of total 1973 foreign investments to total 1967 foreign investments: this ratio approximates a compound growth figure.[44]

Initial population size is measured by figures on the total population for 1960; since this variable is badly skewed, it is transformed logarithmically prior to the analysis.[45] Changes (usually declines) in the crude birth rate are measured in the same way as the flow of foreign investment, since a continuous series is again unavailable. Thus, I take the logarithm of the ratio of 1977 crude births per 1,000 population to 1960 crude births per 1,000 population.[46]

Finally, as part of the analysis to follow, I also control for the level of initial wealth, by dividing countries according to their 1960 per capita GNP (as defined in the previous section). Of the 86 Third World countries for which data are available, 44 have a 1960 score of less than $150, while 42 have a score of $150 or more. I therefore take

[40] For example, Bornschier and others (fn. 6), and Evans and Timberlake (fn. 27).

[41] OECD, *Stock of Private Direct Investment by DAC Countries in Developing Countries, End 1967* (Paris: OECD, Development Assistance Directorate, 1972).

[42] Volker Bornschier and Peter Heintz, *Compendium of Data for World-System Analysis* (Zurich: Bulletin of the Sociological Institute, University of Zurich, 1979), table 3.2.1.

[43] The latter data are from World Bank (fn. 30), Series I.

[44] See George W. Barclay, *Techniques of Population Analysis* (New York: John Wiley, 1958), 28-33; and Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 286.

[45] Data are from World Bank (fn. 39), Series I.

[46] The 1977 figures are from World Bank, *World Development Report, 1979* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), table 18; those for 1960 are from World Bank (fn. 29, 1980), table 18.

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this point (which is close to the median value) as the basis for distinguishing initially low-income from initially medium-income countries.

To summarize, I examine the following model for Third World countries both as a whole and subdivided into low- and medium-income groups:

$$\triangle\text{GNP60-78} = a + b_1\text{DomInv/GDP60} + b_2\triangle\text{DomInv60-73} + b_3\text{ForInv/GDP67} + b_4\triangle\text{ForInv67-73} + b_5\text{Pop60} + b_6\triangle\text{Birth60-77} + e \quad (1)$$

where:

$\triangle$GNP60-78 = annual average percent growth in GNP per capita, 1960–1978
DomInv/GDP60 = Gross Domestic Investment/GDP, 1960
$\triangle$DomInv60-73 = annual average percent growth in Gross Domestic Investment, 1960–1973
ForInv/GDP67 = Foreign Investment/GDP, 1967
$\triangle$ForInv67-73 = $\log_e$(Foreign Investment 1973/Foreign Investment 1967)
Pop60 = $\log_e$Total Population, 1960
$\triangle$Birth60-77 = $\log_e$(Crude birth rate 1977/Crude birth rate 1960)

This simple model elaborates previous efforts[47] in two ways. First, paralleling the treatment of foreign investment, domestic investment is specified as consisting of two basic elements: levels and growth rates. Second, the model incorporates initial population size and changes in crude birth rates, to reflect the emphasis that these factors have received in the standard literature.[48]

Table 2 displays the estimates for equation (1). Those in the top panel are based on all 72 Third World countries for which data on all variables are available, while the second and third panels report the corresponding figures for low- and medium-income Third World countries, respectively.

For all 72 Third World countries, the figures show that both the initial level of and subsequent growth in domestic investment have a positive effect on economic growth, as expected; both estimates are

[47] For example, Chase-Dunn (fn. 4, 1975); Stoneman (fn. 9); Bornschier and others (fn. 6).

[48] Unlike some other recent models (e.g., Bornschier and others, fn. 6), mine does not include initial per capita GNP as an explanatory variable in equation (1). Since the model is estimated below for two groups of countries defined in terms of their initial per capita GNP, the inclusion of this variable on the right-hand side of equation (1) would have served only to control twice for the same variable.

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Table 2

Regressions of Average Annual Growth Rates in per capita GNP, 1960 to 1978, on Stocks and Flows of Domestic and Foreign Investment, Population Size, and Changes in Crude Birth Rates

[Coefficients (t-ratios)]

Cases	*DomInv/ GDP60*	*△DomInv 60-73*	*ForInv/ GDP67*	*△ForInv 67-73*	*Pop60*	*△Birth 60-77*	*Constant*	$\bar{R}^2$	*F-ratio*
All Third World countries (N = 72)	.084*** (3.1)	.215*** (5.2)	−.007 (0.7)	1.020*** (2.8)	.170 (1.2)	−2.270** (2.4)	−2.376* (1.8)	.601	18.8
Poor Third World countries: 1960GNPcap < $150 (N = 33)	−.019 (0.3)	.202*** (3.2)	.077** (2.6)	.340 (0.7)	.250 (1.4)	−3.934** (2.1)	−2.414 (1.4)	.666	11.6
Wealthier Third World countries: 1960GNPcap > $150 (N = 39)	.083** (2.1)	.194*** (3.5)	−.011 (1.1)	1.705*** (3.1)	.413* (1.9)	−2.973** (2.5)	−4.591** (2.1)	.582	9.8

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

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significant statistically beyond the .01 level. In addition, population size has no effect for Third World countries as a whole, but declining birth rates are associated with higher growth rates, as anticipated. However, neither the size of the estimates for foreign investment nor their t-ratios are consistent with those reported in many recent studies. The level of foreign investment has a negatively-signed estimate, but with a t-ratio of only 0.7, while growth in foreign investment has a positively-signed estimate, but with a relatively high t-ratio of 2.8. Stoneman as well as Bornschier and his colleagues report highly significant t-ratios for the level of foreign investment; the latter study reports a low t-ratio for the growth coefficient of 1.4 ($N = 76$).[49] In contrast, the figures in the first row of Table 2 indicate that the level of foreign capital has *no* effect on economic growth for the Third World as a whole, one way or the other. At the same time, they suggest that growth in foreign capital (like both the level and growth of domestic capital) contributes to economic growth—which is consistent with the standard view that capital formation is generally associated with growth.

In a similar vein, the subgroup estimates of the effects of foreign investment in the second and third panels of Table 2 provide little support for the conclusions advanced by Bornschier and others. Among the low-income countries, I obtain a *positive* estimate for the level of foreign investment (t-ratio: 2.6), which suggests that, for these countries, foreign investment may in fact foster growth rather than retard it. Although positive, the estimate for growth in foreign investment for these countries is smaller than its standard error. Among the medium-income countries, I obtain negative coefficients for the stock of foreign investment, consistent with the results reported by Bornschier and his colleagues. However, my estimate for this coefficient is not statistically significant (t-ratio: 1.1). In addition, the effect of growth in foreign investment is much more pronounced in my analysis than it is in theirs (my t-ratio of 3.1 is almost four times the size of theirs of 0.8).

To summarize the subgroup estimates in Table 2, the effects of foreign investment on economic growth vary with the initial level of wealth, but not in the way suggested in previous studies. Among the low-income countries, the level of foreign investment has a positive effect, while growth in foreign investment is unrelated to economic growth. Among the medium-income countries, by contrast, the level of foreign investment has a negative but insignificant effect, while growth in foreign investment has a positive effect on economic growth.

[49] Stoneman (fn. 9); Bornschier and others (fn. 6).

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Among the other coefficients, the subgroup estimates reinforce the earlier interpretation that both the initial level and the subsequent growth of domestic investment lead to higher growth rates, except that the level of domestic investment coefficient for the low-income countries is much smaller than its standard error. In the two subgroups, the estimates for growth in domestic investment are of similar size. Along with this, the subgroup estimates for population size show that this factor has no systematic effect among low-income countries, while it has a systematic positive effect among countries in the medium-income category. This pattern is fully consistent with the argument that among middle-income countries, size has a positive impact on economic growth because it allows for economies of scale.[50] Finally, in both low- and medium-income countries, declining birth rates are associated with growth, and the coefficients are of similar size in the two subgroups.

The most obvious, and major, difference between my analysis and earlier studies is that mine pays more attention to the specification of "internal" factors that affect economic growth.[51] Indeed, by simply excluding initial population size from the model, it is possible to increase the size of the level of foreign investment coefficients for the sample as a whole, and for the medium-income countries in particular. (Not surprisingly, since population size has no meaningful effect among low-income countries, the exclusion has little effect on the coefficient in this subgroup.) In the case of all Third World countries, the coefficient for level of foreign investment and its t-ratio double in size when the population term is excluded, although the increased t-ratio remains small (1.4). For the medium-income countries, the pattern is more dramatic: exclusion of the population term doubles the level of foreign investment coefficient and produces a t-ratio of 2.2, which is statistically significant beyond the .05 level. Thus, the inclusion of population size has a pronounced effect on the results: indeed, this inclusion shows that the apparently negative effect of stocks of foreign investment in medium-income countries is spurious.

One potential problem remains concerning the estimates of Table 2. For some countries, the level of foreign investment is unusually high. For all Third World countries, ForInv/GDP67 ranges from 0.6 per-

[50] Chenery and Syrquin (fn. 19), chap. 4.

[51] Some of the earlier studies also suffer from problems of heteroscedasticity, on which see Jackman (fn. 12). That is not an issue in the present analysis. Note also that Bornschier and others (fn. 6) employ a different deflator for the stock of foreign investment (the geometric mean of energy consumption and population size). However, my own checks indicate that this does not account for the differences between my results and theirs.

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cent to 103.7 percent, with a mean of 16.0 percent. In contrast, DomInv/GDP60 ranges from 5.0 percent to 45.0 percent, although the mean of 16.6 percent is quite close to that for the first variable. While it is in principle not unreasonable for the level of foreign investment to exceed domestic production, it is important to be sure that a few extreme scores are not responsible for the results reported above. Six countries have ForInv/GDP67 scores greater than 50 percent, a figure that is over three times the size of the mean. These (with their scores) are: Jamaica (58.4%), Liberia (96.4%), Mauritania (62.5%), Panama (103.7%), Trinidad and Tobago (84.6%), and Zaire (50.2%). All except Mauritania fall into the medium-income category. The next highest score is 38.6 percent for Venezuela, a medium-income country, while the next-highest score for a low-income country is 26.8 percent (Nigeria). To what extent are the results in Table 2 sensitive to these extreme values?

Table 3 displays estimates that correspond to those in Table 2, except that the six countries with extreme scores on ForInv/GDP67 are excluded. For low-income countries, the N is reduced by one, to 32, while for medium-income countries, it is reduced by 5, to 34. For all the figures in the top and bottom panels of Table 3, most of the coefficients and their t-ratios are not affected substantially, when compared to Table 2, by the exclusion of these cases. Thus, my earlier conclusion that the level of foreign investment has no effect on growth for the sample as a whole, or for medium-income countries in particular, is not dependent on the five extreme values. However, the exclusion of just one case (Mauritania) from the low-income countries indicates that the positive and significant estimate for ForInv/GDP67 reported in Table 2 is not especially robust. Excluding Mauritania (a country whose ForInv/GDP67 score is more than twice the size of the next-largest score among low-income countries, and whose growth in GNP of 3.6 percent is well above average) leads to a reduction of the t-ratio for this coefficient from 2.6 to 1.5, which is not statistically significant at even the .10 level. In all, then, there is no evidence that the level of foreign investment has a consistent impact on growth in either the poor or the medium-income countries of the Third World.

Conclusions

The preceding analyses show, first, that there is little evidence of the commonly-argued Matthew effect where the core has experienced higher rates of growth than the periphery. Instead, my estimates suggest a modified Matthew effect *within* Third World countries, such

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Table 3

Regressions of Average Annual Growth Rates in per capita GNP, 1960 to 1978, on Stocks and Flows of Domestic and Foreign Investment, Population Size, and Changes in Crude Birth Rates, Excluding Outliers on Stock of Foreign Investment

[Coefficients (t-ratios)]

Cases	*DomInv/ GDP60*	*△DomInv 60-73*	*ForInv/ GDP67*	*△ForInv 67-73*	*Pop60*	*△Birth 60-77*	*Constant*	$\bar{R}^2$	*F-ratio*
All Third World countries (N = 66)	.061** (2.1)	.272*** (5.8)	−.011 (0.6)	.676* (1.8)	.218 (1.6)	−2.317** (2.4)	−2.622** (2.0)	.660	22.1
Poor Third World countries: 1960GNPcap < $150 (N = 32)	−.032 (0.5)	.223*** (3.0)	.062 (1.5)	.280 (0.6)	.257 (1.4)	−3.545* (1.8)	−2.251 (1.3)	.662	11.1
Wealthier Third World countries: 1960GNPcap > $150 (N = 34)	.074* (1.8)	.274*** (4.7)	−.033 (1.4)	1.268** (2.3)	.452** (2.1)	−2.891** (2.4)	−4.821** (2.3)	.681	12.7

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

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that the initially wealthiest of these have grown more rapidly than the West which, in turn, has grown faster than the poorest countries of the Third World. It is important to remember, however, that even this modified Matthew effect is not a strong one.

Second, my results indicate that the impact of foreign investment on economic growth rates within the Third World is limited. In particular, the initial level of foreign investment has *no* consistent effect on growth, one way or the other, when other relevant factors are controlled. This last proviso is fundamental; it accounts for much of the difference between my results and those reported in earlier studies. I have shown here that the apparently negative effect of levels of foreign investment suggested by others is spurious, and reflects instead the effect of population size. There is no evidence that high levels of foreign investment themselves dampen economic growth in a systematic manner, as one is led to expect by much of the recent literature. This underscores the costs associated with treating conventional approaches to economic growth as straw men.

At the same time, my results show that the *growth* of foreign investment has a *positive* effect on economic growth, at least among the initially wealthier countries of the Third World. It may be tempting to conclude that these results are consistent with a dependency view. After all, as Portes and others have pointed out, dependence on foreign capital may stimulate growth. However, any such conclusion on the basis of this analysis of the available data is premature. While the positive effect of the growth of foreign investment may be consistent with some of the dependency arguments, it is also consistent with more conventional perspectives. Further analyses are required if we are to choose between these contending views.

What forms might these additional analyses take? I believe one fruitful avenue would be to address some of the *consequences* of economic growth. The pattern of dependent development suggested by Cardoso and Faletto and others implies that foreign investment fosters growth, which (because it is uneven) produces *more* inequality. Minimally, this argument requires that these three factors be statistically interrelated; its evaluation would require building on the present analysis, which addresses only foreign investment and economic growth. Failure to find a more complete pattern would lend support to more conventional arguments, which link neither foreign investment nor economic growth to inequality.

In line with most of the literature, I have treated growth as being potentially dependent on foreign investment. Consider, however, a sec-

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ond avenue that would recast part of the analysis in light of the following alternative:

> Direct investment is dictated almost exclusively by commercial considerations, so that its volume is a reliable index of independent opinions on the economic prospects of the local economy and on the productivity of capital in different employments in it. . . . Mistakes are made; but those providing the capital have a continuing interest in minimising the error and in taking remedial action where necessary.[52]

Such a view implies that economic growth rates (reflecting the "prospects of the local economy") and growth in foreign investment are reciprocally related. Higher growth rates attract more foreign capital, which fosters higher growth rates, and so on. Ironically, such a pattern involves a success-breeds-success Matthew effect of its own. However, that is hardly the Matthew effect anticipated in much of the dependency literature.

Taken together, additional analyses along these lines will enable us to choose between dependency and more conventional approaches to economic growth. Until we have such analyses (which will require more extensive data on foreign investment than are currently available), the results in this paper undermine two currently popular views. They indicate that, first, the core has *not* invariably been underdeveloping the periphery in a blanket way. Second, foreign investment emanating from the industrial West has *not* served to depress growth rates in the Third World. To the extent that economic growth bears on patterns of political change and development, these results suggest that many of the negative political consequences claimed for dependence on foreign capital may be substantially overstated.

[52] Bauer and Yamey (fn. 8), 143.

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SECURITY VERSUS ACCESS TO RESOURCES: Explaining a Decade of U.S. Ocean Policy

By FINN LAURSEN*

Introduction

AT a time when the Reagan Administration has decided to review the American stand on the Law of the Sea, it may be appropriate to take a look at the policies inherited from former administrations, and try to explicate their underlying assumptions. In this article, which constitutes a case study of foreign policy making, I will argue that former U.S. administrations involved in the Law-of-the-Sea negotiations perceived security interests to be of primary importance. Because of this perception, earlier U.S. administrations considered it to be very important for the United States to contribute to the promotion of a widely accepted international agreement concerning the use of ocean space—including the seabed and subsoil, the water column and surface, as well as the air space above—which would assure free military use of the area. To reach such an agreement, the United States was willing to make certain concessions in relation to the exploitation of ocean resources with the understanding that American companies would be guaranteed reasonable access to these resources. In other words, the United States used linkage strategies within the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). The U.S. was willing, from about 1975, to contribute to the creation of an operational International Seabed Authority (ISA) that would itself engage directly in deep seabed mining, along with private companies. The *quid pro quo* for this contribution would be a treaty-guaranteed freedom of navigation beyond the territorial seas, and free transit rights in straits used for international navigation, including free overflight and the right to use the oceans for military purposes.

The alternative to such a multilateral policy and its concomitant linkage strategies was a policy of unilateralism. An all-out unilateral approach might well have forced the U.S. to defend navigational rights by the use of naval power. The Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations shied away from this option, but domestic pressures forced

* The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from Princeton University and the Danish Social Science Research Council.

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World Politics 0043-8871/82/020197-35$01.75/1
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partial unilateral strategies to be implemented during the 1970s. To a certain degree, therefore, domestic politics upset the strategy originally chosen by central U.S. decision makers (i.e., the President and his closest advisors). To the extent that the initial strategy—as it was developed around 1970—was fairly world-order oriented, the fate of the American ocean policy during the 1970s has important lessons for students of world order. Domestic U.S. forces contributed decisively to the national enclosure of ocean resources, thus undermining the idea—solemnly pronounced by the U.N. General Assembly in 1970—that ocean resources beyond national boundaries constitute a common heritage of mankind.

To explicate the complexities of American ocean policy making during the 1970s, I will apply various analytical perspectives, namely, (1) statism, (2) international interdependence, (3) bureaucratic politics, and (4) domestic politics. Of these perspectives, statism and domestic politics will be found most important. Statist goals set important parameters for U.S. ocean policy. The changes that took place within these parameters may largely be explained by domestic politics. International interdependence helps us understand the use of linkage strategies, but the final verdict on interdependence will have to await the conclusion of the Reagan Administration's review of U.S. ocean policy. Although there was a lot of bureaucratic politics, it was rather epiphenomenal from the point of view of explaining the more important outcomes.

Each of the models will single out important structures, processes, and actors. Table I provides an overview. The particular elements will then be developed further, and some predicted outcomes will also be offered. The latter will be compared with actual outcomes in order to determine the relative explanatory power of the different models.

Statist Goals

An important tradition within international relations and foreign policy scholarship centers on the role of the nation-state as an autonomous, rational, and unitary actor which pursues national interests that are often defined in terms of power. Hans Morgenthau, who exemplifies this tradition, called his contribution a realist theory of international politics.[1] Although a number of scholars have been questioning various assumptions of realism over the last decade or so, the theory is

[1] Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973).

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TABLE 1

PERSPECTIVES ON THE MAKING OF U.S. OCEAN POLICY

Model	*Structure*	*Actors*	*Processes*
Statism	Autonomy of state	President State Department	Presidential leadership
International interdependence	Sensitivities and vulnerabilities of states	Other states International organizations	Agenda setting Learning Linkage strategies
Bureaucratic politics	Autonomy of bureaucratic agencies	Bureaucrats	Pulling and hauling
Domestic politics	Capitalist economy Fragmented political power	Constituents Interest groups Congress	Electoral battles Lobbying Log-rolling Congressional leadership

far from dead.[2] On the contrary, various efforts have lately been made to reassert some of the arguments and conclusions arrived at by earlier proponents of realism.[3] One of the more compelling efforts to reformulate some of the central tenets of this intellectual tradition has come from Stephen Krasner, according to whom the state, defined as consisting of "central decision-making institutions and roles," remains an autonomous actor. These central institutions, mainly the White House and the State Department, pursue policies that "cannot be reduced to some summation of private desires." They are said to have a "high degree of insulation from specific societal pressures and a set of formal

[2] Cf. R. Harrison Wagner, "Dissolving the State: Three Recent Perspectives on International Relations," *International Organization*, XXVIII (Summer 1976), 435-66.

[3] See David J. Sylvan, "The Newest Mercantilism," *International Organization*, XXXV (Spring 1981), 375-93.

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and informal obligations that charge them with furthering the nation's general interests."[4]

The classical realist school approached the question of public goals in a logical-deductive fashion. According to Morgenthau, nation-states pursue "interests defined in terms of power." That conclusion was derived from the notion that "politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature." It is the existence of such objective laws that makes it possible to develop a rational theory of foreign policy and international relations. Applied to foreign policy, the concept of national interest "infuses rational order" to the subject matter. It will help us to explain the "astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible, rational continuum, by and large consistent within itself, regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen."[5]

When it comes to defining the national interest in more concrete terms, realists have tended to put territorial and political integrity first. The fact that other values were seen as conditioned by considerations of national survival and political independence explains the central concern for security, balance of power, and other aspects of "high politics" in the writings of realists.[6]

Such a definition of the national interest does not answer the questions asked by students of foreign economic policies. Although one could imagine a deductive approach to economic and resource issues, Krasner arrives at the subject of raw materials policy inductively, asking: What preferences by America's central decision makers have had the highest ranking over time, and has there been a consistent and persistent ranking? On the basis of a series of case studies, he concludes that central or statist actors have pursued three basic aims in raw-materials policy: (1) to increase competitive economic behavior; (2) to ensure security of supply; and (3) to promote broad foreign policy objectives.[7]

The broader foreign policy objectives, according to Krasner, have included both material interests and ideological objectives. Many American leaders have pursued a Lockean vision of liberalism and worked for a nonrevolutionary development of the international order.

[4] Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 5-13.

[5] Morgenthau (fn. 1), 4-11.

[6] See Fred A. Sonderman, "The Concept of the National Interest," *Orbis*, XXI (Spring 1977), 121-38.

[7] Krasner (fn. 4), 13-14.

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Krasner maintains that this ideological component is essential for distinguishing statism from structural Marxism. He holds that ideology has led to nonlogical behavior, such as the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, which cannot be explained by pressures from within the capitalist societal structures. It was anticommunist ideology at work.[8]

Any theory ultimately must face a dual test, namely, questions of logical consistency as well as of consistency with experience. However, by approaching his subject inductively, Krasner has created problems for a logical critique. We will have to ask whether it is possible to generalize on the basis of his findings: Can one make predictions about raw-materials policy or, for that matter, other foreign economic policies? It seems that applications of a statist approach should make such assumptions if the approach has aspirations of getting a predictive and *ipso facto* explanatory capacity.[9] It should be possible to state the rationale for the policies pursued. If it is not, generality and predictive capacity cannot be attained, and statism will have no explanatory power; it will not really go beyond historical description. We will then have to ask the important question: Do facts really speak for themselves?

For the purpose of this paper, therefore, aspects of the views of Morgenthau and Krasner will be merged, and I will offer the following hypotheses about U.S. ocean policy, which will be tested empirically:

(1) A major issue in ocean politics for central U.S. policy makers has been the free use of ocean space for the military.

Rationale: An important part of U.S. strategic deterrent capacity consists of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Further, the U.S. Navy has important conventional superpower missions: sea control, projection of force ashore, and "showing the flag." In carrying out these tasks, the Navy depends on the right to emplace listening devices on the seabed to detect foreign submarines. Since these missions are directly related to the survival of the territorial and political viability of the United States, they should have highest priority.

(2) With respect to resources, U.S. decision makers are likely to be concerned about avoiding the development of international car-

[8] *Ibid.*, 14-17.

[9] For the purpose of this paper, the symmetry between prediction and explanation is being assumed. See Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "The Covering Law Analysis of Explanation," in Leonard I. Krimerman, ed., *The Nature and Scope of Social Science* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 54-58.

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tels like OPEC; they want to ensure security of supply of ocean minerals, such as the oil and gas resources of the continental margins and the manganese nodules of the deep seabed.

Rationale: The economic well-being and political stability, and possibly the political survival of the United States, depend on energy resources and vital strategic minerals, such as the nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese contained in the deep seabed nodules.

How correct were these hypotheses? Are there problems other than empirical ones?

Security interests did play a primary role in the considerations of U.S. decision makers.[10] The proposals made by the United States in the U.N. Seabed Committee (1968-73) and at UNCLOS III (since 1973) fit the predictions quite well. The first major U.S. proposal was a Draft Convention submitted to the Seabed Committee in Geneva on August 3, 1970.[11] It spelled out how an International Seabed Area would be established seaward of the 200-meter depth curve or isobath. Article 3 provided that "the International Seabed Area shall be open to use by all States, without discrimination, except as otherwise provided." Since the exceptions provided by the Draft were related to exploration and exploitation of certain natural resources, the area was left open for other uses, including military ones.[12] Naval activities were not explicitly mentioned, but article 6 specified:

> Neither this Convention nor any rights granted or exercized pursuant thereto shall affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the air space above those waters.[13]

This article was clearly devised to protect security interests in the International Seabed Area. The statement by John R. Stevenson, the State Department's Legal Advisor, before the U.N. Seabed Committee at the time of the introduction of the U.S. Draft emphasized that the limitation of coastal state seabed resource jurisdiction to the area landward of the 200-meter isobath would be a protection against the process of

[10] This argument has also been developed in Laursen, "Sikkerhedens primat: USA og den nye havret," *Internasjonal Politikk*, No. 1 (January/March 1981), 25-40.

[11] "Draft United Nations Convention on the International Sea-bed Area," in United Nations, General Assembly, *Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction* [hereafter cited as *Sea-bed Committee Report 1970*], Suppl. 21 (A/8021), 1970, pp. 130-76.

[12] See, for instance, the interpretation in H. Gary Knight, "The Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area: Background, Description, and Some Preliminary Thoughts," *San Diego Law Review*, VIII (May 1971), 459-550.

[13] *Seabed Committee Report 1970* (fn. 11), 133.

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"creeping jurisdiction." This term was used to denote the process whereby coastal states have been increasing their jurisdiction over ocean resources or areas, thereby possibly interfering with military uses of the oceans. Stevenson further argued that "maritime states' interests in freedom of navigation" would be served by the proposed U.S. Draft Treaty.[14]

Evidence in support of the argument that security interests were of primary importance can also be found in congressional hearings. President Nixon's proposals of May 23, 1970, which had preceded the formal Draft presented at the Seabed Committee in August, were presented to the Special Subcommittee on the Outer Continental Shelf of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs by Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson on May 27, 1970. Richardson argued against broad U.S. claims to continental shelf resources. Broad claims would raise "indirect, but serious, national security questions."[15]

A similar fear of creeping jurisdiction determined U.S. straits policy. At an early stage in the U.N. Seabed Committee negotiations, the United States made it clear that it considered freedom of transit of international straits to be a non-negotiable right; in 1971, the U.S. presented draft articles which were designed, *inter alia*, to secure this freedom. According to these articles, each state would have the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea "within limits of no more than 12 nautical miles," on the following condition:

> In straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State, all ships and aircraft in transit shall enjoy the same freedom of navigation and overflight, for the purpose of transit through and over such straits, as they have on the high seas.[16]

John R. Stevenson introduced the draft articles in the U.N. Seabed Committee on August 3, 1971. He explicitly mentioned the security aspect, arguing that diminished naval mobility could "intensify the competition for strategic advantages." This would have a destabilizing effect and force states to divert more attention and resources to security matters. He referred to the rules of "innocent passage" that apply to

[14] Stevenson, "Statement," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 63 (August 24, 1970), 209-10.

[15] U.S., Congress, Senate, Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, *Outer Continental Shelf*, Part 2, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), 426-30.

[16] "Draft Articles on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea, Straits, and Fisheries," in United Nations, General Assembly, *Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction*, Suppl. 21 (A/8421), 1971, p. 241.

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territorial seas. Such rules, according to Stevenson, would be insufficient for international straits: "Under the Territorial Sea Convention, neither aircraft nor submerged submarines have a right of innocent passage."[17] He further argued that free transit of straits is in the interest of international trade: "If coastal states were given a legal basis for impairing transit, virtually every country in the world would find its very economy dependent upon the political good will of some other state by virtue of geography."[18]

The early U.S. proposals thus clearly concentrated on maintaining freedom of navigation. They stipulated that, if territorial seas were allowed to go beyond the 3 nautical miles so far accepted by the United States, 12 nautical miles should be a maximum; and that could only be accepted if a special regime was introduced for international straits narnarrower than 24 nautical miles. Jurisdiction over continental shelf resource was to be limited to the area within the 200-meter isobath. The outer continental margin beyond the 200-meter isobath, including the continental slope and rise, should be an intermediate "Trusteeship Zone," basically international, but with the coastal state exercising some limited functions on behalf of the international community in respect to authorization of oil and gas exploration and exploitation. There would also be generous revenue sharing with the international community. The basic purpose of the states' limited coastal jurisdiction was to secure the high-seas status of the area for navigation.[19]

The importance the United States attached to keeping the oceans free for the Navy can also be seen in the way it approached the question of seabed arms control. It became an issue when the U.N. General Assembly established the *ad hoc* Seabed Committee in December 1967 "to study . . . the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the seabed." The question immediately focused on the meaning of "peaceful purposes." Some countries interpreted the concept to mean complete demilitarization, an idea that the United States could not accept. Eventually the U.S.—with the help of the Soviet Union—succeeded in having the issue transferred to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) (later Committee on Disarmament [CCD]), in Geneva, where a seabed arms control treaty was successfully negotiated. It was signed in 1971 and entered into force in 1972.[20]

[17] Stevenson, "Statement," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 65 (September 6, 1971), 261-66, at 262.

[18] *Ibid.*, 263.

[19] For details, see Laursen, "The Making of U.S. Ocean Policy, 1970–78," Ph.D. diss. (University of Pennsylvania, 1980).

[20] See especially James A. Barry, "The Seabed Arms Control Issue, 1967–1971:

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From the point of view of this article, the significance of the seabed arms control treaty is its limited scope. Although it outlaws weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, detection devices remain legal. So do naval operations in, on, and above the water. The treaty must therefore be seen as a success from the point of view of U.S. security. It stopped "creeping jurisdiction" in the arms control area. The superpowers had shown that they could have their way in world politics when their vital interests were affected.[21]

The next question is to what extent resource-related U.S. ocean policy has fitted the statist perspective. Here the answer is slightly more difficult. The central conditions set by U.S. negotiators for the acceptance of a treaty have tended to fit the perspective quite well. American access to resources has been emphasized by central decision makers; but exactly what such access meant was open to some debate and disagreement. With respect to resources, there have been some important changes in U.S. policy in the 1970s. These changes cannot be explained by the statist approach, which tends to assume stability of interests and continuity of policy.

U.S. decision makers realized the need for changes in resource-related aspects of U.S. ocean policy soon after the presentation of the early proposals of the Nixon Administration in 1970 and 1971. Five conditions that have remained important through the 1970s were set up:

(1) International treaty standards to prevent unreasonable interference with other uses of the ocean;
(2) international treaty standards to protect the ocean from pollution;
(3) international treaty standards to protect the integrity of investment;
(4) sharing of revenues for international community purposes;
(5) compulsory settlement of disputes.[22]

The first condition, noninterference with other uses, obviously included noninterference with security-related activities. As such, it fits

A Superpower Symbiosis?" *Naval War College Review*, XXV (September-October 1972), 87-101; and Bennett Ramberg, *The Seabed Arms Control Negotiations: A Study of Multilateral Arms Control Conference Diplomacy*, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. XV, Book 2 (University of Denver, 1978).

[21] The subject is discussed further in the author's article, "The Law of the Sea and International Security: Aspects of Superpower Policy," in Laursen, ed., *Toward a New International Marine Order* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, forthcoming, 1982).

[22] John R. Stevenson, "U.S. Calls for Prompt International Action to Settle Problems of Law of the Sea," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 67 (October 2, 1972), 382-86.

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the argument about the importance of security interests quite well. The conditions concerning environmental protection, revenue sharing, and dispute settlement may be subsumed under Krasner's "promoting broad foreign policy objectives." That leaves as most directly resource-related the provision for integrity of investment, which would be a precondition if U.S. private business was to play a role in the exploitation of ocean resources. All U.S. proposals through the 1970s can be said to have aimed at protecting its access to ocean resources—although, as is consistent with the statist perspective, these proposals were often criticized by the American industries that were directly concerned. With respect to continental margin resources and coastal fishing, the U.S. moved toward greater congruence with the policies advocated by the affected industries. It was only with respect to deep seabed resources that the U.S. can be said to have moved away from the policy preferred by domestic firms. This particular change can only be explained by an effort on the part of U.S. decision makers to strike an international bargain in order to secure navigational rights in a widely accepted treaty. It is therefore necessary to look at both international and domestic factors; only the general concern for access to resources and security of investments can be accounted for by statist goals.

There is one other problem with the statist perspective: What happens if the President and the State Department have different perceptions of the national interests? Is the President as insulated from domestic politics as the model suggests, or does he occasionally listen less to the arguments of his foreign and security policy advisors than to the dictates of domestic politics? The latter seem to have been decisive in President Ford's decision to sign the 200-mile fishery zone bill, which does not fit the statist perspective.

The various shortcomings of the statist approach suggest that additional perspectives should be used. U.S. ocean policy cannot be explained without a look at the international negotiations and the domestic politics by which it has been affected.

Sensitivities and International Linkage Politics

The United States has been one of the most important participants in the negotiations on the international law of the sea. We therefore need an analytical perspective on why the U.S. agreed to multilateral negotiations in the first place, and on what the impact of those negotiations has been.

The literature on international interdependence contains some useful

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insights. This perspective, developed largely by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, questions some of the central assumptions of the realist view of international relations, such as the unitary nature and dominant influence of nation-states in world politics, the usability of force, and the predominance of "high politics" over "low politics." According to Keohane and Nye, international politics increasingly approaches a situation characterized by multiple channels between societies, making it impossible for states to act coherently as units. Further, there is an absence of hierarchy among issues; military force plays a minor role.[23]

All states—even superpowers—are sensitive to policies of other states and foreign groups. An example of American sensitivity is the cost, for American society, of increasing oil prices during the 1970s. The extent to which the United States depends on smaller foreign countries varies with respect to different resources, but this sensitivity often provides smaller countries with power that makes it possible for them to extract concessions from bigger countries.[24]

The translation of power into outcomes is accomplished through a bargaining process, which is conditioned by different dynamics, such as agenda setting, learning, and linkage strategies. The outcome of the process may, under certain circumstances, be an international agreement.[25] For an international agreement to emerge, the negotiators must develop a perception of joint gain. It has been the premise of the package-deal approach to UNCLOS III that such joint gain would be possible in respect to ocean uses.

What are the sensitivities of the United States with respect to the ocean, and what kind of predictions can be made on the basis of such knowledge and the suggested dynamics of international negotiations?

Various standards of sensitivity can be examined, and much depends on the policies of other states, which can be difficult to predict. In terms of import figures for oil and minerals, there was a degree of sensitivity that explains the American interest in access to these ocean resources. The United States imports most of its nickel, cobalt, and manganese. It is also a net importer of fish products, but here substitutions are easier. However, knowledge about sensitivities does not provide an answer to the question whether access is best arrived at multilaterally

[23] Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 23-29. Only selected aspects of Keohane and Nye's models are applied in this article.

[24] *Ibid.*, 8-19.

[25] See also Ernst B. Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics*, XXXII (April 1980), 357-405.

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or unilaterally. Since the United States has important offshore resources of oil and fish, as well as the technology to exploit deep seabed minerals, it has a unilateral option with respect to exploitation of these resources. Exercising that option, however, could have certain costs: it might hurt the interests of U.S. tuna and shrimp fishermen, who have traditionally taken an important part of their catch off the coasts of Latin American countries. Furthermore, it would be difficult to predict the reaction of foreign countries who are dependent on access to U.S. coastal areas if they had to decrease their catch or to leave U.S. coastal areas completely. The Soviet Union and Japan might accept having to reduce their fishing off U.S. coasts if a 200-mile fishing zone was introduced as part of an international package deal; but they might not accept it if such zone was introduced unilaterally by the United States. These uncertainties and risks could therefore be minimized by the added legtitimacy that a widely accepted international agreement could provide. With respect to deep seabed minerals, an international agreement would provide the guaranteed access sought by U.S. industry; security of tenure would be more difficult to arrive at unilaterally, since a majority of states did not accept unilateral access to those minerals.

There was a further reason for the United States to adopt the multilateral route: national sensitivities concerning navigation and military uses of the oceans. If coastal states introduced broad territorial seas (thereby restricting navigational rights), or closed some international straits, serious economic and military costs could result. In such a situation the United States would have the option of trying to defend navigational rights by the use of naval power. However, that would certainly involve diplomatic costs, and it could have military costs as well. Since Third World countries have been increasing their naval capabilities in recent years, a better way of securing navigational rights might be through a widely accepted international ocean treaty; this would be worth certain concessions in other areas. On the basis of this kind of reasoning, I would offer the following hypotheses:

(1) International interdependence in the ocean area calls for a multilateral treaty approach.

Rationale: Through an internationally negotiated package deal, the United States would secure its most important interests—freedom of navigation and reasonable access to resources—without the costs that a unilateral approach might entail.

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(2) The most important linkage in UNCLOS III negotiations is between navigational rights and deep seabed mining.

Rationale: The coastal nations of the world which have the unilateral option with respect to coastal zone resources and the potential capacity to create obstacles for navigational rights are for the most part Third World countries that do not have the technology or capital to exploit deep seabed minerals. In return for agreeing to guaranteed freedom of navigation, they are able to ask for a *quid pro quo* from the technologically advanced maritime powers: an operational international seabed authority which could help them get a share of the resources and revenues from deep seabed mining.

Although the outcome of the international negotiations cannot be predicted with certainty, this perspective suggests the likelihood of an international bargain being struck, based on a premise of rationality and joint gain. To the extent that the negotiation process can be controlled by rational and pragmatic negotiators, it should be possible to generate enough trade-offs to create a perception of mutual advantages. In other words, it is the linkage aspect of international interdependence that is important.

What are the aspects of U.S. ocean policy that can be explained by this perspective? The very fact that, despite adversity, the United States stayed in the international negotiations through the 1970s is due to international interdependence. It is a paradox that interdependence was mainly perceived to exist in respect to security, while there was a widespread feeling that the United States could respond to resource-related sensitivities through unilateral measures. (This perception eventually had an impact on offshore oil and fisheries policies as the United States moved to accept broad coastal jurisdiction over these resources from about 1973.) The paradox of interdependence is exemplified by the initial U.S. strategy of not accepting wide coastal zone resource jurisdiction. Acceptance of such jurisdiction was used as a bargaining chip in the international negotiations despite the fact that the United States would be the winner if the concept of the 200-mile economic zone were accepted.

Since domestic politics undermined the use of continental-shelf oil and coastal-area fish as international bargaining chips, the major area left for linkage politics was deep seabed mining. This was an excellent linkage instrument for the U.S. which, contrary to most states, had the

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technological lead and the financial capacity to start this new activity. The United States was a credible linker; the linkee group, mainly the developing countries (Group of 77), would be worse off if the United States carried out its threat to go unilateral. Therefore the United States could expect a *quid pro quo* in the form of navigational freedom in return for contributing to the creation of an operational ISA. American acceptance of the idea of a parallel regime for deep seabed mining was announced by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the mid-seventies as a way to reach a compromise between the industrialized countries (which preferred simple registration of claims or licensing of mining activities), and the Group of 77 (which demanded an ISA with an active "enterprise" that would engage in mining, either alone or through joint ventures with private companies).[26] The basic linkage was clearly on Secretary Kissinger's mind when he spoke to the American Bar Association in Montreal on August 11, 1975. He stated that under certain conditions, the United States could accept that an international organization would have "the right to conduct mining operations on behalf of the international community primarily for the benefit of developing countries." These conditions included:

(1) rights of all countries and their citizens directly to exploit deep seabed resources;
(2) fair adjudication of conflicting interests and security of investment;
(3) revenues from deep seabed mining to be paid to the international organization, to be used for the benefit of developing countries;
(4) voting procedures reflecting and balancing the interests of the participating states;
(5) no international control of prices and production rates.

The United States would be prepared to explore ways of sharing deep seabed technology with other nations if these conditions could be fulfilled.[27]

The reason for America's willingness to compromise was also made clear by Secretary Kissinger:

> The breakdown of the current negotiation, a failure to reach a legal consensus, will lead to unrestrained military and commercial rivalry and mounting political turmoil.

[26] For details, see Laursen (fn. 19).
[27] "International Law, World Order, and Human Progress," in Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, 3d ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), 217-36.

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> Ultimately, unless basic rules regulate exploitation, rivalry will lead to tests of power. A race to carve out exclusive domains of exploration on the deep seabed, even without claims of sovereignty, will menace freedom of navigation, and invite a competition like that of the colonial powers in Africa and Asia in the last century.[28]

On the other hand, the establishment of an international regime for the deep seabed could "turn interdependence from a slogan into reality."[29]

That Secretary of State Kissinger attached importance to the conclusion of an international agreement can also be gathered from the fact that he attended the fourth and fifth sessions of UNCLOS III in 1976. On both occasions he suggested further U.S. concessions. At the fourth session, in the spring, he stated that the United States was prepared to accept a temporary limitation on production of seabed minerals, tying such limitation to the growth of demand for nickel in the world market. Further, the U.S. would agree to the ISA's participation in international commodity agreements and to the use of some seabed mining revenues for adjustment assistance to land-based producers of nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese—the most important deep seabed minerals.[30] Finally, at the fifth session, Kissinger said that the United States was prepared to help financing the enterprise so that it could get started "either concurrently with the mining of state or private enterprises or within an agreed timespan that was practically concurrent."[31]

Although the domestic mining industry criticized Secretary Kissinger's concessions,[32] the Carter Administration continued the efforts to reach an international agreement based upon the parallel system. It was widely believed that the world was close to reaching such an agreement when UNCLOS III issued a Draft Convention after the ninth session in Geneva in August 1980.[33] Despite the difficulties of the negotiations and the temptation to go unilateral, the United States continued trying to hammer out acceptable details on the deep seabed mining sections of the negotiating text. That the United States had security reasons for such a policy has been admitted on a number of occasions

[28] *Ibid.*, 222, 225.

[29] *Ibid.*, 226-27.

[30] Kissinger, "The Law of the Sea: A Test of International Cooperation," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 74 (April 26, 1976), 533-42.

[31] "Secretary Kissinger Discusses U.S. Position on Law of the Sea Conference," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 75 (September 27, 1976), 395-403, at 398.

[32] See, for instance, U.S., Congress, Senate: Commerce, Foreign Relations, and Armed Services Committees, *Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act*, Joint Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).

[33] U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.3, September 22, 1980.

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by President Carter's chief UNCLOS negotiator, Elliot Richardson. In an article that dealt with U.S. naval missions, the increasing naval capacities of other states, and the dangers of creeping jurisdiction, he said about the participants in the international negotiations that they had "understood from the outset that the accommodation of navigational and resource interests must be at the core of any eventual 'package deal.'"[34]

After the publication of the Draft Convention in 1980, Richardson told a meeting of the American Mining Congress in San Francisco that the result was "an unprecedented achievement for multilateral negotiation." Although the United States had now enacted the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, which would allow U.S. companies to start commercial deep seabed mining in 1988 even in the absence of a treaty, Ambassador Richardson suggested to representatives of U.S. mining companies that the uncertainties and threats of reprisal which were associated with the unilateral legislative approach could only be removed "through the establishment of a universally recognized international regime for the exploitation of deep seabed minerals."[35]

Richardson also went over the detailed provisions of the Draft Convention, arguing that there was assured access for U.S. companies, "a fair chance to earn a return on investment commensurate with the risk undertaken," and "solid protection against the arbitrary or unpredictable use or abuse of the Authority's power."[36] The statement was of course designed to sell the Draft Convention to the U.S. mining industry. While the emphasis on access also fits the statist perspective, the adopted linkage strategy is best explained by international interdependence.

So far, we can conclude that statism accounts for some of the major goals pursued in the law-of-the-sea negotiations by the United States, and that international interdependence explains the linkage strategies applied in those negotiations. But why did the United States go unilateral in the fisheries area, and why did the President and the State Department disagree about the enactment of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976? To understand some of these problems, we will have to look at bureaucratic and domestic politics. If the United States under the Reagan Administration were to go unilateral

[34] Richardson, "Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 58 (Spring 1980), 902-12, at 911.

[35] Richardson, "Seabed Mining and the Law of the Sea," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 80 (December 1980), 60-64, at 61.

[36] *Ibid.*, 61-63.

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in the deep seabed mining area, this step would have to be explained by domestic politics, plus possibly some idiosyncratic elements of the Reagan Administration, such as the special role played by conservative ideologues.

Bureaucratic Politics

Advocates of a bureaucratic politics perspective were the first to question some assumptions of the realist perspective—mainly the notion of the state as a unitary actor. Graham Allison has put it as follows:

> The "leaders" who sit on top of organizations are not a monolithic group. Rather, each individual in this group is, in his own right, a player in a central, competitive game. The name of the game is politics: bargaining among players positioned hierarchically within the government.[37]

The national leaders involved in bargaining games, according to Allison, are political leaders as well as leaders of major bureaucratic agencies. They form a circle of central players. Because central players disagree, decisions and actions result from a political process. Governmental action thus is a political outcome—not deliberately chosen, but resulting from "compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence."[38]

There is a problem with Allison's model from the point of view of understanding the dynamics of the political process. It includes bureaucrats, presidents, legislators, and representatives of interest organizations. Since different motivations and forces are involved, the models's predictive capacity will be limited, at best.[39] For the purpose of this article, the importance of "bureaucrats" in the sense of career officials will be the central element of the bureaucratic politics model. The suggested limitation follows from the reasoning that motivations of bureaucrats, as defined here, are different from the motivations of legislators and presidents. A bureaucratic politics model makes sense if policy positions taken by officials can be predicted from their positions in the bureaucracy. That is what Morton Halperin had in mind when he said, "Where an individual sits in the process determines in large

[37] Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 144.

[38] *Ibid.*, 162.

[39] For critiques, see, for instance, Amos Perlmutter, "The Presidential Political Center and Foreign Policy: A Critique of the Revisionist and Bureaucratic-Political Orientations," *World Politics*, XXVII (October 1974), 87-106; and Jerel A. Rosati, "Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective," *World Politics*, XXXIII (January 1981), 234-52.

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part the faces of the issue that he sees and helps to determine the stakes that he sees involved and hence the stand that he takes."[40]

Most organizations, including national bureaucracies, have missions to perform. It ought to be possible to predict policy positions of various bureaucracies from their missions, or from the interpretation of those missions given by the dominant group in the organization. A general proposition of importance for the bureaucratic politics model, then, is that bureaucratic officials will try to enhance the missions of their organization. For this reason, they will tend to favor policies and strategies that they consider to be important for their agency, but will be rather indifferent to policies that do not affect their missions. They will struggle for the capabilities and functions they view as necessary for carrying out their missions, and they will resist efforts to take them away.[41]

For the purposes of the present study, the central question, then, is the following: On the basis of the above propositions about bureaucratic behavior, how will various federal departments and agencies be involved in the formulation of U.S. ocean policy?[42] The following hypotheses will be offered:

(1) The State and Defense Departments will work toward an international agreement.

Rationale: Central to the missions of the State Department is an interest in harmonious international relations and good bilateral relations with other countries. The Defense Department will be concerned about the free military use of ocean space. Stopping "creeping jurisdiction" through a widely accepted international treaty would be safer than doing so through the use of naval power.

(2) Resource-related agencies will support their "client" industries: the Interior Department will work for the interests of the oil industry, and the fishing and deep seabed mining industry will have found support in the Commerce Department.

Rationale: The Interior Department is in charge of offshore oil leasing, and the Commerce Department is involved in a number

[40] Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 17.

[41] *Ibid.*, 39-40.

[42] For an early effort to explain U.S. ocean policy from a bureaucratic politics perspective, see Ann L. Hollick, "Bureaucrats at Sea," in Ann L. Hollick and Robert E. Osgood, *New Era of Ocean Politics* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 1-73.

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of ocean activities, including fisheries and deep seabed mining, through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). By promoting their "client" industries, these agencies will enhance their missions.

A major problem with the bureaucratic politics model is its inability to predict the outcome of a conflict between security- and resource-related agencies. In isolation, the prediction would be incoherence, infighting, or stalemate. Coordination of policy requires executive leadership, which may not always be forthcoming. In order to make predictions in these situations, it is necessary to go beyond the bureaucratic agencies and study wider societal forces. Such wider forces will lend weight to the arguments of particular agencies, and will often be decisive.

The latter point emerges clearly if we study the role of the Interior Department with respect to offshore oil leasing. The Nixon Administration's original effort to limit coastal state authority to the area landward of the 200-meter isobath was strongly criticized by the oil industry. Through the National Petroleum Council (NPC)—established in 1946 as the oil companies' advisory body to the Interior Department—the industry issued a report in March 1969 in which it argued that the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention already gave the coastal state jurisdiction over the entire continental margin. "The coastal nation's exclusive jurisdiction over the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil" was said to extend to where the abyssal ocean floor begins, including the continental shelf, slope, "and at least the landward portion of the continental rise overlapping the slope."[43] Whereas central U.S. decision makers feared "creeping jurisdiction" that might impede navigation, the oil industry feared "international encroachment." The establishment of an international regime with jurisdiction over a part of the continental margin resources would be a "giving away of rights already confirmed to this nation."[44] The U.S. continental margin was considered potentially rich in oil and gas resources. The U.S. oil industry wanted to forestall foreign influence over these resources. It preferred to seek leases from other coastal states in other parts of the world to having to deal with an international organization:

> . . . recent trends within the United Nations give little reason for hope that American nationals would fare better under a regime formulated

[43] National Petroleum Council, *Petroleum Resources under the Ocean Floor* (Washington, D.C., 1969), 57.
[44] *Ibid.*, 69-70.

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> by a 126-nation forum in which the United States has one vote, than they would fare dealing with individual nations under national laws.[45]

This was the fundamental choice of the American oil industry a year before the Nixon Administration decided to propose a Trusteeship Zone between the 200-meter isobath and the outer edge of the continental margin. Despite the bureaucratic support of the Interior Department, central decision makers had not bought the argument. President Nixon proposed exactly what the oil industry and the Interior Department did not want.

After the presentation of the Draft Convention in Geneva in 1970, the Interior Department again invited the NPC to submit its opinions, in the form of "an article-by-article analysis" of the U.S. Draft. The criticism that followed was harsh. The new NPC report objected strongly to "the relinquishment by the coastal state of its existing mineral resource rights in the outer continental margin," and maintained that an international authority holding a "residuum of powers" would create instability and uncertainty.[46]

The second NPC report and the work of the Interior Department did not change U.S. policy in 1971. The decisive event in that respect was the emergence of a widespread perception of an energy crisis in 1973. Even before OPEC's oil embargo, President Nixon, on April 18, 1973, had directed the Secretary of the Interior to triple the amount of offshore oil leasing.[47] A few days later, the Interior Department issued a call for bids for offshore oil and gas leasing off Louisiana that included areas beyond the 200-meter isobath. Leases beyond the 200-meter isobath were specified to "be subject to the international regime to be agreed upon."[48] But, despite the reference to a future international regime, it was clear that U.S. policy was changing. Partly, this was due to lack of international support for the Trusteeship Zone idea. But the new perceptions of the national interest which followed the energy crisis were also very important. Because of the emerging changes in U.S. ocean policy, the May 1973 NPC report on the Law of the Sea had no quarrel with U.S. policy.[49]

[45] *Ibid.*, 72.

[46] National Petroleum Council, *Petroleum Resources Under the Ocean Floor: A Supplemental Report* (Washington, D.C., March 1971).

[47] U.S., Congress, House, Judiciary Committee, *Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas* [hereafter cited as *Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Hearings*], 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), 76.

[48] U.S. Department of the Interior, "Outer Continental Shelf Off Louisiana," *Federal Register*, XXXVIII (April 20, 1973), 9839.

[49] National Petroleum Council, *Law of the Sea: Particular Aspects Affecting the Petroleum Industry* (Washington, D.C., May 1973).

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A further indication of changes in U.S. policy was a draft document presented by the United States in July 1973 to the U.N. Seabed Committee, proposing a "coastal sea-bed economic area."[50] The idea of a Trusteeship Zone had been dropped, and the idea of the economic zone was creeping into U.S. policy. "We believe this policy is substantially consistent with the recommendations of the National Petroleum Council," wrote John Norton Moore, Chairman of the NSC Task Force on the Law of the Sea, in a letter to Senator Clifford P. Hansen in November 1973.[51]

The 1973 changes in U.S. continental margin policy were crowned by a notice in the *Federal Register* that leases beyond the 200-meter isobath would no longer require provisions subjecting them to future international agreements.[52] Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton referred to a feeling in Washington that the 1970 policy "was not accepted by the majority of the nations"; but he also suggested that "our own national interests" had perhaps changed.[53] The latter part of the statement presumably was a reference to the energy crisis, which had increased the weight of the Interior Department in determining ocean policy. Thus, the decisive event was exogenous to the bureaucratic system *per se*. The bureaucratic politics aspect of the policy change was rather epiphenomenal.

The role of the Department of Defense (DOD) also fits this pattern. The central importance of security goals in U.S. policy is not so much explained by DOD politicking as by the fact that the United States is a superpower; by its size, economy, and resources; and by the perceptions of its people and politicians. These are factors that are exogenous to the bureaucracy, but they explain the DOD's clout in Washington politics.

In other agencies, we will find that the bureaucratic politics perspective often explains the position taken by those agencies. But in a conflict between, say, the State and Commerce Departments, much will depend on the issues, the constituents, and congressional involvement. Further, it does happen that sectors of the industry do not receive strong bureaucratic support. When coastal fishermen thought that the support they

[50] "Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Rights and Duties of States in the Coastal Sea-Bed Economic Area," in United Nations, General Assembly, *Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction*, Suppl. 21 (A/9021), 1973, III, pp. 75-77.

[51] U.S., Congress, Senate, Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, *Status Report on the Law of the Sea Conference*, Hearing, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), 108-13.

[52] "Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Beyond 200 Meters," *Federal Register*, XXXVIII (November 5, 1973), 30457.

[53] *Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Hearings* (fn. 47), 227.

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got from the Commerce Department was not adequate, they contacted their representatives in the Congress. This brings us to the importance of domestic politics.

Domestic Politics

Because of the limited predictive capacity of the bureaucratic politics model, a fourth model will focus on the role of Congress, interest organizations, and public opinion. According to William Quandt, "Congress often becomes the vehicle through which domestic groups try to achieve their goals, and lobbying, electoral battles, and struggles between the legislative and executive branches of government are part of the foreign-policy process."[54]

Quandt talks about a domestic politics perspective and suggests that "in a democratic polity, foreign policy is inevitably influenced by domestic realities."[55] The label "democratic politics model" is used by authors such as Wilfrid Kohl[56] and Stephen Cohen.[57] They seem to have similar processes in mind. However, because of the value connotations of "democratic," I will use the term "domestic" politics.

Domestic political variables should be singled out in a special model because the dynamics are different from those of the bureaucratic system. This has been stated very explicitly by Cohen:

> In sharp contrast to career civil servants' job security, all members of Congress face reelections. The economic health of their constituents is a matter of great import. At times their self-interests require congressmen to play the role of ombudsman to assure that the executive branch policy does not become insufficiently responsive to the needs and demands of key groups within the domestic sector.[58]

The major question about which we are trying to formulate hypotheses concerns the extent to which various domestic groups actively lobbied for their interests, and the extent to which the interests of constituents influenced members of Congress to get involved in the process of formulating U.S. ocean policy.

Among the different interests involved in ocean policy, it is resource interests that tend to dominate domestic politics. These include fishing,

[54] Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 15.
[55] *Ibid.*
[56] Kohl, "The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and U.S.-European Relations: Patterns of Policy-Making," *World Politics*, XXVIII (October 1975), 1-43.
[57] Stephen D. Cohen, *The Making of United States International Economic Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1977), 93-95.
[58] *Ibid.*, 62.

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offshore oil exploitation, mining of deep seabed minerals, commercial navigation, marine scientific research, environmental protection, and so forth. From the point of view of the voter and the member of Congress, some of these interests have been more salient than others. For reasons of space, the present discussion will be limited to fishing and deep seabed mining. With respect to the former, there are important regional differences. In some areas (Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and New England) fishing is mainly coastal. In others, it includes important distant-water fishing (California and the Gulf Coast). Since U.S. fishing is predominantly coastal, however, this part of the industry might be expected to build a winning coalition. Some coastal stocks were being overfished; coastal fishermen therefore used the argument of conservation in their efforts to have a 200-mile fishing zone introduced, thus diminishing foreign fishing off U.S. coasts. Concerning deep seabed mining, there is a presumption of low salience. The average voter is not concerned about manganese nodules. Nor has the mining industry been able to use the conservation argument in its coalition-building efforts. More lobbying was therefore necessary in this area than in that of fishing in order to get Congress to act.

The domestic politics model focuses on "constituency jobs and real estate."[59] Since these aspects are of greater popular concern in the case of fishing than of seabed mining, a domestic politics model can be expected to have more explanatory power in the former case than in the latter; at the least, it may explain the different timing of the two policy sub-processes.[60]

The central premise of this article in respect to domestic politics is that a structural bias exists in favor of subnational or parochial interests. Forces speaking for mankind, or what Robert Johansen has called the "human interest," will be very weak.[61] Because of this structural bias of the system, world-order type policies will often be frustrated. The following hypotheses are offered:

(1) Coastal fishermen will work for national enclosure of coastal resources through unilateral legislation; this implies a de-linkage of coastal fishing issues from the international negotiations.

[59] Terms used in the chapter on "Congress and Foreign Policy," in Barbara Hinckley, *Stability and Change in Congress* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 155.

[60] For recent studies on Congress and foreign policy, see Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); and Robert A. Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1928–1976* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

[61] See Johansen, *The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

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The mining industry will also lobby for protection of its interests through national legislation. It will be against, or very sceptical about, the idea of an international authority that will regulate its activities.

Rationale: Domestic interests are more likely to trust national administration than international administration of resource rights.[62]

(2) Members of Congress will be responsive to demands from constituents. Members from states with special fishing or mining interests will provide leadership in building the necessary coalitions for congressional action.

Rationale: Members of Congress fear "retribution at the polls."[63] They will usually work actively for the interests of constituents.

The timing of congressional action will not depend solely on the salience of the issues. Presidential involvement is very important. In order to survive, the multilateral approach will usually need active presidential support. The perspective of domestic politics, however, suggests that Presidents—especially when seeking reelection—may follow the views of domestic groups instead of the dictates of statism or international interdependence.

In examining the empirical aspects of U.S. ocean policy, we find that the enactment of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) of 1976 fits the domestic politics model. It was a major event of U.S. ocean policy. Early in the 1970s, coastal fishermen concluded that the executive branch was not providing adequate support for their views. They therefore went to their Senators and Congressmen, who eventually acted by passing the 200-mile fisheries bill. President Ford signed it against the advice of the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, as well as that of the National Security Council.

The FCMA went against the premise of international interdependence. In fact, it was the State Department and NSC opposition to the bill that fitted the interdependence perspective. John Norton Moore, Chairman of the NSC Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea, stated five reasons against enactment of the bill:

(1) It would be counter to U.S. policy of resisting unilateral claims to ocean space, and could thus interfere with other U.S. interests;

[62] The rationale for national enclosure can also be stated in terms of the "prisoners' dilemma." See Ross D. Eckert, *The Enclosure of Ocean Resources: Economics and the Law of the Sea* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979).

[63] John W. Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 59.

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(2) it could be seriously harmful to important foreign relations interests;
(3) it would not be compatible with international law, in particular the 1958 Convention on the High Seas;
(4) it would pose serious risks for U.S. fishing interests, in particular the U.S. distant-water fishing interests;
(5) it could seriously undercut efforts to conclude the Law of the Sea Treaty.[64]

Some of the central U.S. decision makers were clearly concerned about sensitivities and vulnerabilities. How would Japan and the Soviet Union react? Both countries were customarily fishing within 200 miles of the U.S. coastline. Moreover, if the United States could unilaterally abrogate one of the freedoms of the sea, such as fishing, couldn't other countries unilaterally abrogate other freedoms of the sea, such as freedom of navigation? If so, U.S. interests might be seriously hurt. There was also a bargaining aspect: if the United States unilaterally introduced a 200-mile fishing zone, then such a zone would no longer be a bargaining chip in the international negotiations; thus, a part of the American linkage strategy was at stake.

By passing the bill, Congress brushed aside all these concerns about sensitivities and linkages. Members of Congress from the New England and Pacific Northwest states had listened to their constituents and provided leadership in a coalition-building effort that secured the passage of the 200-mile bill in January 1976. Only pressures from constituents can explain what happened. Congressman William Cohen (R-Maine) admitted in one of the hearings:

> There are many of us here in Congress who have fishermen as constituents. We have voices, but because we have not been using our voices to speak up for them, those constituents doubt the legitimacy of our own representations as their Congressmen.[65]

To remain legitimate representatives of their constituents, Congressmen from coastal states *had* to work for the 200-mile fishing zone. The pressures were enormous. At one point, Senator Bob Packwood (R-Oregon) stated that he had received over 400 letters during the two preceding weeks demanding immediate and effective action to help coastal fishermen.[66]

[64] U.S., Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, *Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974*, Hearing, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), 49-51.
[65] U.S., Congress, House, Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, *Territorial Seas*, Hearings, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), 64.
[66] U.S., Congress, Senate, Commerce Committee, *Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1975*, Part 1, Hearing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), 29-32.

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But why did President Ford sign the bill? The answer is that he was seeking reelection. The final Senate vote on the bill came on January 28, 1976. At that time, the President was concerned about the upcoming New Hampshire primary, where he faced a tough and important battle with Governor Ronald Reagan.[67] Asked about the 200-mile limit at a news conference in New Hampshire on February 8, 1976—16 days before the primary—President Ford said, "If the [UNCLOS] negotiators dilly dally, don't do something affirmatively, then they ought to recognize the United States feels it is vitally important that we do something to protect not only our game fish but our commercial fish." If sufficient progress wasn't coming soon, "then the United States ought to move unilaterally."[68]

The President subsequently decided that the negotiators were not doing enough; he signed the bill on April 13, in the middle of the 4th session of UNCLOS III. The FCMA extended U.S. jurisdiction over 2.2 million square miles of ocean that had hitherto been considered high seas and open to fishermen of all countries. The United States was enclosing about 10 percent of the world's fishery resources, the largest fishery resource under the control of one state.[69]

The dictates of domestic politics thus turned out to be more important than the dictates of international interdependence. Moreover, the President's decision to sign the 200-mile bill against the advice of his chief foreign and security policy advisors suggests problems for the statist perspective: "central decision makers" are not always a unitary body. The President is a political figure *sui generis*. He is not as insulated from societal pressures as the statist perspective suggests. Even a relatively small group, such as maybe 100,000 coastal fishermen, can be important as marginal voters in a tight political race. The wide sympathy which the coastal fishermen received from the press and the general public, and the support from conservation and environmental groups, were important factors. Senator Warren Magnuson (D-Washington) and Congressman Gerry Studds (D-Massachusetts), provided strong leadership, which the President had to follow in order to avoid high domestic political costs.[70]

[67] See Ron Nessen, *It Sure Looks Different from the Inside* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 196-201.

[68] *The Presidential Campaign 1976*, Vol. II, Part 1: President Gerald Ford (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 114.

[69] "NOAA and the Marine Fisheries Conservation Act," *Marine Fisheries Review*, XXXVIII (August 1976), 27.

[70] I have developed this argument further in "International Interdependence, Statist Goals, and Domestic Politics: The Case of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976," Paper prepared for delivery at the 22d Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Philadelphia, March 18-21, 1981.

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The case of deep seabed mining is different. Although the first deep seabed mining bill was introduced before the first 200-mile fishing bill, it was only in June 1980 that Congress passed and President Carter signed the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act. Despite pressures from the mining industry, the Nixon and Ford Administrations had successfully opposed unilateral steps in respect to deep seabed mining. These pressures did contribute to the Carter Administration's decision to support the legislation, but in this case there was a further reason: deep seabed mining was an excellent linkage instrument from a U.S. point of view, and through support for the legislation Washington was able to put pressure on the international negotiations. It was a way of telling the Group of 77 that, if it did not enter real bargaining on the details of the parallel system in such a way that U.S. companies would get guaranteed access to a reasonable number of mine sites, the United States could start deep seabed mining unilaterally.[71]

When the Carter Administration decided to support the legislation, Ambassador Richardson gave three reasons. First, the administration had concluded that legislation would "be needed with or without a successful law of the sea treaty." Second, it believed that "the orderly development of deep seabed mining should not only be continued but also . . . encouraged." And finally, it believed that legislation would not "negatively affect the prospects for reaching agreement at the Law of the Sea Conference." On the latter point, Ambassador Richardson added an indirect threat to the Group of 77: "Administration opposition to deep seabed mining legislation could be misunderstood as a total reliance on the Law of the Sea Conference for achievement of our seabed objectives."[72]

The first UNCLOS III session at which the U.S. delegation was headed by Ambassador Richardson was the sixth session, May 23-July 15, 1977, in New York. That session produced the third negotiating text of the Conference, the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) which Richardson later called "fundamentally unacceptable." The problems included lack of "reasonable assurance of access," transfer of technology provisions, financial burdens, production limits, insufficient protection of minority interests in the system of governance, and so forth.[73]

Aiming its strategy in two directions, the Carter Administration de-

[71] For details, see Laursen (fn. 19), 302-416.

[72] U.S., Congress, House, International Relations Committee, *Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act*, Hearings and Markup, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), 28.

[73] Richardson, "Law of the Sea Conference: Problems and Progress," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 77 (September 19, 1977), 389-91.

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cided to support domestic legislation during the evaluation process that followed the sixth session. Internationally, the Administration wanted to improve the negotiating text. Domestically, it made the pending legislation more consistent with a possible future international regime. The process was ably spearheaded by Ambassador Richardson. In June 1980, a Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, which postponed unilateral deep seabed mining until 1988, was passed.[74] And in August 1980, a Draft Convention acceptable to the Carter Administration emerged from the ninth session of UNCLOS III in Geneva. It looked as if the Richardson strategy was succeeding.[75]

Many observers now believed that the world was on the way to adopt a legal regime for 71 percent of the surface of the globe. Although it was a difficult, tedious, and frustrating multilateral effort of international legislation, it could be viewed as a remarkable example of rational politics. It had been a process of true give-and-take—although, as is normally the case in politics, some had taken more than others. With respect to coastal resources, the winners were the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Australia, and other states with long coastlines.[76] The losers, of course, were the land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states, although they were supposed to have some access to the living resources of the economic zones of the neighboring countries. They might further expect some revenues from the exploitation of minerals beyond the 200-mile limit. But, since the most important oil and fish resources are within the 200-mile limit, geography had indeed been an important distributive factor. In respect to navigational rights, the maritime powers were the winners; so the United States fared well on this account, too. The price was the parallel deep seabed mining regime, with certain production limits and rules about transfer of technology. For a moment it looked as if this price was considered a fair one by nearly everybody except the mining industry. That moment lasted until the sudden announcement, on March 2, 1981, that the Reagan Administration was not ready to complete the negotiations during the tenth session of UNCLOS III, scheduled to start in New York on March 9. According to the new administration, serious problems had been found in the Draft Convention; future U.S. policy would be determined through a review process.[77]

[74] See Kathy Koch, "Deep Seabed Mining Passed by House," *Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Report*, XXXVIII (June 14, 1980), 1624-25; and "Seabed Mining," *Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Report*, XXXVIII (June 28, 1980), 1787.

[75] See Richardson (fn. 35).

[76] See Lewis M. Alexander and Robert D. Hodgson, "The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone on the Law of the Sea," *San Diego Law Review*, XII (1975), 569-99.

[77] Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Bars Treaty for Now on Use of Sea Resources," *New York Times*, March 4, 1981, pp. A 1, A 11.

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It is too early to predict the outcome of that process. It may lead to a final de-linkage, and thus bring several years of international negotiations to naught. In that case, the United States may have to use sea power to defend navigational rights, since coastal and straits states may no longer feel bound by the provisions of the Draft Treaty. Alternatively, the United States may return to the Conference and demand improvements in the deep seabed mining provisions of the Draft Treaty. This, it seems, would be the most rational outcome. The United States still has bargaining power; it is foremost both in terms of naval capacity and ocean technology. A treaty without U.S. participation, although conceivable, would not be of great value.

Explanatory Assessments

All four perspectives or models that have been applied in this article are based on a premise of rationality. The statist perspective assumes that central decision makers will pursue national interests in a rational manner—i.e., they will try to maximize the values and interests they perceive to be important from the national point of view. The three other models suggest that central decision makers are constrained in their value maximization by both international and domestic factors. Although there have been tendencies in the literature on bureaucratic politics—and to a lesser extent in the literature on international interdependence—to downgrade or to dispense with the premise of rationality, the assumption here has been that rationality is essential for making predictions, and that attaining a predictive capacity is and should be one of the goals of social science.[78]

Thus, it can be considered rational to use linkage strategies internationally. Obviously, the interests of other countries will have to be taken into consideration if an international bargain is to be arrived at. Moreover, the procedural aspects—such as the consensus approach often applied in international negotiations—may influence the outcome. At the same time, it is quite rational for central decision makers to consider the domestic reaction. After all, any treaty will have to be ratified by the Senate. And the Senate does—at least to a certain extent—listen to the mood of the country. Nor should it be considered irrational if a President calculates the impact of his decisions on his chances for reelection.

The assumption is rationality of individuals. It is through a political process of decision making that individual rationalities add up to out-

[78] On the utility of the assumption of rationality for scientific purposes, the author has benefited from discussions with Professor Pierre Salmon at the European University Institute, Florence, 1977-1979.

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comes. That political process primarily consists of bargaining: actors seek to influence events through efforts at coalition building. The models suggest basically that ocean politics is a very complex matter involving both international and domestic aspects. In this case, the term "intermestic" applies.[79]

The central decision makers were caught up in an "intermestic" bargaining situation; they had to listen to both international and domestic demands, and try gradually to adjust the conflicts between them. Changes in policy during the 1970s can therefore to a large degree be seen as resulting from feedback from these two bargaining forums.

Since domestic bargaining (and legislation) is often simpler than international bargaining (and treaty-making), timing tends to become an important variable. International decision making is usually very slow—for both cultural and procedural reasons. That is why there is always a high probability that domestic politics will undercut the politics of international linkages. This problem was raised by Senator Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) in the debate on the 200-mile fishing zone; he castigated his colleagues for not seeing that UNCLOS III had made tremendous progress during its first two sessions. He felt that members of Congress did not understand UNCLOS III "because we are operating from our perception and our experience. We legislate from a basis of sovereignty. In the international community you don't legislate from a basis of sovereignty. You legislate from a basis of consensus."[80]

The conclusions concerning the rival explanations of U.S. ocean policy are summed up in Table 2.

The statist perspective was useful for understanding the primacy of security interests through the 1970s. The general predictions about statist policies with respect to access to resources were useful, too; but because of the complex nature of these issues, it was more difficult to make specific predictions. A major weakness of this perspective was its inability to explain changes in policy; it presumed a rather well-defined static national interest. The model was not able to foresee conflict between the President and his foreign policy and security advisors.

The model of international interdependence explains why the United States decided to take part in the international law of the sea negotiations: certain vulnerabilities were perceived, and linkage strategies

[79] The term was proposed by Bayless Manning in "The Congress, The Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 55 (January 1977), 306-24. See also Douglas J. Bennett, Jr., "Congress in Foreign Policy: Who Needs It?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57 (Fall 1978), 40-50.

[80] U.S., Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, *Two Hundred-Mile Fishing Zone*, Hearing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), 105.

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TABLE 2

EXPLANATORY CONCLUSIONS OF U.S. OCEAN POLICY

Model	*Hypothesis*	*Explanatory Power*
Statism	Primacy of security	Confirmed
	Importance of access to resources	Confirmed
		Model does not explain changes in policy or conflict between the President and foreign policy advisors
International interdependence	Use of linkage strategies	Confirmed
	Likelihood of international agreement	Uncertain
Bureaucratic politics	Incoherence, infighting, stalemate	Epiphenomenal
Domestic politics	Unilateral actions	Explains passage of the FCMA

were adopted. However, the enactment of the FCMA in 1976—which meant de-linkage of the fisheries aspect from the international negotiations—can only be explained by domestic politics. The legislation was demanded by constituents who built an effective coalition in an election year.

With respect to deep seabed mining, domestic politics and international interdependence are pulling in different directions. It is now up to the Reagan Administration to decide whether interdependence will necessitate the continuation of the treaty approach, or whether the United States can afford a policy of total de-linkage.

THE REAGAN DILEMMA: LINKAGE OR DE-LINKAGE?

No prediction can safely be made about the outcome of the review by the Reagan Administration. The above analysis, however, should help to offer certain considerations. If Morgenthau's statement about

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continuity in the foreign policy of great powers is taken at its face value, and if Republican policy makers such as Kissinger and Richardson were able to recognize the national interest involved, then we might expect security considerations to remain important in U.S. ocean policy. In an attempt to advance a value ordering, it is therefore suggested that the United States should rate the treaty approach more highly than the final unilateral de-linkage option. This was true of former administrations; however, it is somewhat uncertain in the case of the Reagan Administration, which has decided on a rather substantial expansion of U.S. naval capacity. Nonetheless, in Figure 1 we present a matrix that shows a threat-induced linkage situation, with actor A (the United States) having the dominant strategy, A_1, of a treaty approach.[81] However, the U.S. is presumed to prefer a renegotiated

		ACTOR B: G-77
	B_1 Draft Treaty	B_2 Reopen negotiations
A_1 Treaty approach	A_1B_1 3,4	A_1B_2 4,3
ACTOR A: U.S.A.		
A_2 Unilateralism	A_2B_1 2,1	A_2B_2 2,1

FIGURE 1. THREAT-INDUCED LINKAGE

treaty (value 4), with easier access to deep seabed resources, to the existing Draft Treaty (value 3). The lower value of 2 is assigned to the unilateral option (with some hesitation). Actor B, the Group of 77 (G-77), is assumed to prefer the Draft Treaty to a renegotiated treaty. In this case, the assigned values are the inverse of row A_1. If the United States "goes unilateral," any outcome—Draft Treaty or other treaty

[81] See Arthur A. Stein, "The Politics of Linkage," *World Politics*, XXXIII (October 1980), 62-81.

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without the United States—will be of low value for the Group of 77. The lowest value (1) is assigned to these outcomes. Since unilateralism is supposed to be less costly for the United States, value 2 has been assigned to option A_2 for the United States.

Toward the end of the Carter Administration, situation A_1B_1 looked like a possible outcome. However, the Reagan Administration puts a higher value on access to minerals. According to the value ordering in Figure 1, situation A_1B_1 would satisfy the Group of 77, but would leave the United States aggrieved. Situation A_1B_2 reverses the situation. Can the United States negotiate such a reversal?

Although the parties communicate, communication is never complete in this type of negotiation. The United States can obviously use the threat of unilateralism to try to extract greater concessions from the Group of 77. But the Group's decision to accept the reopening of the negotiations will depend on the credibility of that threat, or—in terms of the matrix—the value ordering assigned to the United States. If the Group assigns high costs to U.S. unilateralism for the United States, it may gamble and resist reopening the negotiations. In that case, acceptance of the Draft Treaty would be most rational for the United States if the value ordering of Figure 1 is correct. However, there is always the risk of unilateralism, even if it were to lead to a suboptimal outcome. The situation may be compared to one of taking hostages. It does happen that hostages are killed, even if the hostage taker is worse off afterwards.

On the other hand, there is the possibility that the Group of 77 would consent to reopen the negotiations. In that case, the outcome might be A_1B_2—a situation that would satisfy the United States, but leave the Group aggrieved. This outcome is not unlikely, however, because of the value the Group attaches to participation by the United States.

One further problem that should be mentioned has to do with payoffs in other North-South negotiations. The Law of the Seas has been viewed as a test case of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), a concept that is clearly not to the taste of Reagan conservatives. The issue of credibility of threats is thus introduced in a different way. Just as labor unions do strike occasionally, even at high cost, to keep the strike threat a credible weapon for future situations, the Reagan Administration may "go unilateral" in the case of deep seabed mining in order to keep unilateralism a credible strategy with respect to other North-South negotiations. Judging by the rhetoric of the Administration, it does not want to "appease" the Third World. Therefore, a suboptimal outcome cannot be ruled out.

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Research Note

CHANGE AND STABILITY IN FOREIGN POLICY:
Détente as a Problem of Stabilization

By KJELL GOLDMANN*

> [The Soviet action in Afghanistan has made] a more dramatic change in my own opinion of what the Soviet Union's ultimate goals are than anything they have done in the previous time I have been in office.
>
> —Jimmy Carter, December 31, 1979.

> [The USA is] an absolutely unreliable partner . . . whose leadership . . . is capable at any moment of violating its international obligations and cancelling treaties and agreements signed by it. [However,] we shall manage without these various ties with the USA.
>
> —Leonid Brezhnev, January 12, 1980.

I. Introduction

THIS article proceeds from the assumption that there are patterns in the foreign policy of a government, and not just single acts. According to this assumption, a knowledge of the pattern—the "policy"—of an actor is useful for explaining and predicting actions. If we can show that the intervention in Afghanistan fits into a Soviet pattern, for example, we have in one sense explained the intervention. We can anticipate what the Soviet Union will do if similar circumstances recur. Most important for the present paper, we have identified a regular feature of international politics which may be more or less amenable to change.

The existence of foreign policy patterns is easy to explain; the causes range from geopolitics to standard operating procedures. It is less obvious why some patterns are more stable than others. Sudden changes in well-established patterns do occur: Sadat's speaking to the Knesset could hardly have been predicted on the basis of previous Egyptian

* This essay is a revised version of a paper prepared for the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Philadelphia, March 18-21, 1981, and the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Lancaster, March 29-April 4, 1981. The article draws on research supported by the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences. I am particularly indebted for useful suggestions to my project colleague Jan Hallenberg, my I.S.A. discussant Pierre Hassner, and Bengt Sundelius.

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policy. Other patterns persist even though preconditions change radically, and even though there is considerable negative feedback: Israel's West Bank policy, for example. What determines the occurrence, the scope, and the timing of changes in foreign policy? In the present article, we will approach this question by focusing on what we will call the "stabilizers" of foreign policy.

The article is part of an ongoing research program dealing with post-1945 relations among the great powers. The phenomenon commonly called détente is at the core of this program; it is in two ways a problem of foreign policy stability. In order to bring about détente between enemies, it is necessary to destabilize long-standing policies of hostility. Once this has been achieved, however, the task becomes one of stabilizing emerging policies of amity—that is, to make them able to survive those disturbances that are bound to occur. The present article is intended to contribute to the study not only of the general problem of foreign policy change, but also of the specific problem of détente stabilization.

In section II, we will suggest a framework for the analysis of foreign policy change and introduce the concept of "stabilizer"; this conceptual discussion is a prerequisite for specifying the problem with which the article is concerned. In section III, we will take some small steps in the direction of a theory of foreign policy change by suggesting a number of phenomena which may function as stabilizers. An experiment with applying these ideas to détente is made in section IV.

II. The Framework of Analysis

The basic structure of the framework of analysis is shown in Figure 1. A change in policy has "sources," but sources do not produce policy changes directly. Sometimes pressure for change does produce change, but sometimes it does not. That is the problem of stability to be considered here. Our concern is not with the sources of change in foreign policy, but with its stabilizers.

Thus, two intervening variables, so to speak, are assumed between



Figure 1. The Framework of Analysis: Basic Structure

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sources and policies. Sources of policy change are events tending to start a process of policy change. A stabilizer is a variable affecting (a) the likelihood that such an event will in fact set a process of change in motion, and/or (b) the extent to which a process of change will be carried through and produce a change in policy. Our chief questions are: What are the stabilizers? How do they operate? When do they fail to operate?

A more detailed view of the framework of analysis is set out in Figure 2. Three sources of policy change are shown. One possibility is that a change in policy is brought about by a change in the environmental circumstances called "conditions." We may call this a process of adaptation. Policies may also be their own sources of change—that is, a policy may change in response to feedback; this will be called learning. However, some instances of policy change are neither adaptation nor learning, and there is therefore a need for the category of "residual factors."



FIGURE 2. THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS: DETAILED VERSION

Figure 2 also distinguishes between three processes of change. Each policy is assumed to be based on a set of ideas on the part of the policy-making system, and each change in policy is assumed to be based on a change in ideas. The latter change may, however, be of three different kinds: rethinking by individuals within the policy-making system (represented in Figure 2 by the direct arrows from "conditions," "policies," and "residual factors" to "ideas"); a change in the composition of this system; or a change in the balance of power between the members of the system.

In the rest of this section, the concepts and relationships in Figure 2 will be discussed in more detail.

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A. Policy

It is commonplace to point out that foreign policy research has been imprecise about its dependent variable.[1] The same may apparently be said about so-called policy studies. This literature keeps emphasizing that the meaning of "policy" is unclear, and that "policy" is a "generic symbol pointing toward a field of interest, rather than a scientifically precise concept."[2] One solution to this problem is to introduce distinctions between "dimensions" or "components" of policy, often in terms of "the goals/means/activities/results scheme."[3]

An attempt to define policy in a precise fashion has been made by Kerr, however.[4] In her analysis a distinction is maintained between policy on the one hand, and policy determinants and resultants on the other. She suggests that four conditions are necessary requisites for a public policy, and implies that together, they are sufficient. Her first condition is:

(1) An agent must intend to act in accord with some conditional imperative *X*, i.e., whenever conditions beta obtain, do action(s) alpha.

Hence, a policy requires an agent and a conditional imperative. Without an agent, there is no policy, but "some sort of principle." A policy has a specific subject and is not a universal norm.

Kerr then goes on to distinguish between "policy" and "promise." Whereas a promise is specific to one or a specified number of instances, a policy is general: whenever beta obtains, alpha should be done:

(2) The agent must perceive as likely that conditions beta will occur more than once or a restricted number of times.

There is, however, one more difference between policies and promises: they are not "equally revisable." To change a promise is to break it.

[1] See, for example, Ib Faurby, "Premises, Promises, and Problems of Comparative Foreign Policy," *Cooperation and Conflict*, XI (No. 3, 1976), 141-44; Charles F. Hermann, "Foreign Policy Behavior: That Which Is To Be Explained," in Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore, and Charles F. Hermann, eds., *Why Nations Act* (Beverly Hills/London: SAGE, 1978), 25-32.

[2] Richard Rose, "Comparing Public Policy," *European Journal of Political Research*, I (April 1973), 73. For similar observations, see Dag Anckar, "Politikprocesser och politikinnehåll: till frågan om politik som orsak och policy som verkan," *Politiikka* (No. 2, 1978), 113-14; Ilkka Heiskanen and Tuomo Martikainen, "On Comparative Policy Analysis: Methodological Problems, Theoretical Considerations, and Empirical Applications," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, IX (1974), 11.

[3] *Ibid.*, 11-12. For similar distinctions, see Austin Ranney, "The Study of Policy Content: A Framework for Choice," in Ranney, ed., *Political Science and Public Policy* (Chicago: Markham, 1968), 7; Rose (fn. 2), 73.

[4] Donna H. Kerr, "The Logic of 'Policy' and Successful Policies," *Policy Sciences*, VII (September 1976), 351-63.

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A change in policy does not carry this connotation; "the agent has only to revise the conditional imperative." Hence this condition:

(3) The agent may substitute conditional imperative X' for conditional imperative X, without violating conditional imperative X.

Kerr's final step is to distinguish between public and private policy by adding this criterion:

(4) The agent must declare to the relevant public the agent's intention to act in accord with the conditional imperative X.

The problem of identifying the "relevant" public is extensively discussed by Kerr, but is unimportant for our present purposes. From our point of view, the chief problem is that Kerr defines policies as programs and not as behavior patterns. In foreign policy research, the opposite position is sometimes advocated; the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project has decided "to conceptualize the external actions of national governments in terms of behaviors rather than goal-seeking policies."[5] However, programs are not only very close to what is usually meant by policies, but are important objects of study because they can have important consequences. The question is whether policies are necessarily programs: major change has occurred in recent years in Soviet naval action on the high seas, but we cannot (for the sake of the argument) find any Soviet document substituting, in Kerr's terms, conditional imperative X' for conditional imperative X. Can we talk of a change in Soviet naval policy nevertheless?

One possibility is to assume a change in program behind a change in behavior; Kerr's fourth condition is not fulfilled, but the three others are. Allison and others have taught us to be cautious with ascribing intentions to complex actors on the basis of their behavior, however.[6] Another possibility is to regard a behavior pattern as a policy regardless of whether it has been the agent's intention to pursue such a policy. In our approach, we shall distinguish between verbalized policy, defined roughly along Kerr's lines, and nonverbalized policy, defined without reference to the intentions and perceptions of the agent.

The following definitions are a starting point; they are intended to separate policy from both goals and outcomes, but to encompass both programs and behavior patterns.

(D1) *Policy*: an agent's line of action with regard to an object.

[5] Hermann (fn. 1), 32.

[6] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

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(D2) *Line of action*: the agent does alpha whenever beta obtains; beta will occur more than once or a restricted number of times.

D1 plus D2 is a variation on Kerr's conditions 1 and 2; the "object" has been added to D1 in order to make clear that a policy concerns either a specific issue area (e.g., "trade policy") or the agent's relation to some other actor (e.g., somebody's "China policy"). Kerr's condition 3 is not acceptable, however. It is misleading to distinguish between promises and policies. Policies *are* promises, commitments.

The essence of D1 plus D2 is that a policy is attributed to an agent and that it consists of a line of action. The subclass "verbalized policy" may be defined as follows:

(D3) *Verbalized policy*: a line of action that an agent declares he is following or intends to follow with regard to an object.

A verbalized policy is identified by—and only by—the study of the agent's declarations. D3 refers to the policy as described by the agent. Alpha and beta are specified by the agent himself.

"Nonverbalized policy" is a more difficult concept:

(D4) *Nonverbalized policy*: a line of action followed by an agent with regard to an object.

In this case, alpha and beta are specified by the observer and not by the agent. Moreover, whereas a verbalized policy can be future-oriented in the sense of expressing intentions, a nonverbalized policy is by definition a generalization about past behavior.

Verbalized and nonverbalized policies are different phenomena. They can exist independently of each other. There may be a causal relationship between the two, however. Programs may lead to behavior, and behavior may lead to programs. The correlation between decision and implementation is unlikely to be perfect, but also unlikely to be zero.

An analysis of policy stability presupposes a definition of policy change. The only author explicitly discussing the latter concept seems to be Rose.[7] However, his variable is "progress in terms of a policy objective"; he is thus concerned with change in outcome rather than change in policy as defined here. In our definition, a change in policy with regard to a given object can only mean a change in alpha, beta, or both: either a new act in a given type of situation, or a given act in a type of situation previously associated with a different act, or a new

[7] Richard Rose, "Models of Change," in Rose, ed., *The Dynamics of Public Policy: A Comparative Analysis* (London/Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1976), 14-23.

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act in a new type of situation. Stabilizers are those factors which inhibit such changes.

B. Ideas

In our framework of analysis, a change in policy is based on a change in ideas, on rethinking, on reappraisal. What does it mean to say that a policy is "based" on ideas? On whose ideas? On what kind of ideas?

Ideas are related to policies both in the sense of argument within the policy-making system and in the sense of public justification. The common dichotomy between "real" and "declared" motives is misleading: the degree of similarity and the amount of interaction between arguments for a policy that are given to different audiences, and between these arguments and private thoughts, is an empirical question with no self-evident answer.[8] Policy change is assumed to be based on a change in ideas, in the sense that there is a difference between the arguments for the previous policy and the arguments for the new one.

Whose arguments? Part of the answer is simple. Organizations produce not just policies, but also authoritative statements about the ideas in which the organization has decided to believe. There is a precise meaning in ascribing such ideas to an organization. Official beliefs do not exhaust the kind of ideas that can be meaningfully ascribed to organizations, however. "Ideas" in our framework of analysis are meant to include ideas that are circulating in the policy-making system without necessarily being expressed in official documents. This leads to the problem of specifying the border between the policy-making system and its environment. I have in mind, roughly, the cabinet, the foreign and defense ministries, and other relevant portions of the administrative apparatus, but not, for example, the political opposition or the media. Admittedly, that is imprecise. Moreover, individuals within the policy-making system may have different reasons for supporting a policy, and this is one more ambiguity in the notion that an organization's policy is based on the ideas of its decision makers. Both ambiguities are common in foreign policy analysis. For the purpose of the present discussion, it seems possible to live with them. What is important here is that, since a change in ideas is a concomitant of a change in policy, it is a prime task of the student of the latter to identify the factors inhibiting the former.

Since ideas are central in our framework of analysis, it may be worth-

[8] This is discussed in more detail in Goldmann, *International Norms and War Between States* (Stockholm: Läromedelsförlagen, 1971), 51-53.

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while to examine in more detail what may be involved in a change in ideas. A policy may be either expressive or instrumental, depending upon motivation or justification. It is *expressive* if based on two types of ideas: (1) norms, according to which a certain policy should be pursued under certain conditions; and (2) a description of the situation, according to which these conditions obtain. A policy is *instrumental* if it is based on three types of ideas: (1) norms laying down goals; (2) a theory according to which the pursuit of a certain policy under certain conditions increases the likelihood that these goals will be attained; and (3) a description of the situation according to which these conditions obtain. A reappraisal may be normative, descriptive, theoretical, or a combination. In a normative reappraisal, a shift in policy is rooted in a change in the agent's value system; in a descriptive reappraisal, a shift in policy is rooted in a change in the definition of the situation; and in a theoretical reappraisal, a shift in policy is rooted in a change in causal beliefs.

There are several kinds of theoretical reappraisal. Suppose the old policy has been based on reasoning which, using the language of cognitive mapping,[9] can be described thus:



Reappraisal of this belief may imply falsification or extension. In the case of falsification, the agent ceases to believe in a theoretical assertion previously found to be plausible. In the case of extension, the agent adds new variables to his theory.

One kind of falsification may be called avoidance of inconsistency. A theory is inconsistent if there is more than one causal path between policy and utility, and if at least one path is positive and at least one other path is negative. For example:



An agent discovering such incompatibility may do nothing; in politics, it is possible to live with inconsistencies. He may quantify the strength

[9] Robert Axelrod, ed., *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). A positive arrow from X to Y means that, in the actor's view, X (or an increase in X) leads to an increase in Y, and non-X (or a decrease in X) leads to a decrease in Y. A negative arrow means that X (or an increase in X) leads to a decrease in Y, etc.

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of the relationships and thereby draw conclusions about which effect is stronger; that seems to be uncommon.[10] Or he may switch to a policy that does not increase intervening variable 2; that is reappraisal in the sense of avoidance of inconsistency.

Another kind of falsification is adaptation to new evidence. "New facts" undermine old beliefs, and the latter must therefore be abandoned.

One kind of theory expansion is policy innovation; the agent used to believe that



but discovers that



The result may be a switch to policy 2.

Another kind of theory expansion is goal addition. The belief that



becomes



That is, negative side effects are discovered with regard to goals that were originally not considered to be relevant.

We now have six types of reappraisal upon which a policy change may be based (Figure 3). They are not equally probable. Hypothetically, normative reappraisal is least likely, and descriptive reappraisal most likely to occur;[11] adaptation to new evidence and policy innovation may be more likely than goal addition and avoidance of inconsistency. This speculation is not central to our present concerns, however. The main point is that distinctions such as these can be useful tools in the study of the stabilizers of foreign policy.

C. Composition of the Policy-Making System

Reappraisal on the part of an organization need not involve reappraisal on the part of individuals. An organization may "rethink" by

[10] *Ibid.*, 70, 262-65.

[11] "Any change in Soviet policy, when acknowledged at all, is described as the natural response of a perfectly consistent program to differences in conditions." Jerry F. Hough, "The Evolution in the Soviet World View," *World Politics*, XXXII (July 1980), 509.

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

FIGURE 3. A TYPOLOGY OF REAPPRAISALS

changing its leadership. Even if the beliefs of individuals are constant, the organization's beliefs may change. Leadership change does not necessarily imply policy change, however. The significance of the coming into power of policy makers who are committed to a different policy than their predecessors, or who are uncommitted—that is one of the objectives of the study of policy change.

D. BALANCE OF POWER WITHIN THE POLICY-MAKING SYSTEM

If the policy-making system contains advocates of competing policies, the balance of power between the camps may determine whether one policy or the other will be pursued. Reappraisal may consequently be brought about by a change in the balance of power within the policy-making system. In the extreme case, no single individual has changed his opinion on anything, nor has any single individual entered or left the policy-making system. Yet there has been rethinking on the part of the organization, because a shift in the balance of power between contending norms, definitions of the situation, or theories has occurred.

E. CONDITIONS

We now come to the most problematic concept in our framework of analysis. The framework assumes policies to be intendedly rational responses to situations. Those circumstances defining the situation to which a policy is a response are the "conditions" in Figure 2. A change in conditions is—in the framework—one of three sources of policy change. The other two are feedback from policy and "residual factors."

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The distinction between conditions and residual factors is useful but unclear. It is useful for making explicit the possibility that policy change may be the result of a process set in motion by events substantively unrelated to the policy. The distinction is difficult to make precise and operational, however. There may be no better solution than to conceive of conditions for a policy as those aspects of the environment to which the policy is in fact a rational or logical response. The problem with this solution is the general ambiguity of the concept of rationality, which need not be elaborated upon here.[12]

The precise nature of the distinction is less serious a problem for the student of the stabilizers of foreign policy than for the student of the sources of foreign policy, however. It is important that we are clear about the wide variety of events that may trigger a change in foreign policy; it is less important that we distinguish in a precise fashion between pressure for adaptation, pressure for learning, and pressure from some residual factor.

F. Residual Factors

"Residual factors" thus comprise all events that can set in motion a process of policy change, but that are neither changes in conditions nor feedback. Anything bringing about not just individual rethinking but changes in the composition or the balance of power within the policy-making system can be a source of policy change. To theorize about "residual" sources of policy change does not seem to be meaningful, but it does seem meaningful to search for factors that make a policy more or less sensitive to such events.

G. Stabilizers

The chief purpose of the framework of analysis is to put the concept of "stabilizer" in its proper perspective. This concept can be defined in the following way:

(D4) *A stabilizer of policy P of agent A*: any attribute of *P*, of the ideas upon which *P* is based, of *A*, or of *A*'s relations with the environment that reduces the effects on *P* of changes in conditions for *P*, of feedback from *P*, and of residual factors.

The definition recognizes several types of stabilizer. The significant point here is the broadness of the concept rather than the typology.

[12] See Håkan Wiberg, "Rational and Non-Rational Models of Man," in Joachim Israel and Henri Tajfel, eds., *The Context of Social Psychology* (London: Academic Press, 1972), 297-364.

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The threefold role of stabilizers is shown in Figure 2. Stabilizers determine whether an input into the policy-making system from one of the three sources of policy change will in fact set a process of policy change in motion. They determine whether changes in the composition or in the balance of power within this system will lead to rethinking on the part of the system. And they determine whether and how such rethinking will change policy.

The assumption is that in the absence of stabilizers, policies are highly sensitive to new conditions, to feedback, and to residual factors. Stabilizers reduce this sensitivity. They may

—*block* policy change unless removed,
—*reduce the scope* of policy change, or
—*delay* policy change.

The three functions of stabilizers are not fully compatible. If change is blocked or delayed, the scope of later change may increase. Change is sometimes the appropriate strategy of conservatives, and non-change the appropriate strategy of radicals. Whether a phenomenon is a stabilizer or not may depend on one's time perspective. Unless otherwise stated, we are concerned here with the ability of a policy to remain constant under stress rather than its ability to survive in part by changing in part. In other words, we are examining static rather than dynamic equilibria: we assume that we have identified a policy pursued by an actor and ask what will happen to this policy if there is pressure for change.

The essence of the framework of analysis thus is that policies sometimes come under stress from disturbances, and that stabilizers reduce the policies' sensitivity to stress. Policy stability is sometimes desirable and sometimes not. Sometimes stabilizers should be constructed and sometimes they should be removed. And sometimes it is difficult to make up one's mind, because the long-term effects of short-term change or non-change on stability are difficult to predict.

III. Toward a Theory of Foreign Policy Stability

A. Suggestions from the Literature

Two research orientations in particular can be expected to produce hypotheses about factors facilitating or inhibiting change in foreign policy: "comparative foreign policy" on the one hand, and "organizational process" or "bureaucratic politics" on the other. Some work from

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each of these orientations will be surveyed in a search for ideas about stabilizers.

I. THE DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

The concept of adaptation is associated with Rosenau, a Nestor in the field of comparative foreign policy. His concept of adaptation is different from ours. According to Rosenau, the foreign policy of a "national society" is adaptive "when it copes with, or stimulates, changes in its external environment that contribute to keeping its essential structures within acceptable limits."[13] Thus, while Rosenau considers adaptation to be related to system maintenance, our definition of adaptation as policy change in response to changing conditions carries no such overtones.

It has been argued that Rosenau's theory of adaptation "does not discuss the conditions under which any sort of change might occur" and that the theory is therefore "basically static."[14] Rosenau has proposed a well-known set of hypotheses about the relative potency of types of explanatory variables, however.[15] There are chiefly three background variables: size, developed/underdeveloped economy, and open/closed polity. There are five types of explanatory variables: individual, role, governmental, societal, and systemic. Rosenau's hypotheses may be seen as suggestions where to look for stabilizers in different types of states. His reasoning suggests, for example, that stabilizers of United States foreign policy are likely to be primarily societal (for example, public opinion) and governmental (for example, bureaucratic inertia). In the Soviet Union and China, Rosenau considers individual-level variables to be more important. Since an individual-level stabilizer is something of a contradiction in terms, it follows that foreign policy is more difficult to stabilize in the Soviet Union and China than in the United States. Rosenau also believes the significance of systemic variables to be a negative function of size; the main difference between the foreign policy of great and small powers would therefore be that systemic stabilizers (for example, international structures and agreements) are more important for the latter than for the former.

[13] James N. Rosenau, *The Study of Political Adaptation* (London: Frances Pinter, and New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1981), 38.

[14] Patrick J. McGowan, "Problems in the Construction of Positive Foreign Policy Theory," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods* (New York/London/Sydney/Toronto: SAGE, 1974), 36, 38.

[15] The first version was published in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964). A revised version can be found in Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (London: Frances Pinter, and New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1980), 115-69. For a clarifying interpretation of Rosenau's hypotheses, see McGowan (fn. 14).

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These ideas do have implications for a problem like détente, but they are too general to shed much light on the stabilization of specific policies. Let us turn instead to *Why Nations Act*,[16] a publication of the CREON project. In this book, seven "perspectives" on how to explain foreign policy behavior are examined. Current knowledge is surveyed and a number of propositions are developed concerning each perspective. We have searched for hypotheses about stabilizers in this material, but found fewer than expected. This result may be a reflection of the fact that the field of comparative foreign policy has been underconcerned with the problem of change and stability.[17] The following propositions may be useful for our purposes, however.

(1) "The more dogmatic the head of state, the less likely his government is to change its position on a well-established policy."[18] Interest in foreign affairs strengthens and training in foreign affairs weakens this effect.[19]

(2) Leader-autonomous decision-making groups "will tend more frequently to select behaviors involving change from the government's previous position than . . . other decision structures," whereas delegate groups and assemblies "will tend to select behaviors involving change less frequently than will other decision structures."[20]

(3) "Major successful initiatives would likely be taken by unified regimes; failures would be higher for initiatives undertaken by fragmented regimes, when taken at all."[21]

(4) In the behavior of *A* toward *B*, inertia will predominate unless high uncertainty is implied in *B*'s signals toward *A*.

Low uncertainty results from heterogeneous but reinforcing signals.

Crisis implies high uncertainty.

Pressure of domestic events may decrease the time available for foreign policy decision-making and may therefore prevent heterogeneous and reinforcing signals from being noticed.[22]

Proposition 1 concerns the stabilizing effects of certain personality traits on an individual's foreign policy views. One may argue that this is largely irrelevant here. We are concerned with the ability of policies to survive disturbances such as leadership changes. However, it may be

[16] East, Salmore, and Hermann (fn. 1).

[17] Two of the chapters are about sources rather than stabilizers of foreign policy: those on national attributes and on the international system. The chapter on situations regards the likelihood of change as a function of perceptions (e.g., *ibid.*, 188-89); such propositions tend to be truisms and to beg the question of what factors bring about different kinds of perceptions.

[18] *Ibid.*, 66.

[19] *Ibid.*, 58.

[20] *Ibid.*, 98.

[21] *Ibid.*, 115.

[22] *Ibid.*, 161-72.

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worthwhile to inquire into the conditions favoring the coming into power of stabilizing personalities.

Proposition 2 is based on a typology of decision structures. There are nine types. One of these is suggested to be destabilizing, and two to be stabilizing. The reasoning behind the first part of the proposition is that change is facilitated if the leader decides after discussion with a group whose members are encouraged to advocate different positions that do not have to be cleared with some outside body; some European cabinets are mentioned as examples.[23] The reasoning behind the latter part of the proposition is that decision-making by groups or assemblies consisting of instructed representatives of outside entities inhibits change, because it is difficult "to find a new option from which everyone benefits."[24]

Proposition 3 relates foreign policy stability to the domestic political situation. It suggests that domestic fragmentation makes a change in foreign policy unlikely. Examples mentioned are the French policy on Algeria during the Fourth Republic in comparison with the Fifth, and differences between the Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Administrations.[25]

Proposition 4 has been pieced together from the chapter on prior behavior as an explanatory factor. It seems to imply the following: if *B*'s policy toward *A* is unchanged, *A*'s policy toward *B* is stabilized by the combination of three factors: a multitude of interaction channels, consistency in *B*'s behavior, and full attention by *A* to all signals from *B*. However, if there is a change in *B*'s policy toward *A*, the same factors will tend to hasten a change in *A*'s policy. In other words, proposition 4 suggests some factors that protect a policy against stress from residual factors, but not against stress from changing conditions or feedback. The proposition is suggestive in its emphasis on the interaction between international structures and domestic information gathering.

2. CYBERNETIC DECISIONS

Allison's "models" of foreign policy decision making are an obvious source of ideas about stabilizers.[26] A work of the same basic orientation, but more explicitly concerned with the problem of policy change, is Steinbruner's *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*.[27] Steinbruner summarizes much thinking about organizations, including Allison's, in the

[23] *Ibid.*, 80.
[24] *Ibid.*, 81-83, 98.
[25] *Ibid.*, 115-16.
[26] Allison (fn. 6).
[27] John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

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form of the "cybernetic paradigm." He compares the cybernetic paradigm with the "analytic paradigm," which is a variation on the rational actor theme, and compares both paradigms with elements from cognitive process theory. Roughly speaking, the analytic paradigm is weak on explaining stability, and cognitive process theory is weak on explaining change. The cybernetic paradigm, in contrast, suggests a skeleton theory of change and stability.

In the analytic paradigm, decision making is a relatively successful, intendedly rational adjustment to changing conditions. New information regarding central variables produces appropriate subjective adjustments.[28] Such sensitivity to the environment implies that there is no defect in the policy-making system that leads to inertia. However, it also implies that environmental stabilizers may be important. A change in the conditions for a policy may fail to change this policy because other aspects of the agent's relations with the environment remain constant.

In cognitive process theory, beliefs are stable at the individual level and "changes in the established structure will be unlikely, short of substantial changes in personnel."[29] One destabilizing factor is suggested, however: structural imbalance in belief systems. Cognitive process theory admits that environment affects perceptions (the "reality principle"); perceived inconsistency can therefore develop, and such structural imbalance may destabilize a belief system.[30] Conversely, structural balance may be a stabilizer of policies.

In the cybernetic paradigm, decision processes are assumed to be characterized by highly focused attention and highly programmed response. These concepts promise to be key parts of a theory of foreign policy stabilization.

Highly focused attention implies that information is neither rationally considered, as in the analytic paradigm, nor systematically distorted or neglected, as in cognitive process theory. Rather, a few critical feedback variables are carefully monitored. Variation within tolerable ranges is neglected and does not produce change. The "selection" of critical variables is characterized by decomposition of the environment: "whatever the consequences in the larger environment, decisions . . . are controlled by events within the subsystems."[31] Complex problems are fragmented into specific ones, addressed by separate members of the decision-making system, and treated sequentially at the top of the system.

[28] *Ibid.*, 25-46.
[29] *Ibid.*, 136-37.
[30] *Ibid.*, 103-9.
[31] *Ibid.*, 61.

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Highly programmed response means, among other things, that there exists a pre-planned repertory of responses to environmental change. If one of the critical variables takes on a value that is not tolerable, the response is selected from this repertory and is not invented *ad hoc*.

The cybernetic paradigm thus suggests that we look for stabilizers among standard operating procedures for monitoring the environment, among organizational structures, and among response repertories. Two propositions emerge:

(1) The more far-reaching the degree of organizational fragmentation, the smaller the number of critical feedback variables, and the larger the range of tolerable values for each such variable, the more stable a policy is likely to be.

(2) Knowledge of the critical feedback variables and of the range of tolerable values makes it possible to predict under what circumstances policy will change. Knowledge of the response repertory makes it possible to predict the substance of the new policy.

The difference between the cybernetic and the analytic paradigms is a definition of bureaucratic inertia. We will suggest that such inertia is likely to represent late rather than early stabilization. One problem with creating lasting détente is that it takes time to create inertia in policy-making systems. Stress is likely to become too intense too early.

B. A Taxonomy of Stabilizers

The object now is to construct a taxonomy of foreign policy stabilizers. One starting point is to assume that, given a disturbance (a change in conditions, negative feedback, or some residual factor), the stability of a policy is a function of

1. the sensitivity to the environment,
2. the availability of alternatives, and
3. the costs of change.

If a disturbance is to change policy, it must be noticed and found to be critical. If a policy change is to be considered, there must be alternatives. If an alternative is to be chosen, the costs of choosing it must be smaller than the benefits. Stabilizers are factors determining how sensitive the policy-making system is to its environment, the extent to which alternatives are available, and how costly these alternatives are.

According to definition D4 above, stabilizers are attributes of the policy, of the underlying ideas, of the agent, or of the relations between agent and environment. A further distinction is necessary between

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general and policy-specific stabilizers. The former affect the stability of all the agent's policies. Rosenau's background variables and the CREON proposition on regime fragmentation are examples. In the present article the focus is on policy-specific stabilizers—that is, on variables whose values may differ from policy to policy. General stabilizers will be thought of as background variables determining the extent to which specific stabilizers will emerge and be effective. Due to lack of space, these background variables will be given very limited attention here.

A list of hypothetical stabilizers is found in Figure 4. It must be assumed not to be exhaustive, and the categories are not fully mutually exclusive. The list is meant as a starting point for research; it will undoubtedly have to be revised and refined as a result of further reflection and of empirical application.

In the figure, the stabilizers have been grouped into four categories. *Administrative* stabilizers are identified by examining the mode of operation of the bureaucracy; *political* stabilizers are identified by studying the domestic politics of the state under consideration; *cognitive* stabilizers are found in the ideas upon which the policy is based; and *international* stabilizers have to do with the external relations of the state. There is a wealth of ideas about administrative stabilizers in the literature on organizational process. The analysis of cognitive stabilizers can draw upon structural balance theory and cognitive mapping. International stabilizers pervade the I.R. literature, particularly works on integration, international organization, and international law—but also classic power-politics reasoning of the my-enemy's-enemy type. Political stabilizers have attracted less attention in systematic foreign policy theory. There is a contrast here between academic theorizing and day-to-day analysis of foreign policy stability: the former is dominated by organizational processes, international structures, and cognitive maps, whereas the latter focuses on domestic politics.[32]

In what follows, brief notes will be made on each stabilizer suggested in Figure 4. Then, in section C, the way in which they may be causally interrelated will be touched upon.

1. ADMINISTRATIVE STABILIZERS

The suggestions made here about administrative stabilizers incorporate some insights from the literature of organizational process. To

[32] The same observation is made in Barry B. Hughes, *The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1978), xi. Hughes's own work, while concerned with the domestic politics of foreign policy, does not directly address the question of stability and change.

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

FIGURE 4. HYPOTHETICAL DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY STABILITY

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this we add the CREON proposition about decision processes and a speculative idea about the role of independent specialists.

Fragmentation. Adaptation and learning presuppose that the environment has been kept under observation. Keeping the environment under observation can be organized in a more or less fragmented way. Fragmentation implies specialization, which, in turn, seems to imply increased sensitivity to small changes in the environment on the part of the policy-making system. On the other hand, fragmentation may mean (1) a decreased ability on the part of the system to perceive patterns of small changes; (2) a greater dependence on standard operating procedures (SOPs), and hence a reduced ability to discover the unexpected; and (3) a larger number of administrative levels between the person discovering something and the decision maker who ought to know about the discovery. All three consequences seem difficult to avoid if policy conditions and effects are monitored by a large organization rather than by one or a few individuals. The net effect is likely to be stabilizing.

Proposition 4 from *Why Nations Act* (section III-A-1) may strengthen this conclusion. In essence, the proposition states that a diversity of information helps to stabilize a policy in the absence of a change in conditions, but will destabilize it in the presence of a change in conditions. Fragmentation guarantees that a large body of information can be made available to policy makers upon request, thereby reducing the probability that they will mistakenly conclude that conditions have changed. At the same time, the very fragmentation of information gathering may delay or prevent the discovery of new conditions. Fragmentation does seem likely to protect policies against disturbances.

Critical variables. Inspired by the cybernetic paradigm, we may assume the existence of SOPs that determine which are the critical variables. Other things being equal, a decrease in the number of such variables should help to stabilize a policy.

More important than the number of critical variables is their substance, however. Knowledge of the relevant SOPs provides clues to the events that are likely, and those that are unlikely, to trigger policy change.

Tolerable ranges. According to the cybernetic paradigm, each critical variable has a range of values that is considered to be normal and does not require any special measures. The location of the critical thresholds provides additional information about the extent to which, and the way in which, a policy is or is not sensitive to the environment.

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Independent specialists. The cybernetic paradigm describes a number of limitations on an organization's sensitivity to the environment. The independent specialist may be a counterweight. By "independent specialist" we mean a person who has expert knowledge and who functions within or in cooperation with the policy-making system but whose SOPs are those of his profession rather than of the bureaucracy; for example, a university professor in an advisory body. The independent specialist is less likely than the bureaucrat to analyze the environment in terms that are relevant to policy makers, but he is more likely to discover new factors that will be considered relevant in the future. Moreover, according to the cybernetic paradigm, organizations are weak on innovation. The independent specialist may come up with alternatives not previously thought of. Absence of independent specialists—their non-existence or non-use—may help to stabilize policy.

Response repertory. The central feature of the cybernetic paradigm is the assumption that the freedom of action of an organization is restricted to its repertory of programs. The existence of programs that involve radical alternatives is bound to be destabilizing. However, if no alternative program exists, the policy may break down under stress because less drastic change is impossible. Therefore, the stability of a policy is likely to benefit from the existence of pre-planned moderate alternatives.

Decision processes. We shall adopt the hypothesis that decision making in leader-autonomous groups is conducive to change because in this setting, a free search for alternatives without blocking decision making is encouraged; delegate decision making is conducive to stability because it discourages innovation, is time-consuming, and requires bargaining and compromises. If a policy is administered in such a way that it will come up for revision in a delegate decision-making context, this fact is likely to be a stabilizer. Conversely, if the policy is likely to come up for revision in a leader-autonomous group setting, one type of stabilizer will be absent. The likelihood of each may vary with both the type of regime and the type of situation. Delegate decision-making seems more typical of Washington than of London or Moscow. A crisis does not encourage the use of stabilizing decision processes.[33]

[33] The further development of the notion of the decision process as stabilizer can benefit from Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1980).

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2. POLITICAL STABILIZERS

The stability of a foreign policy is likely to be related to its role in domestic politics. Rosenau would argue that such stabilizers are more significant in "open" than in "closed" societies. However, the significance of political stabilizers is hardly nil even in a "closed" society. Most of us take it for granted that there are links between, say, the stability of Soviet foreign policies and the power struggle in the Kremlin. But what is the precise nature of such links between domestic politics and foreign policy?

Consensus and salience. A policy may be more or less controversial. At one extreme there is complete consensus: the policy is never questioned. At the other extreme, a different policy is advocated by a strong opposition. In Sweden, for instance, the policy of neutrality comes close to the former extreme, but some aspects of foreign aid policy do not.

A policy may also be a more or less salient issue in domestic politics; that is, where one stands on an issue may be more or less important for one's political position. In Sweden the policy of neutrality is highly salient, but the policy of foreign aid is not.

The effects of opposition on policy stability are contradictory. Opposition implies that changes in the composition and the balance of power within the policy-making system are likely to be consequential; that there are some who have an interest in actively searching for and spreading information about whatever may justify switching to a new policy; and that at least one alternative policy is readily available. Against this, one may set the insight that controversy tends to freeze the positions of the contenders.

It seems useful to distinguish here between first-order and second-order stability of a policy. First-order stability refers to the probability of policy change as a result of rethinking by individuals. Second-order stability refers to the probability of policy change as a result of changes in the composition or the balance of power within the policy-making system. The effects of opposition may differ with regard to first-order and second-order stability as well as with the salience of the issue.

We would hypothesize that a combination of consensus and high salience is particularly stabilizing. It is not an impossible combination: Sweden's policy of neutrality illustrates how useful a noncontroversial policy can be in domestic politics. A combination of opposition and low salience, on the other hand, will be particularly destabilizing: sensitivity to the environment is high, an alternative is available, and the

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political costs of abandoning the old policy are small. Consensus combined with low salience is in-between. The remaining possibility, opposition combined with high salience, is the most interesting one. It is illustrated by the role the question of membership in the Common Market used to play in Swedish politics, and by the role of détente in the politics of the United States during much of the 1970s. Here we would hypothesize that, whereas the second-order stability of a policy is minimal, its first-order stability is high.

These possibilities merely scratch the surface of a vast topic. Among many other things, the meaning and effects of consensus and salience in democratic, as compared with nondemocratic systems, must be specified. Our objective here is limited to illustrating the relevance of the domestic politics of foreign policy, an underpopulated field of study, to the problem of stability in foreign policy.

Domestic institutionalization. A policy is a commitment. The more committed the agent, the higher the costs of change. The more institutionalized a policy, the more committed the agent. The institutionalization of verbalized policies must be a function of the authority as well as of the frequency of the statements that present the policy.[34] There is a difference between an official declaration by the President of the United States and a statement in the *New York Times* by an anonymous spokesman. There is also a difference between a policy confirmed year after year in document after document and one stated on a single occasion. The institutionalization of nonverbalized policies may be a function of the amount of evidence that a behavior pattern exists. Behavior patterns create expectations, and expectations are not violated without costs. Hence, institutionalization is a mechanism that makes policies self-reinforcing. A high degree of institutionalization is probably a significant stabilizer.

3. COGNITIVE STABILIZERS

Consistency. The set of ideas upon which a policy is based is inconsistent to the extent that it contains beliefs according to which the pursuit of this policy decreases the actor's utility (section II-B). It is a standard element in cognitive process theory that such imbalance is destabilizing (section III-A-2). We shall adopt this hypothesis and regard consistency as a stabilizer. Politically and psychologically, it is probably more costly to change a policy based on consistent reasoning than one whose underlying ideas contain inconsistencies.

[34] For a more detailed discussion, see Goldmann (fn. 8), 34-36.

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Links to other policies. If consistency is one dimension of cognitive structures, complexity is another. One dimension of complexity, in turn, is the extent to which other policies are drawn into the argument. If policy P_1 is thought to facilitate the successful pursuit of another policy, P_2, and if P_2 is stable, then this positive link between P_1 and P_2 is a stabilizer of policy P_1. For instance, a government's economic policies may presuppose certain foreign policies rather than others: the Soviet Union may want détente for economic reasons. Such a link between economy and détente is a likely stabilizer of the latter.

4. INTERNATIONAL STABILIZERS

International institutionalization. Commitments are made not just to domestic but also to international audiences; behavior patterns create commitments not just in domestic but also in international systems. International norms in the form of treaties and agreements as well as of custom create expectations and help to stabilize policies. They are the traditional means of stabilization in international politics.[35]

Interdependence. The concept of interdependence was in vogue in the 1970s; it may by now have become a "wholly and redundant blanket concept."[36] It is used here in the reasonably narrow sense of mutual structural dependence. Roughly, agent A has become structurally dependent on interaction with another agent, B, to the extent that it has become more costly for A to do without this interaction than was originally the case. A policy is stabilized by interdependence to the extent that a change in policy would endanger continued interaction. If the pursuit of a given policy by A is a prerequisite for the continuation of interaction with B, and if A is structurally dependent on this interaction, then this dependence helps to stabilize that policy.

Interdependence has generally been thought to be associated with policies of amity, with détente. The assumption has been that interaction leading to interdependence presumes a minimum level of amity, and that the emergence of interdependence prevents a return to enmity. This hypothesis about the relationship between cooperation and conflict is of course controversial. It can hardly be doubted, however, that

[35] For a detailed discussion, see *ibid.*; Raymond Cohen, "Rules of the Game in International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly*, XXIV (March 1980), 129-50. See also the discussion about "focal points" in Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), chaps. 3-4.

[36] Philip A. Reynolds and Robert D. McKinlay, "The Concept of Interdependence: Its Uses and Misuses," in Kjell Goldmann and Gunnar Sjöstedt, eds., *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence: Problems in the Study of International Influence* (London/Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1979), 161.

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some kinds of interdependence help to stabilize some policies under some circumstances. One task of foreign policy research is to identify these parameters.

Third parties. Third parties may act as stabilizers. A policy is unlikely to be abandoned if its continuation is essential for the protection of a state against its enemy; détente between a state and its enemy may be a prerequisite for some policy changes. Similarly, a policy is unlikely to be abandoned if its continuation is essential for a state's relations with its friend; if there is to be a change in policy, it may be a prerequisite that the friend agrees. Hence, stable relations of amity and enmity help to stabilize some policies. Conversely, the more fluid or ambiguous the situation—in other words, the more difficult it is to determine who is whose ally against whom—the less stable some policies are likely to be.

Our inventory of stabilizers needs to be improved in three respects. First, conceptual clarification is required on several points. Some of the stabilizers suggested here have been reasonably well defined elsewhere, both theoretically and operationally; the chief examples are cognitive consistency[37] and international institutionalization.[38] In some cases, the theoretical meaning is fairly clear, but the operationalization is not; that is true of all the administrative stabilizers. In still other cases, even the theoretical concepts are obscure; the situation is particularly unsatisfactory with regard to the diffuse concept of salience and the nebulous concept of interdependence.[39]

Second, as has already been pointed out, the inventory cannot possibly be exhaustive. In particular, the category of political stabilizers is probably richer in content than has been suggested here. The reader is invited to contribute.

Third, the way in which each stabilizer interacts with each type of change process needs to be specified. For example, each stabilizer

[37] For an operational procedure, see Axelrod (fn. 9).

[38] For an operational procedure, see Goldmann (fn. 8).

[39] The distinction between links to other policies and the remaining stabilizers affecting the costs of policy change may seem to be illogical. As made clear in the introduction to Section III-B, the distinction is meant to be operational: the links are identified by, and only by, the study of the agent's ideas, whereas other stabilizers are identified by the study of "objective" phenomena such as relations of interdependence and the behavior of enemies and allies. The relationship between "objective" and "subjective" stabilizers needs further study; some hypotheses are mentioned in section III-C. Note that the existence of an "objective" stabilizer necessarily implies a link to other policies only in the sense that it can be taken for granted that all actors pursue a policy of minimizing costs.

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should be systematically related to each type of reappraisal shown in Figure 3. A more detailed analysis of how the various stabilizers operate is likely to benefit from a systematic consideration of the different ways in which changes in policy may come about.

C. The Process of Stabilization

Although it is premature, it may be worthwhile to sketch a model of the process of policy stabilization. Some stabilizers—such as international agreements—may emerge early in the life of a foreign policy, whereas others—such as a major increase in tolerable ranges on the critical variables—are likely to occur only after a considerable time. Moreover, some stabilizers may help bring about others; for example, interdependence may contribute to administrative fragmentation and to the discovery of links to other policies. The basic pattern probably runs from international, to cognitive, to political, to administrative stabilizers.

A speculative model of foreign policy stabilization, using most of the concepts introduced above, is suggested in Figure 5 as a point of departure for criticism, further research, and subsequent revision. The model is intended to describe the series of events likely to occur under favorable circumstances; it is not a deterministic process, but is meant to indicate a scenario as it develops in the absence of disturbances. In the model, *phase I* of the stabilization process consists in commitment in the form of domestic and international institutionalization. Third-party stabilizers are also assumed to operate at this stage. During *phase II*, the policy becomes increasingly embedded in a structure of interdependence. *Phase III* is characterized by a strengthening of the positive links of the policy to other policies, by increasing consistency in the ideas upon which the policy is based, and also by increasing administrative fragmentation. In *phase IV*, political consensus emerges, and decision making is increasingly of the delegate type. During *phase V*, there occurs a decrease in the number of variables considered critical and an increase in the ranges of values considered tolerable; radical alternatives also tend to disappear. At the end of the process, no variables are monitored and no alternatives are thought of. The policy has become virtually independent both of changes in conditions and the degree of success; it is equally invulnerable to residual disturbances.

Sweden's policy of neutrality demonstrates the possibility of extreme foreign policy stabilization, or phase V. Central aspects of Norway's NATO policy may have attained phase III, but not phase IV. The mu-

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

FIGURE 5. A HYPOTHETICAL MODEL OF FOREIGN POLICY STABILIZATION

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tual peace policies of Egypt and Israel have recently entered phase II. The application of the model to East-West détente will be discussed in the next section.

The model may not be relevant for all foreign policies. Moreover, the division into phases is not clear-cut, since several of the variables are matters of degree and lack definite thresholds; for example, links to other policies may exist from the outset to some extent. Variables that are extraneous to the model determine how far the process can go and how fast it will be; that includes what is here called disturbances. The process of *de*stabilization may be different: it may be neither identical to nor the reverse of the process of stabilization. And the process is perhaps better thought of as dialectical than as one in which stabilization facilitates further stabilization. The model outlined in Figure 5 has many limitations.

The sketch may nevertheless shed some light on a particularly interesting problem of foreign policy stabilization, exemplified by Egyptian-Israeli and East-West relations: the problem of how to stabilize détente so that it does not break down under stress. It is not misleading to read Figure 5 as an attempt to model one kind of integration. The starting point is a marriage of convenience, which is quite vulnerable to disturbances. The outcome is a Deutschian security community, where alternatives to peace no longer exist and the sensitivity to the environment approaches zero.

The idea of thinking in this way about integration among enemies raises two questions that can merely be mentioned here. First, can we really assume that the same model of policy stabilization is applicable to both parties? In particular, is a model of foreign policy stabilization that has clearly been inspired by Western politics also applicable to the East? Rosenau would presumably answer "no" (see section III-A-1). There is indeed reason to expect different political systems to function in different ways with regard to foreign policy stabilization, even though we do not know very much about the nature of the differences. The more asymmetry there is between the parties in this respect, the more complex a model of integration will have to be. Second, what is the significance of the interaction between the parties; that is, how does the behavior of one affect the stabilization of the policy of the other? The answer is that the behavior of one can be a source of stress on the policy of the other, and that integration is therefore difficult to bring about. The proposed model is less a program for integration than an indication of why the task may be a Sisyphean one.

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IV. The Early 1980s: Détente under Stress

International tension may be defined roughly as the degree of mutual threat perceptions.[40] A policy of détente may be defined roughly as a policy calculated to reduce the threat perceptions of one's opponent. In a process of détente, both parties pursue such policies.[41]

East-West détente in this sense began in 1964 and appears to have culminated in the early 1970s.[42] As late as June 1979, however, Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter not only signed the SALT II treaty, but expressed "their firm intent to continue working toward the establishment of a more stable and constructive foundation for U.S.-Soviet relations," acknowledged "the necessity of expanding areas of co-operation," and stressed "the importance . . . of efforts so that conflicts or situations should not arise which could serve to increase international tensions."[43]

Half a year later the situation had changed: the discussion in 1980 did not concern the detailed implications and long-range possibilities of détente, but whether anything of it remained. In this section, we explore what it means to analyze the détente crisis as a problem of foreign policy stability. From the point of view of our framework of analysis, the détente policies of the East and West had come under stress. The stage had been set for a test of the effectiveness of existing stabilizers. There were sources of change (disturbances) and sources of persistence (stabilizers). An analysis of the confrontation between them may improve our understanding of both the theoretical problem of foreign policy stability and the practical problem of making current international relations less dangerous. Since the confrontation is still going on (mid-1981), and since this is written at an early stage of ongoing research, we will merely be able to indicate some of the questions and hypotheses to which the framework of analysis draws our attention.[44]

[40] For a detailed discussion of this way of defining international tension, see Kjell Goldmann, *Tension and Détente in Bipolar Europe* (Stockholm: Esselte Studium, 1974), 13-27.

[41] This is of course a matter of degree. Agent *A* may pursue a policy of détente in relation to *B* to a greater or lesser extent, depending upon the ratio of friendly to hostile elements in *A*'s behavior. It may be misleading to talk of a qualitative change from a policy of non-détente to one of détente when this ratio increases. Similarly, it may be an oversimplification to describe a decrease in this ratio as a shift from a policy of amity to one of enmity, or as the abandonment of a policy of détente.

[42] For quantitative data, see Goldmann (fn. 40), 41-47; Kjell Goldmann and Johan Lagerkranz, "Neither Tension Nor Détente: East-West Relations in Europe, 1971-1975," *Cooperation and Conflict*, XII (No. 4, 1977), 254-56; Johann Lagerkranz, *Stormaktsattityder 1950–75* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1980).

[43] *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* [hereafter cited as *KCA*], 1979, pp. 30123-24.

[44] Since we are limiting ourselves to suggesting questions for further study, we will

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A. Sources of Change

There seems to be wide agreement about the factors underlying the détente crisis; the more interesting questions apparently are concerned with other matters. Three lines of thought are common, and all three are plausible.

According to one line of thought, what took place was an adaptation to new conditions. Western *Ostpolitik* and Eastern *Westpolitik* had been responses to the "military balance" or the "correlation of forces" of the 1960s. In the course of the 1970s, the balance or correlation had changed. Both parties were under pressure to adapt to these changes.

Second, there was pressure from negative feedback. Some of the hopes held in the 1960s had not been fulfilled in the 1970s. In particular, the opponent did not behave as expected. There was a lesson to be learned, and the better one party appeared to have learned the lesson, the stronger the pressure for change was on the other.

Third, there were disturbances caused by "residual factors." One is to be found in the Carter Administration. Détente did not benefit from the shift from realism à la Kissinger to idealism à la Carter. If we assume that the election in 1976 was determined by Watergate rather than by détente, we have a good example of a residual source of foreign policy change. Other examples include the sequence of local crises that occurred in the 1970s, which provided the great powers with opportunities too tempting not to be exploited, or challenges too dangerous not to be met: in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan.

If the arms race had stopped, if détente had lived up to expectations, if there had been no Watergate and no crises—then the future of détente might have been brighter. Disturbances like these seem bound to occur, however. As suggested in the foregoing section, détente may be the first step taken by enemies on the road to a security community. Prerequisites for taking the first step are presumably the existence of an appropriate military balance and the expectation of gains. However, the military balance will change, some expected gains will fail to materialize, and there will be unexpected costs. Moreover, leadership changes are as inevitable as crises. Conditions will not remain as favorable to détente as they were at the outset.

That is why stabilizers are decisive. The parties may fail to adapt to

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talk in a rather loose fashion about "détente," "cold war," and the like. In a more definite analysis it would be imperative to specify the policies with which we are concerned along the lines suggested in section II-A.

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changes in the military balance and fail to learn from negative feedback. Changes in leadership do not always lead to changes in policy. Crises are not always exploited by one party in a way that the other interprets as being threatening to it; even if they are, the second party does not always escalate or even retaliate. From the point of view of our framework of analysis, the key questions do not concern the sources of increasing tension. They concern the factors tending to block, delay, or limit the scope of policy change in spite of the existence of pressure for change. To create a security community is to stabilize policies of détente. Integration is policy stabilization. The détente crisis of the early 1980s may be able to teach us something about the problem of building a structure of peace in a system of anarchy.

What happened in 1980 seems to show that détente had become more effectively stabilized in Europe than in bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations. President Carter emphasized the "dramatic change" in his opinion of the Soviet Union's "ultimate goals" that occurred as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[45] In American policy in 1980, it became impossible to conduct what was repeatedly called "business as usual." Soviet leaders, for their part, may have decided in advance that, if necessary, they could "manage without these various ties with the USA," as President Brezhnev put it.[46] In the same speech, Brezhnev made a very strong commitment to continued détente vis-à-vis Western Europe, however: "We are strongly in favor of consolidating and multiplying everything positive that has been created over the years on the European continent." West European governments, in turn, were reluctant to sacrifice in a few days all the gains that had been made through détente, to use the expression of the French foreign minister.[47] France and West Germany came to the common conclusion that détente could not withstand "another" shock.[48]

The détente crisis thus provides an opportunity for the comparative study of stabilizers. Three comparisons can be made: between Western *Ostpolitik* and Eastern *Westpolitik*; between United States and West European (especially West German) *Ostpolitik*; and between Soviet policy toward the United States on the one hand, and toward Western Europe on the other. To repeat, we will here merely suggest some of the questions to be asked in conducting comparative research on détente.

[45] Statement on December 31, 1979, *KCA*, p. 30232.
[46] Statement on January 12, 1980, *KCA*, p. 30236.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 30238.
[48] Summit declaration, February 5, 1980. *KCA*, p. 30382.

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B. International Stabilizers

Institutionalization. The extent to which East-West détente has been codified in international agreements is striking—from the U.S.-Soviet statement on "basic principles" of 1972 to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. To what extent such international regulation is a constraint on governmental behavior is a common bone of contention that is difficult to examine empirically. Its significance is hardly nil, however.

As explicated in an earlier study,[49] one factor affecting the significance of norms as stabilizers is the likelihood that "problems of application" will arise in specific situations. The norms of détente seem to imply two classic problems of this type—one related to the notion of initiative and the other to the notion of proportionality.

It has probably been taken for granted that, just as the U.N. Charter prohibits aggression but permits defense, the norms of détente permit replying to violations in kind. A decisive question then becomes who made the first move; there will be controversy about which moves have in fact been made, and which move should be regarded as the first. Moreover, unlimited retaliation is presumably not permitted. Rather, retaliation should be in proportion to the violation; it would probably be considered a violation of détente to escalate a conflict. But proportionality is not always easy to measure. East-West interaction in 1980 illustrates the difficulty of applying to a concrete situation a norm to the effect that both parties, in the words of the U.S.-Soviet "basic principles," should "always exercise restraint in their mutual relations." The Soviet declaration that, long before December 1979, "imperialism, together with its accomplices, launched an undeclared war against revolutionary Afghanistan,"[50] and Western insistence that détente is "indivisible," exemplify classic problems in the regulation of international conflict by international norms.

It is one of the tasks of research on the stabilizers of détente to penetrate more deeply into the détente treaties as well as into the more informal rules of the game, and to explore their significance for governmental behavior.

Third parties. The Chinese threat has generally been seen as a stabilizer of Soviet détente policy. Was this threat reduced in the course of the 1970s? And if so, was it because of de-Maoization, because of China's inability to teach Vietnam a lesson, because of the growth

[49] Goldmann (fn. 8), 28-31, 141-75. [50] *KCA*, p. 30236.

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in Soviet military power? Is this an example of a stabilizer losing its capacity to stabilize?

West German *Ostpolitik* may have been one of the stabilizers of United States détente policy that were tested in the early 1980s. An examination of the interaction between U.S. and German *Ostpolitik* should throw light on the role of allies as a stabilizer. To what extent does the fact that one's friend is a friend of one's enemy compel one to remain friendly with the latter? Conversely, to what extent does the fact that one's friend becomes hostile to some third party compel one to shift from amity to enmity vis-à-vis the latter? Is U.S. détente policy protected or West German détente policy undermined by disagreement between Bonn and Washington over détente?

Interdependence. Interdependence was, of course, a key element in Kissinger's concept of détente. By 1980 it was widely concluded that this strategy had not worked. The conclusion may have been premature.

To begin with, it is unclear whether East-West interdependence had in fact developed sufficiently by the late 1970s for a meaningful test of the hypothesis. East-West economic transactions did multiply in the 1970s, but mostly in the early days of détente. The relative importance of East-West trade did not increase after about 1975; even for a key country like the F.R.G., the "expansionary phase" was replaced by "a period of consolidation" at that time.[51]

There was more interdependence in some East-West relations than in others, however. Soviet imports from the United States between 1973 and 1977 amounted to an annual average of 5.3 percent of total Soviet imports, whereas imports from the European Community were

[51] Michael Kreile, "Ostpolitik Reconsidered," in Ekkehard Krippendorff and Volker Rittberger, eds., *The Foreign Policy of West Germany: Formation and Contents* (London/Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980), 138-39. One aspect of East-West interaction is summarized by an index of bipolarization developed by G. Roger Wall and reported in his *The Dynamics of Polarization* (Stockholm: Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm, 1975). The index aggregates data about the way in which each country divides its interaction with the two superpowers between the United States and the Soviet Union. In one version, the index can vary between 100 (all superpower interaction of all countries is either with the U.S. or with the U.S.S.R.) and 0 (equal interaction with both). Data are available on European trade bipolarization for the period 1946–1978. The time series peaked as early as 1951 and 1952 with a value of 89. The period from 1954 to 1961 was one of gradual depolarization to a level of about 70. Europe then remained at this level for twelve years. In 1974 the figure dropped to 63, and remained at 63-64 through 1978. For data on 1946–1970, see Goldmann (fn. 40), 228; on 1971–1974, see Goldmann and Lagerkranz (fn. 42), 264. Data on 1975–1978 have been computed on the basis of the *1978 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics* (New York: United Nations, 1978).

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15.3 percent, and from the F.R.G. alone 6.5 percent of total imports.[52] U.S. exports to Eastern Europe in the period 1973–1978 amounted to an annual average of 2.4 percent of total U.S. exports, whereas the figure for West Germany was 6.1 percent; in view of the fact that the United States economy is much less dependent on exports than the German economy, that is a major difference. It corresponded rather strikingly to the different ways in which the two countries reacted to the détente crisis, as has often been pointed out. For the Americans, "business as usual" had become impossible, but for the Germans there was "no alternative to détente."[53]

Developments, in fact, pointed at the analogy between nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence. The latter, and not just the former, fits Schelling's concept of a threat: "one asserts that he will do, in a contingency, what he would manifestly prefer not to do if the contingency occurred."[54] Both raise the problem of credibility. Interdependence, like a nuclear balance of terror, may deter not only the offense but also the defense and, because it may do the latter, it may fail to do the former. The more effectively the defender is deterred, the more probable is the attack, but the less probable is escalation. Europe's reluctance to follow the United States in punishing the Soviet Union for having invaded Afghanistan is suggestive. In one sense interdependence failed to stabilize détente, but in another sense it succeeded. The détente crisis thus raises several questions about interdependence.

C. Cognitive Stabilizers

Consistency. A detailed analysis of the ideas underlying each country's détente policy is required in order to draw conclusions about cognitive consistency. This particular stabilizer appears not to have developed very far during the 1970s; there may have been more structural balance in pre-détente policies. For example, there is a much-discussed potential incompatibility between the baskets in the Helsinki Final Act: contact and communication between the West and East appear unlikely to improve the West's relations with the Soviet government, except in the rather long run. From the Soviet point of view, another dilemma may have made itself felt: How do you combine working with the imperialists in Europe and fighting them in the Third World?

[52] These and subsequent figures are from the *1978 Yearbook*, *ibid.*

[53] On the relationship between the *Ostpolitik* and business interests, see Kreile (fn. 51).

[54] Schelling (fn. 34), 123.

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An impressionistic hypothesis: there was more consistency in Bonn than in Washington, and more consistency in Soviet ideas about relations with Western Europe than in its ideas about relations with the United States. Another impression: in the course of the 1970s, the degree of consistency in the ideas underlying détente decreased both in the West and in the East.

Links to other policies. Some links between détente and other policies are usually taken for granted. An example is the Soviet Union's interest in economic development through access to Western technology. Another is West German interest in facilitating contacts between the two Germanys. It seems worthwhile to examine whether some such links weakened in the 1970s (Was there Soviet reconsideration of the economic advantages of détente?), and whether new links emerged (What role did Soviet energy resources play in the way West Europeans thought about détente?).

D. Political Stabilizers

Institutionalization. By the mid-1970s, the policy of détente apparently had become quite firmly institutionalized in Washington, Bonn, and Moscow. It is premature, however, to draw the conclusion that this stabilizer had proved to be ineffective by 1980. We need more detailed information. To what extent had each of the governments committed themselves to what? Was verbalized policy compatible with nonverbalized policy? Was the détente to which the governments had committed themselves internationally the same détente as the one to which they had committed themselves domestically?

Consensus and salience. The case of détente seems to illustrate a combination of high salience and lack of consensus; clearly, that has been the case in Washington and Bonn, perhaps also in Moscow. The effects on stability of such a combination are intriguing. The hypothesis put forward in this article is that first-order stability is achieved to some extent, but that second-order stability is minimal (section III-B-2).

It is important to examine in detail the role played by détente in the domestic politics of the countries concerned. To what extent did the opposition use negative feedback or changes in conditions to further its political interests? Was there any trend toward increasing or decreasing consensus, or toward increasing or decreasing salience? Since these stabilizers may be decisive, it is particularly important to understand how they are strengthened and weakened, and how they operate.

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E. Administrative Stabilizers

The first administrative stabilizer to emerge, according to the sketch presented in section III-C, is fragmentation. Had the administration of East-West issues been sufficiently fragmented by the end of the 1970s for this stabilizer to be significant? How was the *Ostpolitik* administered in Western capitals, and how was the *Westpolitik* administered in Moscow? A German study points out that problem solving in Bonn is "segmented"; in the view of the authors, this leads to incrementalism and the blocking of alternatives. Crisis management is "the way in which resistance against thorough-going changes can be eliminated."[55] All of this may apply to détente. Perhaps there has in fact occurred considerable fragmentation of the *Ostpolitik* both in Bonn and in Washington, as well as of the *Westpolitik* in Moscow. Perhaps détente was protected somewhat in this way against disturbances in the form of gradual environmental change, but not against disturbances in the form of crises.

Whether more advanced administrative stabilization of détente has developed is uncertain. According to the model it may be too early. However, that is an empirical question. No organization collects all the information that can be collected; no organization finds every piece of information important enough to necessitate decision making; and no organization has a plan for every contingency. The more we know about variables that are considered critical, ranges of values that are considered tolerable, and responses that are included in the repertory, the better we are able to answer the key question of what kinds of disturbances are likely to trigger what kinds of change in East-West relations.

V. Conclusion

The perspective on foreign policy with which we have experimented here seems to deserve elaboration. It may help us to ask worthwhile questions in a systematic way. It may be helpful in integrating ideas, hypotheses, and findings from diverse research orientations. It may provide guidance to empirical studies and serve as a framework for interpreting their results. Why did a decade elapse between the emergence of Sino-Soviet conflict and the onset of Sino-American normalization? What made it possible for Sadat to go to Jerusalem? What is the effect that domestic opposition has on foreign policy? How

[55] Joachim Krause and Lothar Wilker, "Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany," in Krippendorff and Rittberger (fn. 51), 155-57, 165.

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can a process or a condition of détente be strengthened? These are the kinds of questions to which the framework offers an approach.

What does the framework imply for East-West détente? What does it mean to regard détente as a problem of stabilization?

First, the framework does not explicitly consider the basic East-West cleavages. Their continued existence is implicitly assumed. Détente is regarded as the result of unusually favorable circumstances. It is taken for granted that circumstances will become less favorable, and our attention is focused on the factors making détente capable of resisting stress from unfavorable circumstances. The implication is that the process is difficult and that the outcome is in doubt.

Second, reasoning along the lines of the framework leads to the conclusion that, in the best of circumstances, the stabilization of détente is bound to take time. It may, for example, be too early to draw the conclusion that the transactions/spillover/peace hypothesis has proved not to hold. Decisive interdependence may need more than five or ten years to develop—not to mention its cognitive, administrative, and political consequences.

Third, a comparative as well as an integrated analysis of détente is encouraged by the framework. In particular, our attention is directed to the interaction between the ideas, the norms, the economics, the domestic politics, and the administration of détente. Such synthesis is the main function of the theory we have begun to develop in this article. What we suggest is in effect a program for the multidimensional measurement of East-West integration. In a hypothetical model of policy stabilization inspired by the framework of analysis, the process is divided into five phases. Impressionistically, U.S.-Soviet relations may not even have remained in phase I, whereas relations between Western Europe and the Soviet Union are in phase II and may even be on the verge of entering phase III. One of the uncertainties in the current situation is what the outcome of this difference will be.

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Review Articles

WOMEN AND MODERNIZATION THEORY:

A Decade of Feminist Criticism

By JANE S. JAQUETTE

Ester Boserup, *Women's Role in Economic Development*. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1970, and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974, 283 pp., $5.95 (paper).

Elise Boulding, *Women in the Twentieth Century World*. New York: Halsted Press, 1977, 246 pp., $15.95.

Zillah H. Eisenstein, ed., *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979, 394 pp., $16.50 ($6.95 paper).

Barbara Rogers, *The Domestication of Women: Discrimination in Developing Societies*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, 199 pp., $22.50 ($6.95 paper).

IN 1976, when a conference on the integration of women into national economies was held at Wellesley College, and the Women in Development Office began to function at the Agency for International Development, a new, interdisciplinary field was created. Much of the literature in this field is highly practical, focusing on immediate issues of how to achieve female participation in development programs. Some is policy-oriented, analyzing how development programs have tended to marginalize women in the past, and asking what kinds of new programs, institutional structures, and resource commitments could reverse this process.

These policy-oriented studies draw on an older, if neglected, tradition in political thought: the study of the comparative status of women. Since the late 19th century, when comparative analyses of constitutions and social and political mores re-emerged as a major theme in the study of politics, societies have been compared (among other respects), regarding the status of women. Yet, like comparative studies of democracy, comparisons of the status of women tend to be static and unilluminating. By contrast, linking modernization theory—or the Marxist critique—to studies on the status of women provides a dynamic that can illuminate both.[1]

[1] Among the most prominent comparative studies on the status of women are Janet

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The purpose of this review is to examine the new feminist theories of development, based on the growing number of empirical studies of the impact of that process on women. I shall begin by comparing conventional modernization theory and its feminist counterpart or critique. I will then examine Marxist views of the role of women, and the feminist critique within Marxism. Because these two traditions are in a critical dialogue with each other, and because feminism cuts across both, this approach illustrates some important parallels between Marxist and liberal development theory, and at the same time identifies the fundamental differences between these two feminist points of view. I will then identify a third feminist perspective, which I have labeled "female sphere." The female-sphere perspective—in contrast to both liberal and Marxist feminism—is not egalitarian, but asserts that there is a female culture that provides the basis for redefining the goals and restructuring the process of change.

The three approaches conflict on core political issues: what is the ideal polity in terms of male-female relations as societies adjust to modernization? How shall values, including sex roles, be allocated? And what are the conflicting implications for praxis of the three feminist models of change?

I. Liberal Theory and Its Feminist Critics

The little that modernization theory says about women reflects the general liberal assumptions about development: that it is a linear, cumulative process, that it is expansionist and diffusionist, and that value differences—traditional versus modern—are central. From the beginning, it was recognized that women were an anomaly less easily made into modern economic or political participants than men. In a few instances (Talcott Parsons' development of the "pattern variables" is the most obvious case) it was recognized that some of the more traditional values that are present in and necessary to modern societies (such as "affectivity") were maintained by women's roles in the family. A few theorists view changes in the status of women as significant.

Zollinger Biele and Audrey Chapman Smock, eds., *Women: Roles and Status in Eight Countries* (New York: John Wiley, 1977); Alice Schlegel, ed., *Sexual Stratification: A Cross-Cultural View* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Lynne B. Iglitzin and Ruth Ross, eds., *Women in the World* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Clio Books, 1976); Beverly Lindsay, *Comparative Perspectives of Third World Women: The Impact of Race, Sex, and Class* (New York: Praeger, 1980); and Rae Lesser Blumberg, *Stratification: Socio-Economic and Sexual Stratification* (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown, 1978).

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In David McClelland's study of achievement motivation, for instance, women's desire for autonomy and success is seen as an important intermediary variable in the development process: those women who could not act this desire out in their own lives would inculcate "need achievement" in their sons.[2]

Scholars who turned their attention to the effect of development on women found only positive effects. Industrialization was seen to reduce the social impact of biological asymmetry between men's and women's physical strength; birth control was said to give women freedom from the endless cycle of involuntary reproduction; and modern values and expectations were expected to increase women's mobility and freedom of action. A typical presentation of this view states:

> Industrialization encourages new attitudes and behavior and stresses experiences women have in industrial society which enhance their competence and feelings of self-respect, and alter their relationships with others—particularly family members. It is said that the omnipresent mass media, which seem to penetrate every nook and cranny of industrial society, inform as well as entertain women. Everyday experiences in city streets and in stores and shops, sharpen their faculties and sensitize them to the importance of competence and achievement. The opportunities for employment outside the home enrich them intellectually as well as financially. . . .[3]

Thus, standard liberal theory sees women and development as part of an overall process of modernization—technology, the movement from a subsistence to a cash economy, and the development of complex organizations that increase the need for labor mobility. Any differences between male and female absorption into this process are seen as a failure of diffusion, not as a failure of the model itself. Women's relative "backwardness," like that of rural peasants, is explained as the stubborn and irrational persistence of traditional attitudes. In this view, traditional societies are male-dominated and authoritarian, and modern societies are democratic and egalitarian, at least in the long run. The process of modernization itself, and the administration of development policies and programs, are perceived as sex-neutral or as particularly advantageous to women, who have been more hemmed in than men by traditional values circumscribing their roles.

[2] See F. X. Sutton, "The Pattern Variables," in Harry Eckstein and David Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (New York: Free Press, 1963); David McClelland, "The Achievement Motive in Economic Growth," in Bert Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, eds., *Industrialization and Society* (The Hague: Mouton, 1963), 74-96.

[3] Bernard Rosen and Anita LaRaia, "Modernity in Women: An Index of Social Change in Brazil," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, XXXIV (May 1972), 354.

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II. The Feminist Critique of the Liberal Model

Esther Boserup's *Women's Role in Economic Development*, published in 1970, launched the first thoroughgoing feminist attack on conventional liberal assumptions, particularly on the view that technology liberates women. Using data primarily from Africa, Boserup argues that improved technology in farming actually lowers women's status by reducing their access to productive work. She distinguishes between a "female farming system"—using the hoe, slash-and-burn techniques, and communal farming—and a "male farming system"—using the plow on private, fixed plots, and employing hired labor. In female farming systems, there is polygyny (which allows women to share work burdens) and bride price—a marriage exchange system which values women, and in which men must pay the bride's family to compensate for its loss. In male systems, by contrast, marriage is monogamous, and the dowry, by which the bride's family must pay the groom's family, prevails. In the former systems, women are often traders and have considerable geographic mobility; in the latter, women are often confined to their homes and under the strict surveillance of male kin.

Boserup argues that other aspects of modernization are also detrimental to women: urbanization cuts women off from their kinship support networks, there are fewer jobs in the modern sector, and the jobs that are available are often closed to women because of sex stereotyping. Urban women throughout the world are the main participants in the so-called "informal sector," which is primarily petty trading, and often prostitution. Colonial administrations, contributing their own definitions of appropriate roles for women, reinforced the process of female marginalization by training men only, and by structuring access to credit and other resources to the male as "head of household."

In agriculture, the conversion to cash cropping—a process still promoted by postcolonial governments and by development planners—is dominated by men. Barbara Rogers's study of women in World Bank development assistance programs summarizes the effects:

> The domestic/subsistence economy receives a dwindling amount of resources and, as it falls behind, its political influence diminishes even more. [Michael] Lipton's formulation of a consistent and cumulative bias in development (which he identifies as urban bias but which could similarly be seen as a form of male bias) is perhaps most useful in clarifying the increasing inequality inherent in the standard "development" process and another blow to the already discredited trickle-down enthusiasts (p. 42).

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Feminists see urbanization, mobility, and the conversion to the cash economy not as unalloyed benefits, but as processes that cut women off from their traditional economic and social roles and thrust them into the modern sector where they are discriminated against and exploited, often receiving cash incomes below the subsistence level. This condition, in turn, increases female dependency. Faced with the evidence of dependency, the liberal model comes full circle in its exclusionary logic. Either women are not recognized as a development problem because it is assumed that they will be cared for by male heads of households and that their marginalization from economic activities is both inevitable and appropriate; or arguments that favor directing resources to women are denied on the grounds that women are "less productive" or "too traditional." Foreign assistance programs may be directed toward women, but only as mothers (nutrition and maternal and child health programs) or potential mothers (population programs). Women are seen as reproducers, not producers; welfare cases, not workers.

Boserup's work inspired a number of supporting case studies.[4] The liberal feminist solution to female marginalization was to prescribe the necessary legal and administrative changes which would ensure that women had equal access to work and to its economic rewards. Such changes not only entail a constitutional base of both legal and political equality for women, but also have important implications for the family as an object of policy. Liberal feminist critiques discuss the exploitative potential of the family as a social and economic unit: women's unpaid family labor, the lack of child care, and the prevalence of unequal intra-household distribution of income. They point out that a large proportion of women are not supported by male heads of households. Worldwide, an average of 30 percent of households are headed by females; the percentage is much higher in regions with significant male out-migration.[5]

[4] See Irene Tinker and Michele Bo Bramsen, eds., *Women and World Development* (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1976); Barbara Lewis, ed., *Invisible Farmers: Women and the Crisis in Agriculture* (Washington, D.C.: Women in Development Office, Agency for International Development, 1981); Lourdes Arizpe, "Women in the Informal Labor Sector: The Case of Mexico City," *SIGNS*, III (Autumn 1977), 25-37; Kathleen Staudt, "Agricultural Productivity Gaps: A Case Study of Male Preference in Policy Implementation," *Development and Change*, IX (July 1978), 439-58; Roslyn Dauber and Melinda Cain, eds., *Women and Technological Change in Developing Countries* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981); Mayra Buvinic and others, eds., *Women's Issues in Third World Poverty* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming); Ruth Dixon, *Rural Women at Work: Strategies for Development in South Asia* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

[5] Mayra Buvinic, Nadia H. Youssef, and Barbara Von Elm, "Women-Headed House-

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For feminists, the goal generally is women's equal participation in the existing system. There is little attempt to redefine power or economic development. Rather, the major barriers to women's integration are male discrimination and male domination of the cultural, political, and economic values in society. Since the liberal feminists' primary argument for changing development policies is egalitarian, their studies tend to emphasize that women are disadvantaged or discriminated against.[6] The fact that discrimination is not economically rational also provides an argument based on efficiency: if women are marginal to economic development programs, it is at the cost of greater productivity; at the micro-level, the failure to include women may jeopardize the success of programs or projects.

Politically, feminists are reformist, pluralist, and incrementalist. Their recognition of the function of interest groups leads them to support women's organizations as a means to increase pressures for egalitarian policies at the political and bureaucratic levels. This support extends to the encouragement of women's economic organizations, such as women's cooperatives, which are seen by more radical critics as integrationist and individualistic.

III. The Marxist Perspective

The primary assumption of classical Marxism is that the "woman question" should be subsumed under the general critique of capitalism. Thus, classical Marxism shares with the liberal development model the view that the low status of women derives from the structure of production.[7]

Although Marx had very little to say about the role of women in capitalism, two of his comments have often been quoted: that wives and husbands are in the same relationship to each other as proletariat

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holds: The Ignored Factor in Development Planning," mimeo (Washington, D.C.: International Center for Research on Women, 1978).

[6] Nadia H. Youssef and Mayra Buvinic, "The Productivity of Women in Developing Countries: Measurement Issues and Recommendations" (Washington, D.C.: International Center for Research on Women, 1980).

[7] The discussion of Marxism is drawn from Margaret E. Leahy, "Equality and Inequality in Capitalist and Socialist Societies: A Conceptual Framework for Comparative Studies of Women and National Development," paper presented at the International Political Science Association Meetings (Moscow, 1979); Norma Chinchilla, "Ideologies of Feminism: Liberal, Radical, Marxist," paper presented at a symposium on Women in the Americas (Tijuana, Mexico, April 1978); and Karen Sacks, "Engels Revisited: Women, the Organization of Production, and Private Property," in Rayna R. Reiter, ed., *Toward an Anthropology of Women* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 211-34.

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and bourgeoisie, and that the degree of advancement of a society can be measured by the status accorded to women. Based on studies that had just become available which showed the high status of women in primitive societies, 19th-century anthropologists argued that the change from hunter-gatherer societies to settled agricultural production was accompanied by a loss of status for women. For a full discussion of the issue, Marxists turn to Engels's *The Origins of the Family: Private Property and the State.*

For Engels, the key to this decline in status was not to be found in changes in technology, as Boserup later posits, but in changes in the social organization of wealth. When domestic animals and land under settled farming conditions started to create a surplus of wealth, the basis for private property—and its domination by men—was at hand. Surpluses provided the basis for exchange, and production for exchange came to dominate production for use. Since the men controlled production for exchange, they came to dominate social and political relations in those societies; women were reduced to a form of property. The bourgeois family as we know it is a means of controlling and exchanging women who, under capitalism, are responsible both for domestic production and for reproduction.

Later writers, such as Madeira and Singer, have taken another step in the argument. With industrialization, the constant social redivision of labor further isolates production for use from production for exchange. Families are no longer economic units in the sense of producing goods for the marketplace; such production now occurs in factories, and families have become units of consumption, with women specialized to that role.[8] Dependency theorists maintain that during the colonial period, the undeveloped countries were integrated into the world economic system under terms highly favorable to the industrialized center; agriculture turned from subsistence to cash cropping; and urban migration occurred under conditions of high unemployment for both males and females. The marginalization of women became an extreme and telling example of the marginalization of the periphery.[9]

Although the oppression of women had its origins in the rise of private property and capitalist industrialization, it survives in the present

[8] Felicia Madeira and Paul Singer, "Structure of Female Employment and Work in Brazil," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, XVII (November 1975), 490-97.

[9] See discussion in Marysa Navarro, "Research on Latin American Women," *SIGNS*, V (Autumn 1979), 111-21; June Nash, "A Critique of Social Science Roles in Latin America," in June Nash and Helen Safa, eds., *Sex and Class in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1976), 1-24.

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—despite technological changes and liberal values that favor women's participation—because the exploitation of women serves the needs of capitalism. In the Marxist view, the role played by women as unpaid family workers and in reproducing the labor force makes it possible to pay workers less than subsistence, and thus to increase capital accumulation. Moreover, women's intermittent employment in the paid labor force—at low wages—creates a "reserve army of labor" which undermines the solidarity of the working class. Multinational firms seeking the cheapest, most docile labor have turned to employing young, unmarried women, notably in Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan, and more recently in the *maquiladoras* along the Mexican border.[10] This trend is further evidence of female exploitation under capitalist development.

Just as the liberal view of the dual economy can be criticized for failing to account for the interrelation of the two parts, so the failure to integrate women can be seen not as a failure of diffusion, but in terms of the exploitative interaction between the two spheres of production, and between center and periphery:

> It makes little sense to study changes in women's work independently from men, just as it gives an incomplete understanding to study occupational structures or growth independently of an international context of investment, production and control. . . . The fate of women, the way they carry out their daily tasks, and the view of the world they derive from these experiences depends, in the final analysis, not so much on the policies of their governments or the "enlightenment" of the men around them as on the function that the economy of which they are a part serves in the world system.[11]

Because the cause of women's oppression is structural—the origin of private property and capitalist accumulation from the point of view of Marxists, and the international division of labor from that of dependency theorists—solutions are also structural: revolution, or a break from the capitalist international economic system. After the revolution, the granting of equal rights is not enough, since women are disadvantaged by their domestic responsibilities in competing with men. As Margaret Leahy has argued, quoting Engels, "Only when 'private housekeeping is transformed into a social industry [and] the care and education of children becomes a public affair' will women be afforded

[10] Linda Lim, *Women Workers in Multinational Corporations*, Ann Arbor, Mich.: Occasional Papers in Women's Studies, No. 9 (Fall, 1978); Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, "The 'Maquila' Women," *NACLA Report on the Americas*, XIV (September/October 1980), 14-19.

[11] Norma Chinchilla, "Mobilizing Women: Revolution in the Revolution," *Latin American Perspectives*, IV (Fall 1977), 96.

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the conditions to achieve true equality."[12] This point is further developed by Larguía and Demoulin:

> The emancipation of women will only be possible when women can take part in production on a large scale and domestic work no longer claims anything but an insignificant amount of their time. And only now has that become possible through modern, large-scale industry, which does not merely permit the employment of female labor over a large range . . . but also tends toward ending private domestic labor by changing it more and more into public industry.[13]

To summarize, Marxist theorists maintain that the dependent status of women will be altered primarily by socialist revolution, and subsequently by the elimination of domestic labor. Like the liberal model, Marxism accepts the view that technology liberates women; it finds positive aspects for women, and for society as a whole, in the diffusion of modern values and social organization—of the male exchange economy and the public arena—to the domestic sphere. In both cases, this change applies to women's economic activities and not to the family as an affective institution. On the contrary, the family's function will be enhanced:

> Until now the present domestic relations and the family have intervened as relations necessary to the functioning of all modes of production since the primitive domestic economy. . . . Communism . . . is the only system which extends the promise of a mode of production that is truly new, radically freed from the archaism of the family, but at the same time renewing affective relationships.[14]

The Socialist-Feminist Critique

Feminist analyses have emerged in both the conventional and the dependency strains of Marxism; in fact, socialist feminism was the most dynamic arena of feminist theory and debate in the 1970s. For socialist feminists, there is constant tension between the obvious need for a feminist awareness on the one hand, and the need to preserve the integrity of the materialist core of Marxism on the other, as the analysis of "patriarchy" is added to that of the mode of production. This tension may preclude certain lines of argument, as pointed out in Peggy Sanday's criticism of the common assumption that women's participation in production and women's status are closely linked. She finds that

[12] Leahy (fn. 7), 11.

[13] Isabel Larguía and John Demoulin, "Aspects of the Conditions of Women's Labor," *Latin America and Empire Report*, IX (September 1975), 4.

[14] Claude Maillassoux, *Mujeres, graneros y capitales* (Mexico: Siglo XXI Press, 1977), 196; author's translation.

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economic participation is a necessary but not sufficient condition of high female status; low levels of participation correlate with low female status, but so do very high levels, where women become virtual slaves.[15] An increase in female economic participation not sanctioned by cultural norms often leads to sexual antagonism rather than to greater status or power. In order to carry this analysis forward, one would have to re-examine the concept of work and the equation of economic and political roles, but this kind of study has not yet been undertaken.

Socialist feminists argue that the failure to incorporate women into the revolutionary societies of the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba proves that socialist revolution does not by itself liberate women. The critique of capitalism must be joined by a critique of male domination. As Zillah Eisenstein has defined the task, what is needed is a theory of "capitalist patriarchy:"

> I choose this phrase . . . to emphasize the mutually reinforcing dialectical relationship between capitalist class structure and hierarchical sexual structuring. . . . Although patriarchy existed before capitalism, and continues in postcapitalist societies, it is their present relationship that must be understood if the structure of oppression is to be changed. In this sense socialist feminism moves beyond singular Marxist analysis and isolated radical feminist theory ("Developing a Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist Feminism," p. 5).

Eisenstein begins with the thesis of "woman as class," pointing out the way in which Marx's definition of alienation can be applied to women. Like proletarianized workers, women are cut off by both capitalism and patriarchy from achieving their essence, from "life as a species being." In a similar way, their oppression gives rise to the possibility of revolutionary consciousness. She opposes the feminist antithesis of "woman as sex," as represented by Shulamith Firestone's powerful but deterministic view that biology determines destiny, and biology must be changed: just as Marx argued that socialism should not eliminate class privilege, but the class distinction itself, so the feminists' demand should be for the elimination not just of sex privilege, but the sex distinction itself.[16] Women's primary role must no longer be to bear and rear children, nor should the biological family be the basis of social organization.

[15] Sanday, "Female Status in the Public Domain," in Michele Z. Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere, eds., *Women, Culture, and Society* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1974), 189-206.

[16] See Firestone, *The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution* (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), 11.

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But, Eisenstein argues, women's inequality arises not out of biological differences between men and women, but out of the social assessment and valuation of those differences. The synthesis is "socialist feminism," which links the relations of production to the relations of reproduction. The prospect held out by socialist feminism is not only the profound modification of Marxist theory, but the use of the universal fact of female subordination (which, however, varies in content and form through time and under different modes of production) as a basis for comparative study and a new praxis. The cause of oppression is not production or reproduction, but the social construction of those activities:

> Any of the particular oppressions experienced by women in capitalist patriarchy exhibit relations of the society. As things, they are completely neutral. Abstracted from reality, there is nothing inherently oppressive about contraception, pregnancy, abortion, childrearing, or affectionate familial relations. . . . If men and women believed that childrearing was a social responsibility, rather than a woman's responsibility; if we did not believe that childhood affection was dependent on privacy rather than intimacy, the "relations" of childrearing would be significantly different. If being pregnant did not involve a woman in patriarchal medical care, if it did not mean the loss of pay and the incurrence of financial obligations, and if it meant bringing life into a socialist, feminist society, the act of childbirth would take on a wholly different meaning ("Some Notes on the Relations of Capitalist Patriarchy," p. 52).

The danger here, which makes socialist feminists vulnerable to attacks from classical Marxists, is that the focus on patriarchy will dilute revolutionary consciousness and undermine the materialist base on which Marxism rests. The anticapitalist revolution becomes a precondition for the feminist revolution rather than a center-stage event, and the future policies of a socialist feminist state become indistinguishable in their specifics from the policies of an enlightened welfare state. Policies that are attacked as merely reformist, or even cynical, under capitalism become enlightened under socialism. An example of this is Gimenez's treatment of the population issue:

> Under capitalism, where individuals' life chances are left to the vagaries of the market, it makes no difference how many people there are because the logic of the system is such that even with zero population growth, unemployment and poverty—i.e., excess population—would still be present. Under a socialist economic and social organization, on the contrary, given its commitment to organize production for the satisfaction of everyone's needs, the population problem would become acute.[17]

[17] Martha Gimenez, "Population and Capitalism," *Latin American Perspectives*, IV (Fall 1977), 33.

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The view that the link between the relations of production and the mode of production are at the core of women's oppression takes a different form in the work of theorists such as Karen Sacks, Eleanor Leacock, Nancy Chodorow, and Gayle Rubin.

Sacks begins with a new perspective on Engels:

> Engels presents a historical process by which women are transformed from free and equal productive *members of society* to subordinate and dependent wives and wards. The growth of male-owned private property, with the family as the institution which appropriates and perpetuates it, is the cause of this transformation.[18]

One result of this analysis is a focus on a golden age of the dominance of production for use, not exchange. In Leacock's words, "Women are in a qualitatively different position in [modern] societies than they are in societies where what has been called the 'household economy' is the *entire* economy."[19] This view has led to a debate about whether women are actually better off, in Marxist terms, under primitive or feudal forms of production than under capitalism; and to what extent our understanding of how so-called matriarchies functioned offers any insights into a socialist feminist future. Insofar as the thesis of the "household as the entire economy" is sustained, this branch of socialist feminism merges into the female-sphere perspective that will be outlined below.

It is possible, beginning with Engels, to intensify the search for the origins of women's oppression in the kinship system itself, and in the psychological adjustments women must make which permit male control of their sexuality and of their freedom to enter the public sphere. Gayle Rubin quotes Lévi-Strauss to argue, in a way fully consistent with Engels's view of women as property, that marriage is "a total relationship of exchange," not between a man and a woman, "but between two groups of men, and the woman figures as one of the objects in the exchange. . . ."[20] The male/female division of labor is "endlessly varied," so that the form under which it comes to exist is "utterly irrelevant": "The sexual division of labor is nothing else than a device to institute a reciprocal state of dependency between the sexes," which is asymmetrical in favor of men, and, in Rubin's interpretation, constitutes a "taboo against the sameness of men and women."[21] The re-

[18] Sacks (fn. 7), 213.

[19] Leacock, "Women's Status in Egalitarian Society: Implications for Social Evolution," *Current Anthropology*, IX (June 1978), 247-75, at 250.

[20] Rubin, "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex," in Reiter (fn. 7), 157-210, at 174.

[21] *Ibid.*, 178.

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mainder of Rubin's essay is an interpretation of Freud's theories of contrasting male and female responses to the oedipal crisis as an illustration of the psychic costs for women of accepting structural powerlessness. This acceptance becomes embedded in female "gender identity"—a point that Nancy Chodorow develops further in *The Reproduction of Mothering*.[22]

Rubin and Chodorow push the question of the cause of women's oppression beyond traditionalism and capitalism and beyond the sexual division of labor to the construction of gender identity itself. It is not only "incremental" feminist policies that are suspect in their view, but also efforts by revolutionary regimes limited to restructuring the sexual division of labor. Accordingly, changing patterns of socialization, providing wages for housework, or involving men in "women's work," are weak strategies:

> We cannot dismantle something we underestimate or do not understand. The oppression of women is deep: equal pay, equal work, and all of the female politicians in the world will not extirpate the roots of sexism. Lévi-Strauss and Freud elucidate what would otherwise be poorly perceived parts of the deep structures of sex oppression. They serve as reminders of the intractability and magnitude of what we must fight, and their analyses provide preliminary charts of the social machinery we must rearrange.[23]

V. The "Female-Sphere" Critique

Because it is not forced into the mold of a theory focused primarily on other issues, the female-sphere perspective is eclectic. As with ethnic and national identity, female "identity" is sought in an ideal reconstruction of history and a projection of that reconstruction onto the future.[24]

Although theorists from all of the approaches discussed here may use "female sphere" arguments (particularly those that use women's high status in past societies to point out that the oppression of women is neither inevitable nor natural), two strains of female-sphere theory are relevant to the discussion of both the proper goals of development and the means of change.

The first approach is derived from the public/private distinction drawn in Rosaldo and Lamphere's path-breaking anthology, *Women,*

[22] Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

[23] Rubin (fn. 20), 198.

[24] For the general case and a feminist analogue, see Kay Boals, "The Politics of Cultural Liberation," in Jane S. Jaquette, ed., *Women in Politics* (New York: John Wiley, 1974), 322-42.

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Culture, and Society.[25] The recognition of the private sphere as a terrain dominated by women and the locus of positive values had far-reaching consequences, particularly for the study of women in developing societies. In these countries, where women's roles are highly differentiated from men's, the women's sphere forms a larger part of the economic and social structure, and the ability of women to enter the public sphere is often severely circumscribed by legal and social restrictions.

Greater focus on the female sphere leads to a theory of female power based on complementarity—"separate may be equal," as Leacock put it—and of the myth of male dominance. The work of Susan Carol Rogers on peasant communities in Southern France is representative:

> The two sexes operate within partially divergent systems of perceived advantages, values and prestige, so that the members of each group see themselves as "winners" in respect to the other. Neither men nor women believe that the "myth" is an actual reflection of the situation. However, each sex believes (or appears to believe, so avoiding confrontation), that the myth is a reality. . . .[26]

During the past decade, a number of studies have shown that women derive power and satisfaction from their separate roles, that they use women's networks or kin groups to gain economic advantage or to ensure community survival, that their control over communications networks or ritual values is a source of power, and that—contrary to the image of women as economic parasites or a leisure caste—women consistently work harder and longer than men.[27]

The re-evaluation of the domestic sphere, and its glorification, has sparked strong controversy between female-sphere theorists and feminists who argue that rationalizing female oppression as "female power" can only work to preserve the asymmetric status quo. Suellen Huntington sees Boserup's panegyric on the "female farming system" as misleading to the point of perversity: "Polygyny and high bride-prices may recognize the economic worth and productivity of women,

[25] Rosaldo and Lamphere (fn. 15).

[26] Rogers, "Female Forms of Power and the Myth of Male Dominance: A Model of Female-Male Interaction in a Peasant Society," *American Ethnologist*, II (November 1975), 729.

[27] See Youssef and Buvinic (fn. 6); Julie DaVanzo and Donald Lye Poh Lee, "The Compatibility of Child Care with Labor Force Participation and Nonmarket Activities," P-6126, Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation (July 1978); Larissa Lomnitz, *Networks and Marginality* (New York: Academic Press, 1977); Beverly Chinas, *The Isthmus Zapotecs: Women's Roles in a Cultural Context* (New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1973); Constantina Safilios Rothschild, "A Macro- and Micro-Examination of Family Power and Love," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, XXXVIII (May 1976), 355-62.

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but both also serve to perpetuate male power, authority, and wealth."[28] Susan Bourque and Kay Warren, in a study of Peruvian peasant women, warn that female power analyses continue "to obscure the distinction between a group's exercise of power and a group's development of strategies to limit the power exercised upon it." They also remind us that men themselves consistently use separate-sphere arguments to justify continued male dominance and female subordination. Men have a stake in asserting that women are incapable or unfit to do men's work and thus to share men's power—even where there is clear empirical evidence that women do "men's work" consistently but would be punished for drawing attention to that fact.[29]

Rosaldo, recognizing the role the female-sphere theory can play in questioning the male definitions of power and development, now argues that the focus on the domestic sphere has been overdone, and that there is insufficient emphasis on the uniqueness of the present historical period and on the prospects for a "fundamental challenge . . . to traditional ways of understanding social forms as the creation of the lives and needs of men":

> The most serious deficiency of a model based on two opposed spheres appears, in short, in its alliance with the dualisms of the past, dichotomies which teach that women must be understood not in terms of relationship—with other women and with men—but of difference and apartness.[30]

Nonetheless, it would seem that female-sphere theory has a role to play, both as a heuristic perspective from which to challenge the male definitions of what is valued and how society can and should be structured, and as an explanation of why women themselves are often most resistant to the changes intended to "liberate" them. "Female power" functions less as a rationalization of the present than as an illustration of the constraints on change—a kind of moral economy of resistance:[31] women, like poor peasants, are rational actors who act to maximize benefits and minimize risks. The peasants' failure to respond to market

[28] Huntington, "Issues in Woman's Role in Economic Development: Critique and Alternatives," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, XXXVII (November 1975), 1008.

[29] Bourque and Warren, "Female Participation, Perception and Power: An Examination of Two Andean Communities," in John Booth and Mitchell Seligson, eds., *Political Participation and the Poor* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), 132.

[30] Michelle Z. Rosaldo, "The Use and Abuse of Anthropology: Reflections on Feminism and Cross-Cultural Understanding," *SIGNS*, V (Spring 1980), 409.

[31] The analogy is with James C. Scott's thesis in *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). This view of women's stake in the existing distribution of power explains why women do not revolt, but not why they do. See Robert Bates, "People in Villages: Micro-level Studies in Political Economy," *World Politics*, XXXI (October 1978), 129-49.

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incentives has been explained as rational risk aversion in a marginal subsistence economy. Feminist strategies of change which assume that women can and will seize public-sphere power ignore the fact that such change is often costly for women, or incompatible with holding existing power resources in the private sphere.

Elise Boulding's work represents yet a different view of the female sphere. She argues that women's oppression has created a female culture which is distinct from that of men, and that global changes are occurring which will make female values functional for survival, and thus bring women to power. Noting that population growth, pollution, and the potential of nuclear war are making the earth increasingly uninhabitable, and arguing that new social structures will be necessary to insure human survival, she asks:

> Who will create the new images? It will be those who are marginal to the present society, who are excluded from the centers of power, who stand at the world's peripheries and see society with different eyes. . . . The category of human being I have been writing about . . . fulfills the requirements of marginality, of exclusion from the centers of power, and of possession of practical everyday skills at the micro and intermediate levels of human activity—the family, the neighborhood, the town. Since they also represent approximately half of the human race, their political potential is incalculable. I am referring, of course, to women (p. 277).

Waiting for the exigencies of spaceship earth to force a redistribution of power between men and women has the advantage of being nonconfrontational and consistent with current thinking about decentralized power and no-growth projections of the future. Ironically, it is practical. The largely unrecognized fact that women have economic and political skills, and that neighborhood and other decentralized institutions which have survived and still function in this age of high technology and concentration of power are often women's groups, gives theorists hope and planners somewhere to turn. Women become the logical recipients of intermediate technology; women's organizations may become the future arbiters of politics. The weak shall inherit the earth.

The foregoing perspectives are often in conflict; to choose one or the other is to make important decisions about how to structure policies in the present—such as whether to have "women-specific" or "integrated" development projects, or whether the household, or males, females, and children as individuals, are to be the recipients of foreign assistance benefits. In order to address these differences, what is most needed are micro-studies of the differential impact of development efforts on men and women.

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VI. Conclusions

Although in strong agreement about the need to improve the status of women in all societies and the economically marginalizing effects of modernization on women, the feminist critiques reviewed here are often in conflict with each other, engaged in attack and counterattack over basic assumptions and goals that are rarely spelled out. The division along the Marxist/non-Marxist dimension is clear when it fits the standard pattern, but is made much more complex by the socialist-feminist concern with psychological and anthropological data, the obvious weaknesses of socialist regimes in resolving the "woman question," and the self-declared "revolutionary" orientations of many non-Marxist feminists.

On the other hand, both socialist and liberal feminists are put in a difficult position by female-sphere theories. Evidence of a past era of greater female equality is useful to both; in arguing that female inequality is not inevitable or natural, they build up the level of indignation about current inequities which is necessary to promote change. However, any argument that can be construed as tolerating the status quo—such as the view that male domination is a myth—is dangerous, for it weakens the pressure. Nonconfrontational points of view, such as Elise Boulding's, are rejected by both groups, which favor political action, not futuristic quietism. Policy differences are also at stake, although the differences between liberal and socialist feminists over *policies toward women*, as opposed to their stance toward *socialism*, are often hard to discern.

The important distinction here is the influence of the female-sphere perspective; it tends to be less egalitarian in its priorities, and likely to accept distinct male and female spheres (including the sexual division of labor) as tolerable or even desirable—provided women control access to income-generating resources and enjoy the fruits of their labor. Advocates of female-sphere development look to women's organizations, women's work, and even (in the extreme case) women's seclusion as an opportunity, a basis for solidarity and mutual aid. They are less likely than Marxists and liberals to focus on legal equality (in part because it is often ineffective, particularly for lower-class women), or to argue that placing women in men's jobs should be a priority, except at the elite or administrative level.

The female-sphere/feminist division also lies behind the ongoing debates between "women-specific" versus "integrated" development projects, and the effectiveness of women's bureaus in national governments or women's offices in government agencies. Similarly, the degree

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to which the household is accepted as a unit of analysis in measuring the impact of development is at issue, with feminists in the forefront of those seeking to look at male and female gains and losses, rather than at the household as an undifferentiated whole. Thus, a policy to introduce technology which is to be used by men and will increase family income, but which will take jobs away from women, would be suspect.

The most important implication for research is the need for sex-disaggregated data in all studies of the impact of development on people—whether seen as a long-term process or as the result of discrete project interventions. Without more such data—collected by researchers who are sensitive both to the fact that developing societies have valued and will continue to value complementary rather than egalitarian roles for women, as well as to the fact that women are central to economic production—there will be no way to prove or disprove the hypotheses generated by the feminist critique. Without such studies, a significant opportunity to deepen our understanding of the complexity of development may be missed as well.

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TWO VIEWS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

By RONG ZHI

Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy*. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, 336 pp., $22.95.

J. D. Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1977, 251 pp., $19.00 cloth ($6.95 paper, 1980).

FOR a long time, the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China seemed to be difficult to understand. Up to the Johnson Administration, the United States looked upon China as a more dangerous long-term adversary than the Soviet Union. At that time, the U.S. enforced an embargo on its trade with China, and the Multilateral Coordinating Committee (COCOM) was unwilling to permit third-country sales to China of high technology that was licensed for export to the U.S.S.R.[1] During the Nixon Administration, the U.S. began to change its China policy; eventually this led to the normalization of Sino-American relations during the Carter Administration. During the process of rapprochement, the foreign policy of the PRC became a subject of public concern.

I

China under Threat by Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang and *Revolutionary Diplomacy* by J. D. Armstrong are among the books that have sought to take a new look at the foreign policy of the PRC.

Gurtov and Hwang make an effort to find such a new approach by stressing the importance of the national interests that derive from political, economic, and domestic considerations other than an overarching ideology, and that play a role in the process of foreign policy making (p. 1). They describe the interaction of domestic factors and foreign policy in the PRC as follows:

1. The chief purpose of foreign policy in China is to protect and promote the radical socialist revolution at home (p. 17).
2. A quiescent (nonthreatening) international environment is the optimum condition for radical socialist development (p. 18).

[1] Michel Oksenberg, "China Policy for the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59 (Winter 1980/81), 318.

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3. Economic performance is considered by Chinese leaders to be the key to national security and international legitimacy (p. 19).
4. Chinese sensitivity to external threat is highest at times of domestic political weakness or conflict (p. 20).
5. Foreign policy becomes a domestic political issue by addressing economic or political choices that are under debate (p. 20).
6. Domestic stability promotes conditions that are favorable to foreign policy initiatives (p. 20).

Armstrong, too, tries to find a new approach to Chinese foreign policy. He prefers to take ideology as the decisive factor in the process of policy making, asserting that "Insofar as Mao's thoughts about united fronts are part of the total array of theories and operational principles that make up the Chinese Communist 'ideology,' this essay considers one aspect of the relationship between ideology and foreign policy" (p. 1). The author of *Revolutionary Diplomacy* denies that national interest motivates the process of foreign policy making:

1. "National interest" is a vague and ambiguous term without objectively determinable content.
2. The "national interest-ideology" dichotomy is a false one.
3. The dichotomy is particularly inapplicable when the ideology under consideration is Marxism-Leninism (p. 4).

Armstrong takes the United Front doctrine as a major principle in the foreign policy making of the PRC:

> An international united front strategy would have the dual purpose of isolating and defeating a principal enemy and shifting leftward the balance of forces within the united front (p. 54).

> When China develops a close relationship with a non-Communist state, Peking's objective is to pursue a "dual policy" towards that state of encouraging revolutionary tendencies within it at the same time as and partly by means of an alignment with it against an external enemy (p. 55).

Based on these assessments, the author goes on to assert that "in China's case, lack of power has precluded an attempt to provide for security by global or even regional domination, although if China had the necessary power, the 'alliance model' would point to China's attempting to set up at least a sphere of influence in Asia" (p. 59).

II

With the aim of confirming their viewpoints, the authors of both works cite some facts and try to interpret the process of policy making to suit their hypotheses.

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Gurtov and Hwang take the behavior of the PRC during the Korean War, the Taiwan Strait crisis, the Sino-Indian border war, the Vietnam War, and the Sino-Soviet border clashes as examples to justify their view; Armstrong uses Sino-Indonesian relations, Sino-Pakistani relations, Sino-Cambodian (Kampuchean) relations, and Sino-Tanzanian relations as examples that serve his purpose.

Gurtov and Hwang hold that China has always been concerned about its national security while also taking its domestic needs into account:

> Prior to the [Korean] war, Chinese leaders, having just emerged from a prolonged and costly civil war, had to cope with crucial domestic problems in order to consolidate their power.
>
> Despite these pressing domestic issues, the P.R.C. responded with force to U.S. action in Korea, which most Chinese leaders perceived as an imminent danger to China's national security. The Chinese seemed to fear that invading UN and U.S. forces would occupy North Korea and push their attack beyond the border of Korea into China (p. 25).

The authors maintain that China's involvement in the war was due to its security needs as well as the domestic need to mobilize the people for production: "China's Korean War decision was influenced by and in turn affected its domestic affairs" (p. 25). During the war, the Government of the PRC, seriously concerned about its economic development, advanced a " 'three-sided financial policy'—that is, to fight the war of resistance, to achieve stability, and to get on with national construction" (p. 62). Although the war had some negative effects on China's economy, the First Five Year Plan was accomplished ahead of schedule.

As to the Taiwan Strait crisis, Gurtov and Hwang contend that China's action was no more than a response to the threat of the U.S. and Taiwan. They disagree with the assertion that the crisis was a matter of external adventurism caused by domestic instability. Those who insist on this point of view "either neglect to make a circumspect examination of the domestic Chinese scene during the period in question or they slight the relevance of other governments' actions to Chinese foreign-policy choices" (p. 97). The authors also hold, however, that China's reaction to the Taiwan Strait crisis was caused by overestimating the threat from the United States, because "the Eisenhower-Dulles policy was to use the GMD armed forces as a means of keeping military pressure on China, not for 'rolling back' communism in China." The Chinese response, in turn, "confirmed the State Department in its prevailing assessment of a P.R.C. threat to Taiwan; and the

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ensuing American show of power went considerably beyond Mao's expectations" (p. 98). Thus, a cycle of mutual misperceptions was started that ended in a confrontation. The authors fail to point out that the Taiwan problem is simply a domestic one from the perspective of the PRC.

Concerning the Sino-Indian border war, Gurtov and Hwang find:

> It was not China's intention to conquer India by military invasion; nor, contrary to some analyses, was China out to discredit the Indian development model.
>
> One of China's primary objectives was to achieve essential territorial security by halting India's forward policy at a minimum and by securing Chinese-claimed territory at a maximum (p. 143).

They conclude:

> It is highly probable that the interplay between domestic weakness and external threats misled the Chinese leadership to perceive the threat from India to be much greater than was actually the case, and then to take drastic action against India in order to enhance its own sense of security and correct India's misperceptions of China (p. 152).

This conclusion conflicts, however, with the authors' analysis earlier in the same chapter:

> After the collapse of diplomacy on August 22 [asking the Indian government to halt its forward movement and to come to the conference table], however, the options available to China's leaders were limited. Diplomatic probes accompanied by minimal military pressure had almost been exhausted. It is likely that a more militant line gained ascendency over the line of diplomatic reconciliation (p. 139).

Gurtov and Hwang believe that the Chinese response to the Vietnam War was conditioned by the fear of being encircled by the Soviet Union from the North and the United States from the South. Moreover, there was, "in Beijing's view, the existence of a common basis for the two powers' collusion at Glassboro—the fact that they both regarded the P.R.C. as their 'number one enemy,' and that in the future, both would support any forces that opposed China" (p. 221).

The Sino-Soviet border tension is seen by Gurtov and Hwang as having been initiated by the Soviet Union, since

> in October 1964, the Soviet high command reassessed the general requirements of the Soviet Union's ground forces, including those in the Far East (p. 211).
>
> The first sign of efforts to improve the Soviets' military strength along the border was the conclusion of a new defense treaty with Mongolia

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> in January 1966 which authorized the presence of Soviet troops on Mongolian soil. By early 1967, Moscow had moved nearly a hundred thousand men into the People's Republic of Mongolia. It was also reported that beginning in early 1966, the Soviets continued to improve the capability of their far eastern forces by supplying them with sophisticated weapons such as missiles and surface-to-surface nuclear-tipped rockets. Meanwhile, from seven to eight Soviet divisions were moved from central Asia to a position east of Lake Baikal, bringing the total troop strength there to between 250,000 and 350,000 men (p. 212).

Before the border clash in 1969, "in early December 1968, *Izvestia* had quoted General O. A. Losik, Soviet Far Eastern Military District commander, as saying that military maneuvers had taken place in the eastern part of the Soviet Union. . . . In January and February 1969, . . . the Soviets intensified their efforts to prevent Chinese patrolling of Zhenbao Island" (p. 233)—which was the immediate cause of the Sino-Soviet border clash. Gurtov and Hwang's opinion—that China's domestic instability made China take preemptive military action on the border—is not supported by the facts cited by them.

Armstrong, who asserts that ideology has played a major role in Chinese foreign policy making, picks Sino-Indonesian relations as the first example to show that China had urged Indonesia to follow its course by the application of the united-front doctrine. He advances four hypotheses about China's policy toward Indonesia:

> 1. That Peking, throughout the 1961–1965 period, attached at least as much importance to its relations with the PKI [Communist Party of Indonesia] as it did to those with the Indonesian government.
> 2. That in 1963, and partly as a result of Chinese persuasion, the PKI decided to switch away from its constitutional strategy for winning power and towards a more Chinese-style strategy.
> 3. That Peking used the opportunity presented by Sukarno's rift with both Washington and Moscow to adopt the role of Indonesia's major international ally for the purpose of urging upon Sukarno a confrontation strategy that was aimed at establishing in Indonesia the conditions for a Chinese-style revolution.
> 4. That China's informal alliance with the Indonesian government therefore fully deserves the title "united front" to the extent that it incorporated an alliance "from below" with the PKI to overthrow that government (p. 138).

But Armstrong also acknowledges that "the fact that China attempted to influence the strategy of confrontation in ways that would assist the PKI does not necessarily mean that Peking supported or helped plan the attempted coup of 30 September 1965. It rather suggests the opposite" (p. 148).

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The relations between China and Pakistan do not, at any rate, support Armstrong's hypothesis that China urged Pakistan to follow its model of revolution by applying the united-front doctrine. After analyzing the evidence, Armstrong interprets Chinese policy as follows:

> If the Sino-Pakistani relationship, by virtue of China's support for Pakistan during a war, comes the nearest of the four case studies to the traditional notion of an alliance, it is therefore not surprising that it should derive its rationale from the traditional moulder of alliances: the international system (p. 181).
>
> China was, in part, led into an alliance with Pakistan in 1963. Once there, Chinese policy revolved around a principle that is inseparable from both alliances and international systems: the balance of power. The aim was the classic one of preventing the dominance of a single power on the subcontinent . . . (p. 182).

Nor do the Sino-Cambodian (Kampuchean) relations support Armstrong's hypothesis:

> The pattern of Sino-Cambodian relations was different again from those outlined in both previous case studies. Cambodia received a strong verbal commitment from China, but, unlike the Pakistan case, this was intended to serve purposes other than those associated with a conventional alliance commitment. Similarly, Peking did not display much interest in the revolutionary prospects of Cambodia. Although it eventually supported a "people's war" in Cambodia, it did so only after ascertaining that the new Cambodian government of Lon Nol was not prepared to tolerate Vietnamese Communist incursions to the same extent as had Sihanouk (p. 211).

China's involvement in Tanzania does not help Armstrong's case, either.

> China's general perspective on Africa in the early 1960s seems quite clearly to have derived from the united front doctrine (p. 235).
>
> Indeed, despite Peking's clear revolutionary objective during this stage of its relationship with Tanzania . . . , it is doubtful whether the relationship can even be termed a "united front." It lacks, for example, a "dual policy" element as well as any form of "united front from below" with Tanzanian leftist forces.
>
> Since the Sino-Tanzanian relationship was not supported by the development of new, generally applicable Chinese doctrines on "peaceful transition," it is impossible to say whether it reflected a new line on the Third World as a whole or is a unique case (p. 236).

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III

What are the most important factors that should be taken into account when assessing the foreign policy making of the PRC? Judging by the evidence set forth by the authors of the two books, it seems that Gurtov and Hwang's argument is closer to reality than Armstrong's.

In his conclusion, Armstrong admits that

> the impact of these four policy applications of the united front doctrine was not distributed evenly across the whole spectrum of China's international relations. China's general approach to Africa and its particular policies in Indonesia were strongly influenced by the doctrine, its policies towards Cambodia and Tanzania rather less so, and its relations with Pakistan not at all (p. 238).

If three cases out of four do not support the author's argument, how can it be considered to be valid?

Even the Indonesian case does not support Armstrong's hypothesis. Because the PKI was legal at that time, the contact between China and the PKI was a normal one. The author admits, moreover, that there was no evidence of China's involvement in the coup of September 30, 1965; how can he then conclude that China applied a "dual policy" toward Indonesia, aimed at overthrowing its government?

China's perception of Africa, as defined by Armstrong, was based on articles published during the Cultural Revolution. After having quoted from these articles, the author adds:

> When Peking began to repair its relations with African countries from 1969, a dramatic change of style was noticeable. . . . Peking no longer stressed the example of the Chinese revolution but concentrated rather more than it had in the 1960s on the relevance of Chinese techniques of economic construction (p. 221).

This fact shows that the influence of the ultraleft ideology on foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution did not prevail very long and did not have a great effect on the foreign policy of the PRC.

Since Armstrong's book was published before the downfall of the Gang of Four, misunderstanding and misperception of Chinese foreign policy are unavoidable. This also holds true for Gurtov and Hwang's volume.

Gurtov and Hwang's conclusion is correct—namely, that China's responses to the Korean War, the Taiwan Strait crisis, the Sino-Indian border war, the Vietnam War, and the Sino-Soviet border clashes

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originated chiefly in the desire to secure a quiescent (non-threatening) international environment for socialist development. But their assertion that one of China's principal goals is to "protect and promote the radical socialist revolution at home" (p. 244) may not be accurate. Since the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1978, China has advanced to a new period of development, to realize the "four modernizations." The period of promoting "radical socialist revolution" has passed forever.

Recent developments of world politics are also not taken into account by Gurtov and Hwang. They mention the deployment of ever larger contingents of Soviet troops close to the Chinese border and Mongolia; in addition, however, the Soviet Union has been increasingly involved in Indochina and Southeast and Southwest Asia since 1979, posing a serious threat to China and world peace. To cope with this threat has become the major strategic concern of the PRC. National interest is by no means vague and ambiguous.

Since China is a socialist country, Marxist principles must play an important but not exclusive part in the process of foreign policy making. Mao Zedong's thought is the integration of Marxist ideology with China's conditions. The Chinese Government and Communist Party have repeatedly affirmed that Mao Zedong's thought still remains a guide to their work, including foreign policy making. The essence of Mao Zedong's thought was defined in 1978 at the Third Plenum of the CPC's Central Committee as the integration of Marxism with Chinese conditions, and seeking truth from facts. Because of its own experience, China has always insisted on noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries and other communist parties; it believes that socialist revolution in any country should be carried out by its own people through the integration of Marxism with the conditions of the country concerned. Never to seek hegemony is and will be an important principle of the PRC.

The Soviet Union, however, drawing on the heritage of nationalism and hegemonism, has always tended to impose its will upon others by force, on the pretext of performing an international obligation. Soviet behavior in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in the current Polish crisis, and in the invasion of Afghanistan provides some of the most glaring examples. Perceiving that Mao Zedong's thought may become a major obstacle in their attempt to forge ahead toward world hegemonism, the Soviets have declared: "Now it is far too little to say that the Maoist ideology and policy are incompatible with the Marxist-Leninist teach-

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ing; they are directly hostile to it. . . . We shall continue the struggle against Maoism—a principled and irreconcilable struggle."[2]

As Gurtov and Hwang point out, there should be some interaction between domestic and foreign policies. The ultraleft domestic policy during the Cultural Revolution had an impact, though of short duration, on China's foreign policy; Gurtov and Hwang have acknowledged this to a certain extent. But their assertion that domestic weakness magnifies external threats and may lead to misperceptions or miscalculations on the part of the opponent may not be true: China's response to the Korean War, to the Sino-Indian border war, as well as to the Sino-Soviet border clash was not due, even in part, to its weakness but simply to the necessity of protecting its security and territorial integrity.

In the last chapter, Gurtov and Hwang conclude:

> Class struggle has ceased to be a major issue at home—indeed, class analysis has largely vanished, and Mao's foremost opponents of the past . . . have been rehabilitated. Many radical innovations of the Cultural Revolution period that relied on the spontaneity and enthusiasm of the masses have been abandoned or significantly revised. Abroad, China's efforts now center on the protection of state sovereignty against Soviet inroads, not on class contradictions or the seizure of power. . . . United-front politics are now "from above," as is true domestically. The front has come to include a new partner, the United States, on the basis that rivalry, not collusion, characterizes U.S.-Soviet relations" (p. 252).
>
> . . . The United States and Japan are looked upon as models of corporate efficiency and technological achievement (p. 253).

Although these statements come fairly close to describing China's present domestic and foreign policy, they are not accurate. China's domestic policy boils down to giving priority to socialist construction—i.e., the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. To ensure Taiwan's return to the motherland is also a major component of domestic policy now. As for China's foreign policy, it can be stated briefly as follows: to oppose hegemonism and defend world peace and, for this purpose, to unite with all countries of the world, including the United States; and in state-to-state relations, to adhere to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Such may be a more or less accurate summing up of China's present policy.

[2] Document of the XXV Congress of the CPSU. See A. Meliksetov, "Peking Threatens International Peace and Security," *International Affairs*, No. 3 (March 1981), 48.

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

THE DEFENSE POLICIES OF NATIONS

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

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

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

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